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Children's questions have been studied for a variety of purposes.
First, in an attempt to infer from them, the children's knowledge of
logical relations (Piaget, 1959) or to infer their ability to use questions
in solving problems of classification (Mosher and Hornsby, 1966).
Secondly, children's questions have been studied to determine the order
of acquisition of WH- terms (Ervin-Tripp, 1970; Tyack and Ingram, 1977;
Labov and Labov, 1978). Thirdly, there is the issue of pragmatics or how
children respond to, and use questions to construct and direct social
activities (Ervin-Tripp, 1977; Dore, 1977).
The focus of this thesis falls within the last perspective, although
it is not restricted to this. It is concerned with the use of questions
as a tool for inviting another mind to share, with the questioner, exper¬
iences, knowledge and orientations about the world in which both live.
The thesis is also concerned with the use of questions to argue, persuade,
reject and clarify meanings. In short, it deals with the relation between
questioning and understanding.
Our basic premise was that social activities become possible, partly
because participants actively try to make sense of each other's contribu¬
tions, aspirations and purposes in communication. They proceed to do so
by asking themselves, or their co-participants, questions (possibly in the
form of general propositions) concerning the inferences and interpretations
that their respective contributions would suggest. The participants make
the assumption that each is obliged to attend to questions, in order to
further the course of interaction and attain mutual understanding. In
other words, co-operation between co-participants in which questioning is
a powerful tool, is essential to human social activities.
The use to which 3-, and 5-year-old nursery school children put
questions in three different kinds of social activities, was explored. In
the first of these, a group of 21 children listened to stories read to them
by their teacher. It was hypothesized that the novelty of some items in
the stories would stimulate questions seeking clarification of intentions,
meaning of words, identification of actors, recipients of actions, location
of events, and so on. It was also expected that the children would
provide answers to questions for one another. The second activity in
which the children were engaged was one in which pairs of children were
given a puzzle-box task. One member of each pair hid some mutually-
(iii)
desirable objects (biscuits) in a box with a key. There were six boxes
differing in size and colour. Having hidden the biscuits in one of the
boxes, the hider then had to instruct his partner where to find them. It
was possible to retrieve the biscuits only through co-operation, that is,
through attending to the essential messages of one another. In the third
activity, a child was requested to describe one picture out of four to an
adult-listener sitting opposite him. The objects portrayed in the
pictures (cups) were distinguishable only by their spatial orientation,
i.e. by the position of the handle relative to the subjects. The listener
responded to the child's description by giving implicit information meant
to signal non-comprehension, that the message was not getting through to
him.
The findings in the story-telling situation suggest that children
asked questions to regulate interpersonal.relationships and to seek information.
The evidence procured for the latter function was tenuous mainly because the
sample of questions available was small. The meagre production of questions
was probably due to the size of the group of children. It was therefore
decided to contrive situations where pairs of children would work on tasks
designed to elicit a larger sample of information-seeking questions.
In the second task above (the 'hide-a-biscuit' situation), the
findings suggest that on a simple joint enterprise, older children were
more capable than the 3-year-olds, in teasing out the relevant aspects of
the task, and in focusing the attention of their partners on them. Older
subjects also demonstrated an awareness of the limitations of their
younger partners by asking simpler Yes/ltfo questions from them.
In the third situation, in which the child's description of cups was
given implicit feedback to signal non-comprehension, our findings suggest
that whereas both 3- and 5-year-old children interpreted both the verbal
and non-verbal implicit feedback as indications of a failure in their
descriptions, only the older children gave evidence of having asked them¬
selves why this was so.
It was concluded that although the 3-year-olds used questions to
initiate and sustain social interactions, with a view to gaining more and
more understanding of their world, this skill was best employed in the
more natural situation of story-telling. It was argued that the young
children's performance resulted from the freedom they enjoyed in asking
about whatever topic they found surprising, novel or interesting. In
contrast, they did not spontaneously ask questions in the second and third
(iv)
contexts. It was argued that in a task set and defined by another, it
takes initiative and some confidence to ask questions about it. This,
coupled with a lack of group support such as they had in the story-telling
context may have been responsible for the poor performance of the young
children. In contrast, the 5-year-olds were able to employ their
questioning skills with more flexibility and control, in all three
situations. It was argued that they realised, more than the younger
children, the reciprocity of the relationship between co-participants, and
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This thesis is about the role of questions in the communication of
nursery school children. Specifically, it is concerned with the
issue of the relation between questions and understanding. The
treatment of this relation will necessitate a consideration of the
motive-structure underlying the act of question asking, a description
of the bond between a questioner and an answerer, as well as the
procedures whereby this bond is maintained, especially with regard to
the satisfaction of the questioner's motive. It is hoped that the
treatment will shed some useful light on a set of assumptions that we
feel people make among others, when they interact socially. These
assumptions sire as follows:
(a) That participants in interaction engage in an active
search for meaning and understanding.
(b) This search often proceeds in a rational manner
in the sense that 'appropriate' means for achieving
the goal, of interaction (understanding) axe
employed. These involve the making of interpreta¬
tions and inferences.
and (c) The conduct of this search is governed by social
prescriptions to which participsmts are mutually
expected to subscribe.
Question-asking would seem to be a device whose role in the
communication of pre-school children rests firmly on the above
assumptions. That is, a question can be used to function as a
collaborative and rational tool for understanding the child's
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universe. This is not to say that questions cannot be used for
purposes other than the one stated, nor that question-asking is the
only communicative device that is rational and co-operative. The
argument is that to make sense of how children achieve mutual under¬
standing of each other's intentions about events in the world,
assumptions a - c appear a priori to be necessary. And question-
asking seems an obvious choice in an inquiry into how understanding
is sought and obtained in communication. But how axe questions to be
recognised?
In the grammatical treatment of interrogatives, two types of
questions are recognised, the Xes/fao and the WH-questions. The former
requires 'yes' or 'no' answers and the latter type of questions
contains 'wh-' words. In traditional grammatical treatment, both are
considered to owe their interrogative status to a set of four trans¬
formations of the declarative base structure sentences. These
transformations are: Inversion, wh- Fronting, do- Replacement and do-
Deletion. This is summarised thus:
"The first (ie. Inversion) captures the generalization that
the sequence of verbal elements in questions is identical
to that in declarative sentences, the only difference being
that in the former case part of the verbal sequence appears
before the subject NP. The second captures the general¬
ization that the wh- word appears in sentence-initial
position regardless of its syntactic function in the
sentence. The last two transformations are required to
account for the distribution of 'do' in questions and in
declaratives." (Culicover, 1976: p. 85)
This approach to question identification, though useful in formal
linguistic analysis, is inadequate to cope with the problem of the
psychological recognition of questions. There are several reasons
why this is so. Firstly, it posits that questions are derived from
declaratives. This assumes that developmentally, question-production
should follow the acquisition of declarative sentences. Studies of
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language development do not bear this out. In fact, interrogative
forms appear alongside declaratives, though in a smaller proportion.
(Smith, 1933; McCarthy, 1930; Stern, 1924-; McShane, unpublished.)
Secondly, it does not account for the use of non-linguistic
features in indirect question-sentences, eg. a rising intonation on
the declarative "You are washing" may turn it into a question. Neither
does it account for what constitutes a functionally appropriate
response to a question. For example, can the sentence "I wonder if
it has any meaning" be said to be a question? And when is the sentence
of the sort, "Could you please pass the salt?" to be taken literally as
a question in which case the answer "Yes" would be appropriate, and
when is it to be regarded as a request to which a mere "Yes" would be in¬
appropriate. Clark (1979) has described six sources of information
that are used in deciding whether such sentences as above are intended
literally or seriously as a request. These sources divide into two
main kinds - one, based on linguistic properties of the sentence itself
(e.g. the use of special markers like 'please', conventionality of form
and means, and transparency of indirect meaning). The other consists
of the expectations prevailing in virtue of the context in which the
sentence is uttered (e.g. the speaker's imputed plans and goals, and the
implausibility of the literal meaning)•
Thirdly, the scheme offers no prescription for identifying implicit
non-verbal signals like the raising of the brows which may, and does,
function as a question in certain contexts.
In order to define questions, one must separate functions from
their linguistic forms, since, as shown briefly above, there is no
direct one-to-one relationship between the two. This distinction has
been accomplished with some success by Speech Act theorists such as
Austin (1962) and Searle (1969). They distinguished between the
/
referential or propositions! function of a message and its performative
function. The former corresponds to the denotative or "report"
aspect of a message (Watzlawick Beavin and Jackson, 1968), whereas the
performative function corresponds to the effect the message carries -
the "command" aspect,to use the terminology of Watzlawick et al. The
propositions! content is further thought to have an illocutionary
force, defined in terms of the- speaker's intention as well as a
perlocutionary force construed in terms of the effect it has on the
addressee. Because this approach promises to relate the formal
properties of language to its function, the speech act theory has been
used to treat the problems of meaning and intention in communication
analysis. Robinson and Rackstraw (1972) used it to analyse the
relations between the form and function of questions which they defined
thus:
"Questioning is a behavioural activity manifestly related
to the acquisition of knowledge. The existence of the
possibility of questioning seems to depend upon two
conditions:
1. A gap in a framework of knowledge or belief, and
2. The availability of alternatives for filling
that gap.
1. Regardless of whether the answer is already
known to the questioner or not, the possibility
of questioning requires that he has (a) a frame¬
work of knowledge and belief, and (b) either has
a gap in this framework or can conceive of one.
The parameters of a particular framework are
defined by a questioner when he specifies the
size and function of the gap.
2. The second prerequisite of questioning is that
of holding a set of possible ideas as answers
not all of which empirically are, or even
logically could be, true. A question is posed
signifying a gap (l) which may be filled by
one or more from a set of possible entries.
If the questioning person could not conceive of
the possibility of an entry different from that
presently given, there could not be a question.
This is not to say that the alternative can be
specified, but only that any present entry is
capable of being denied" (pp.16-17).
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We adopt this definition in this thesis even though it is
recognised that it does not cater for various other functions that
questions can be made to serve. Restricted as the adopted definition
appears, we would like to claim that in using questions to satisfy the
motive-structure of the self through an attempt to fill gaps in the
knowledge system of the questioner, it allows at the same time, for some
other functions like seeking and maintaining the attention of others,
controlling and regulating the actions and behaviours of other persons.
We shall return to the issue of the promise of the speech act
theory in relating the form and functions of questions in our review
of the literature (this Chapter). We shall also give a more detailed
account of the recognition of questions in Chapter 3 when we come to
offer a category system based on the referential functions of questions.
For the moment, it may be sufficient to reiterate that the major concern
of this thesis is to clarify the relation between questioning and
understanding. Another concern is to delineate the role questioning
plays for children in their pursuit of understanding and meanings of
events in their world.
Now, there is a related issue of how question-asking ability develops.
Although we shall not be directly concerned with this problem, it may
be profitable to give a brief account of current ideas and conjectures.
An examination of caretaker speech to infants has shown that it is
characterised by syntactically simple statements which tend to be short
and repetitive (Snow, 1972). These statements are frequently of the
interrogative form (McShane, unpublished; Ervin-Tripp, 1977). In
talking to infants and pre-verbal children, caretakers impute meanings
and intentions to their actions and vocalizations, even though these
infant behaviours are largely unclear and unintelligible (Ryan, 1971).
Since questions constitute a large part of such caretaker speech, the
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functional significance they may have for both participants becomes an
issue. Why do they use the interrogative when they cannot possibly
expect a meaningful response? In fact, initially, the caretakers
supply answers to their own questions. No doubt, the caretakers believe
questioning to be a useful strategy for initiating and sustaining this
apparent one-way conversation.
Trevarthen (1979) believes that not only do many of the vocal and
non-vocal acts of infants have perfectly clear motives, but also they
constitute appropriate responses to the non-linguistic aspects of their
mothers' questions. Furthermore, he believes that the most important
communicative function of questions is to acknowledge and deliberately
seek to understand the motive, experiences, interests, intentions, etc.
of another. This is why they are used even with infants. Another
reason which has been suggested for the frequent use of questions by
caretakers, is to "teach" the infants the fundamentals of conversational
exchange, that is, reciprocation of action or turn-taking. Question¬
ing, as an activity that demands answering, thus becomes a prime device
to be used in establishing the basis for turn-taking. This suggestion
has been backed up with some interesting observations. Snow (1977)
has shown that mothers' speech to infants is at first about the infantb
basic body needs like hunger, (Are you hungry?) and fatigue, (You're
bored aren't you?), etc. When the baby is about seven months old, the
mother' speech changes from concern for bodily needs to a presumed
interest in objects and things in the infant's environment. The
infant's vocalizations, arm-movements, visual regards, etc. are taken
both as responses to questions and as cues for his desires and wants.
"What is it you're looking at?" is a typical question at this stage.
"Ohl you want X" would be a usual remark to the infant's vocal, but
non-linguistic, response to the mother's question. "X" may then be
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brought for him to play with. Similar patterns of change have been
observed by Sylvester-Bradley (forthcoming). Other changes have been
recorded in caretaker speech to young children indicating the use of
"training" questions as a device to help them acquire the ability to
answer those questions later.
At about the age of 2 years, the dominant caretaker questions are
"what-is", "what-object", "where", and "what-doing". Some question
forms are not used at all at this stage, e.g. "which", "why", "when"
and "who-object". As the child grows, some question-forms are used
by its mother with increasing frequency while some start to appear.
In short, caretakers appear to consider the difficulty level of
questions in using them to talk to children (Ervin-Tripp and Miller,
1977)• Could it be that caretakers use linguistically age-appropriate
frames for the questions they direct to children perhaps because they
know which question-forms are heuristically useful at each age? This
suggestion is plausible, especially with the observation that mothers
use gestures to augment their question-directives to young children
(MacNamara, 1972). The pointing that accompanies "what's that?
It's a ball" directs the child's attention to the relations between
the ball as an answer predicated on the linguistic question form
"what is ...." One would not expect a temporal question such as
"When is ...." to achieve understanding with the aid of gestures simply
because the "object" to which time refers cannot be pointed at for the
child.
From the above, two consequences appear to follow from the high
frequency of questions in mothers' speech 'bo infants.
1. Infants become increasingly sensitive and responsive to their
mother's questions which acknowledge, follow and vindicate the motives
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of the infants, as do the exclamatory and non-verbal questioning acts
of infants for the mothers® motives.
2. This mutual responsiveness to questions and other forms of
address and invitation expands the framework for the sharing and
negotiation of meanings and knowledge.
We turn now from the issue of the assumed role of caretaker speech
on children's comprehension of question-answer relation, to another
aspect of questioning - production of questions. It has been shown
that pre-school children not only hold 'collective monologues' (Piaget,
1959)> but also hold coherent conversations during play activities
(Garvey, 1971).
Piaget (1959) in his analysis of children's verbal exchanges made
insightful observations on the quantity and quality of coherent
dialogue and information exchange among children and between children
and adults. We shall dwell briefly on two of such observations that
are relevant to this thesis. These are:
1. The age of the listener in relation to the child's
egocentrism,
and 2. The role of questions in relation to the waning of egocentric
thought. At the age of three years and up until the age of 1 years,
children engage less in dialogues and give less information to adults
than to other children.
".... between 3;1 and 3;4 dialogue with children is 23$ as
against 16$ with the adult, which is to be expected as the
co-efficient of egocentrism at this age is 71$ with the
adult and 56$ with children. But, at the end of the year
(3;11 - 4;l) when the co-efficients of egocentrism with the
adult and with children have become practically equal (4-3.5
and 46$), dialogue is found to represent only 14$ of speech
with the adult whereas it rises to 35% with childrenl At
the end of the year, dialogue with children is therefore
nearly twice as important as dialogue with the adult.
This point is significant and we must try to work out the
reason for this." (p. 245)
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Piaget further observed that not only are child-ohild dialogues
more numerous, but also that they are "of a more evolved type" which
constitute an initial attempt to construct and contract a dialogic
exchange "in which statements are no longer merely static or descript¬
ive, but form part of discussions or of active collaboration
(p. 24.6). The reason why this happens more with children than with
adults is because unlike the adult, who is seen as an authority and
all-knowing figure, the different and conflicting viewpoints of other
children in a dialogue can be contributed to. At the very least,
attempts can be made in this direction# However, such attempts
insofar as they did not lead to mutual understanding, failed to
convince Piaget that they were true dialogue contributions based on
reciprocation and negotiation. This is not to say that Piaget
completely discounted co-operative attempts to satisfy each other's
needs and reach understanding in discussion, only that cognitive
egocentrism to the extent that it still existed, disallowed the success¬
ful realisations of such co-operative efforts.
Piaget's second observation concerns the functions of questions,
and its relation to the concept of egocentrism in the conversations
among children and between children and adults. Piaget noted that
during each successive pre-school year, the proportion of questions
to adults contain a high proportion of queries about causality and
explanation, whereas questions to children relate largely to "daily
and immediate activity and not to problems involving theoretical
explanation" (p. 249)•
It would thus seem that children are aware of the differential
benefits from these two sources of knowledge, strive to exploit them
through the use of questioning, but are let down by the weight of their
egocentric burden. Blank and Allen (1976) noted that the early
appearance in children's speech of these causally-related questions
pose some problems. For one, such questions ask about objects, and
events that are not immediately present. Secondly, they are produced
long before it can be said that children understand them. Blank and
Allen studied the development of "Why" questions as an example of a
causally-related question-category and identified three age-related
strategies of usage. The first is characterised by avoidance - the
child simply avoids attending to the "why" questions of others. The
second strategy is to treat "why-" as though they are "what" or "where"
questions - that is, as identification questions. The third strategy
approximates to the adult's treatment - that is, "why" questions are
now given causal answers, characterised by the use of "Because ....".
They concluded that children's early production of "why" questions are
based on inappropriate assumptions of usage. Be that as it may, we
still have the fact of early production of questions (of which causal
ones are only a part) unexplained. Why do children ask questions and
why are the specialised "why" questions directed mainly at adults?
What can we learn from children's causal and non-causal questions about
their motives and their present understanding of social relations?
Garvey's study of "the contingent query" in the conversation of
pre-school children indicated that they employ query-forms in ways that
are pragmatic and appropriate. In so doing, they reveal their knowledge
of the structure of a coherent discourse. She (Garvey, 1977) classified
queries into two types, the solicited and the unsolicited queries. The
former is defined as that which follows "on a speech act that has at its
intended perlocutionary effect (IPS) just the elicitation of the query".
The latter is that which follows "on a speech act that has some intended
effect other than the elicitation of the query". She found that
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solicited queries were used to promote mutual attention and initiate
sympathetic relationship whilst unsolicited queries were used to
achieve mutual understanding of intentions# Unsolicited queries were
so powerful that they succeeded in eliciting their IPEs 80-85% of the
time# Garvey concluded that the children's competence in the produc¬
tion and fulfilment of these two types of queries as "dependent acts
in conversation" evince an understanding of the structure of discourse.
It should be made clear that she regarded as dependent (and therefore,
appropriate) acts, not only successful understanding of, and responses
to intended acts, but also evidence suggesting that attempts are being
made in this direction# This is an important criterial departure
from Piaget's definition of appropriate responses to questions which
is stringently set on success#
"Obviously, these discussions between children are still
strangely 'primitive'. Sometimes the questioners are
not speaking about the same thing. Sometimes their
knowledge of the terms of relationship is not sufficient
to establish reciprocity in points of view, sometimes
they have different numbering-systerns. But, functionally
the usefulness of these exchanges cannot be overestimated
just because they show an effort towards mutual' under¬
standing and the sharing of viewpoints. Thus, if there
is still egocentrism structurally, co-operation is already
present functionally". (Piaget, 1959s PP« 24.7-2.48).
The differences in the studies cited above not withstanding, it
is clear, that question-asking and by implication question-answering
must play a fundamental part in how children acquire or develop their
world view. Although we shall have very little to say about the
development of questioning per se, an excursion into how they are used,
together with a description of the conversational environment that
promotes their use, may illumine some areas of psychological function¬
ing in the child. For example, it may be of value in Piagetian
research because questions may be thought of as expressions of an
intention or motive to resolve conflicting viewpoints arising from
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problem-solving situations or communication contexts. It would be
interesting to speculate on whether question-asking children who
receive answers and those that do not, would differ from one another
in planning their own "moves" or turns to accommodate the view of their
partners.
In researching into the postulates of the Speech Act theory,
questioning may be thought of as a speech act. It would be interesting
to explore how the intentions underlying such acts are realised and
satisfied. In fact, one of the proponents of the theory (Grice, 1967)
has put forward a condition which is regarded as a sine qua non for the
performance and realisation of speech acts. This condition, called
the GO-OPERATIVE PRINCIPLE allows the subjective nature of knowledge
about the world, and intentions based on such knowledge to be shared
and communicated according to a common set of expectations. We shall
now take an excursion into the literature to see what the various
approaches have been on the issue of the motivation for understanding,
the expression of such motives and how they are achieved.
THE SPEECH ACT THEORY - its contribution to the theory of understanding.
We find two concepts fundamental to the theory^ of the speech act,
particularly attractive in our attempt to develop the idea that
questioning, as a psychological activity, constitutes the kernel of a
1. We recognise that the theory of speech acts does not fully
resolve the problem of how and with what interactive constructs mutual
understandings are achieved. The notion of conversational impli-
cature (as inferential and interpreting tools), and the environment
of co-operation that nourishes it, were borrowed from Grice and they
help only partially in explaining the thorny issue of how speakers
derive the illocutionary force of the proposition in an utterance
that permits more than one meaning. We are suggesting that, in
addition to the interactive methods of inference and interpreting,
there is that of QUESTIONING, which we characterise as epistemic and
whose function is to allow speakers to ask for explicit illocutionary-
force-indicators or a ratification of the one assumed to be in
operation. As a construct it can take any form, (verbal or non-verbal)•
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unique socio-cognitive bond, the analysis of which is likely to be
instructive in our understanding of social structures, communication
processes and acquisition of knowledge. One of these concepts is
embodied in the Gricean Co-operative Principle. The other is
encapsulated in the relation between the three componential aspects
of a speech act - locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts
(Austin, 1962).
Austin developed the idea that language is used in communication
to refer to things as well as to do things. The first function,
referential, he labelled the "locutionary act" and the other the
"performative act". Locutionary acts are characterised by their
being testable on a factual criterion. That is, the locutionary
function of an utterance can be identified simply by asking if its true
or false.
E.g. "John is crying" is verifiable by asking if it's true that
John is crying.
Performative acts are those which describe the effects they have,
and these are not identifiable by appealing to their truthfulness or
falsehood. Two types of performatives were distinguished. There are
those governed by explicit linguistic and or non-linguistic conventions.
These, by definition, take unambiguous meanings if employed within the
framework established by tradition.
The linguistic conventions pertaining to the marriage ceremony
are, for example, clear and predictable:
Ql "Do you take this woman •••• to be your wife?"
A: "I do."
Notice that no other answer, however, linguistically equivalent to
A, is considered appropriate in this setting. The non-linguistic
conventions regarding the procedure for standing, procuring the ring,
etc. axe also clear and unequivocal. Performatives of this type are
conventional or ritualised. The other type of Performative acts, the
so-called non-conventional, derives its name from the fact that its
form cannot be predetermined linguistically or non-linguistically. The
-acts of promising or warning, for example, can be performed by anybody,
anywhere and in a great variety of forms. Consider utterances (a) and
(b):
(a) "There is a bull in the field"
(b) "I warn you that there is a bull in the field"
Now (a) and (b) can both be taken as acts of warning although only
in (b) is the act semantically explicit and unambiguous. But not all
speech acts can be expanded into their explicit forms as in the case of
(a) to (b). How then are such performatives recognised and categorised
by the hearer? Austin distinguished three components of the speech
act to deal with this problem:
1. Locution or the act of saying something,
2. Illocution or the act performed by saying something,
and 3. Perlocution or the intended consequence or effect of
saying something in a particular manner.
Thus, for utterances to cohere, that is, for them to constitute a
conversation, they must be related on the basis of locution (reference)
illocution (intention, beliefs, expectations, etc.) and ^erlocution
(compliance, obedience, understanding, etc.). The relations between
these three components are extremely complex and interesting. But
there are certain difficulties. For example, what is it in a speech
act that guarantees its achieving its intended consequence? In order
to cope with this question, Austin refined his characterisation of the
Perlocutionary act into those which attain accidental or unintended
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secondary effects (sequels) and those whose primary intended effects
are realised. Of course, one act can have both effects. Another
problem concerns the locutionary and the illocutionary acts. How are
ambiguous or unintended acts resolved? He argued that the speaker has
control over the lexicon and other linguistic entities which constitute
his locutionary acts and this ought to guarantee or secure an "uptake"
of his intentions, by the listener. But, unfortunately, this does not
solve the problem. For one, control is a matter of degree that must
relate to the speaker's linguistic knowledge as well as to his prior
experience of language usage in similar communication context.
Secondly, even if it were a matter of control, the listener's maximum
uptake could still not be secured because his capacities to comprehend,
infer and interpret illocutionary intent from locutionary acts, could
not be within the province of the speaker to control. On'this, Brown
(1958) has remarked, a word can have more than one reference and a
reference codified in more than one word. Also, the communicative
intent underlying the choice of a word in an utterance can deviate from
normal use as is the case in stylistics, jokes, metaphors, etc.
In any case, the role of control in the choice of lexicons has yet
to be demonstrated.
Austin concentrated his analysis of speech acts on conventional
performatives. Searle (1969) extended this analysis to cover non-
conventional performatives of the explicit type. Explicit performatives
contain illocutionary-force-indicating-devices (Ifid) but the non-
explicit type are primary, that is, they lack Ifids, although some can
be translated into their explicit forms by prefixing them with Ifids.
He has recently (Searle, 1975) tried to generalise his analysis of
explicit non-conventional performatives to explain primary performatives
which he labelled indirect speech acts. But we shall come to this
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later on.
Searle took Austin's dichotomy of locutionary and performative
acts and refined it. The locutionary act according to him is not just
composed of a sense and reference but has a modality or a 'function
indicating device' which marks its illocutionary force. The modality
or devices which function as such include stress, intonation, word-order,
mood of verbs, hesitations, etc. Now, taking the illocutionary act
"I promise ..." as a prototype of explicit performatives, he was
concerned to establish the conditions that are necessary in order for it
to achieve the illocutionary effect it is meant to have, that is, to







- the hearer H is to do the future act A
- H is able to do A
- the speaker S believes that H can do A
- it is not obvious to both S and H that
H will do A without the request,
promise, etc.
- S wants H to do A
- the promisive, requestive, etc.
utterance counts as an attempt to get
H to do A.
These conditions are premised on Searle's conceptualisation of
illocutionary force as something that is determined by both the
speaker and listener and not just what the speaker intended, as
suggested by Austin. Thus, to issue a request successfully, it must
be understood that the listener is to meet the request, that he is able
to and would not do so otherwise, that he is really required to and the
issuing of the request amounts to an attempt to get him to meet it.
Thus far, two broad kinds of knowledge have been suggested by the speech
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act theory as necessary for understanding the meaning of utterances:
1. Knowledge (and control) of grammar and
2. Knowledge of the conventions governing the locutionary/
illocutionary/perlocutionary acts.
But there is a problem mentioned earlier on, concerning how these
two forms of knowledge relate in natural conversation. Suppose a
speaker wants to issue a request for salt whilst at table.
Suppose he knows the following grammatical forms:
(a) "Can you pass the salt?"
(b) "There is not much salt in this food"
(c) "Pass the salt?"
(d) "Can I ask you to pass the salt?"
Suppose he chooses (a), which, grammatically, is an interrogative.
How does the listener decide whether the speaker intends (a) as a question
or as a request? Searle (1975) called utterances of this kind
"Indirect speech acts", and in order to deal with the problem raised by
them, used the concept of co-operation.
"In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the
hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their
mutually shared background information, both linguistic and
non-linguistic, together with the general powers of
rationality and inference on the part of the hearer. To
be more specific, the apparatus necessary to explain the
indirect part of indirect speech acts includes a theory of
speech acts, certain general principles of co-operative
conversation and mutually shared factual background
information of the speaker and the hearer, together with an
ability on the part of the hearer to make inferences", (p. 60)
Grice (1967) stated the general Principle of co-operation under¬
lying the conduct of conversation as follows:
"Make your conversational contribution such as is required,
at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose
or direction of the talk exchange in which you are
engaged", (p. 4.5)
In other words, the Principle obliges conversationalists to
arrange their contributions in such a way that they share common goals
and purposes in order to come to an understanding of each other's
intentions. In doing this, Grice suggested that speakers and hearers
observe and assume that the contribution of each is governed by the
following maxims:
MaTrims Dictates
Quantity - Make your contribution as informative
as is required for the current purpose
of the talk exchange
Quality - Do not say that for which you lack
adequate evidence, i.e. that which you
believe to be false
Relation - Be relevant
Manner - This relates simply to perspicuity.





Now, it is not always possible or even desirable, to adhere to
the maxims. Some are violated and, indeed, deliberately exploited
as when one issues an understatement or a metaphor. In such cases,
the non-literal meaning is derived by assuming the following:
1, That the semantic content expressed in the proposition is
not part of the semantic intent underlying the speaker's utterance,
2, That what is meant non-literal],y is derivable by assuming
that the issuing of an indirect speech act is governed by the
co-operative principle and its maxims. Consider this example from
Searle, It is about two students, X and Y:
X: "Let's go to the movies tonight,"
Y: "I have to study for an exam,"
If the utterance of X is taken by Y to be a proposal, Y's
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utterance would be regarded by X as having a "Primary illocutionary
force" as well as a "secondary" one. The latter concerns what Y
intends to do about a forthcoming exam, which implicates the former -
the primary effect that amounts to a rejection of X's proposal.
Searle's recognition of the illocutionary effect as a product of
the listener's inference and his adoption of the co-operative framework
as a structure within which a speaker and listener strike a chord of
understanding represents a significant contribution to the speech act
theory.
Criticism of the Speech Act Theory
Although there is nothing in. the theory of the speech act that
rules out the use of non-verbal signals as determinants of illocutionary
forces (Lyons, 1977), much of its data base has been linguistic. It
is true that some of the modality component of the speech act are non-
linguistic, e.g. intonation, stress, etc. and these are taken to con¬
tribute to the force (intended meaning) of the illocutionary act.
But these are vocal features of linguistic entities. What about
non-vocal signals? Surely these are important aspects of human
communication, as shown by Abercrombie (1968). Non-verbal features of
communication represents a large area of behaviour spanning facial
expressions, postures, orientation, nods, gaze, intonation, stress,
gestures, etc. The importance of the role they play has been stressed
by Argyle and his associates (1970) and Ekman and Friesen (1975). And
they have been employed as useful guides to the understanding and
expansion of the meanings and intention of children's holophratic
communications (Greenfield and Smith, 1976; Brown, 1973).
The relevance they can have in determining the meaning of an act
can be demonstrated quite simply by noting that a head-shake or a nod
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can functionally replace 'no' and 'yes' in conversation. Our interest
in them, however, shall be restricted to those which are functionally
equivalent to the verbal act of questioning, as for example, a
quizzical look and a worried expression following a piece of
information.
The theory does explain how illocutionary forces are recognised by
appealing to the co-operative context of conversation. This we find
attractive but inadequate, because it does not specify how and with
what tool this co-operative framework is 'worked'. We would like to
suggest that an inferential behaviour such as the one that allows
speakers to realise connectedness in their utterances must be preceded
by a quest or motive for understanding.
This motive may express itself in a verbal or non-verbal question-
form, and it is this that constitutes the basic tool for exploiting
the co-operative context of conversation. The search for understanding,
truth, progress, etc. implies a fundamental quest. The environment
that best satisfies this quest is a co-operative one.
Co-operation as a Consequence of Cognition
Piaget (1959) placed the development of the language and thought
of the child within the psychological framework of co-operation.
According to him, co-operation is made possible by two distinct, yet
related changes at two levels. First at the intra-individual level,
the child undergoes certain necessary cognitive changes which essentially
are the co-ordination of his own actions in relation to objects. This
co-ordination of actions on objects yields mental operations which
have the property of reversibility. This quality permits:
(a) a return to the starting point,
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(b) changes in direction,
and (c) a combination of pairs (transitivity).
These operations, according to Piaget, must be prior to and indeed
usher in the changes which are to occur at the other level of mental
activity - the plane of inter-individual actions. Here, the co¬
ordination of actions yields reciprocal mental operations which can then
be used in meaningful co-operative relations with other persons for:
"Obviously the individual could not act with any logical
sequence without taking the actions of others into
account" (p0 281).
Piaget characterised co-operation as the inter-individual
reciprocation of mental operations. But, if there are these two levels
of mental functioning, the objective dealing with mental actions on
objects, and the subjective dealing with the inter-personal or social,
the question arises as to the relationship between these two, with
particular respect to language use. The development of language-use
for purposes of communication and co-operation is intricately related to
the waning of the child's egocentricity. For Piaget, egocentrism is
more or less a unitary concept pervading the under-eight year old's
actions on both the physical and the social plane as the following quote
attests.
"Generally speaking, intellectual and social forms of ego¬
centrism are one and the same thing, because both are linked
at their source to the conditions of initial activity and
both vanish in correlation with one and the same factor;
gradual co-ordination of actions, which is the common root
both of the systematic operation of reason and of inter-
individual co-operation, or the system of communal activities"
(p.278).
Perhaps the "conditions of initial activity" in the quote refers
to the initial quality of the child's adaptive process of assimilation
and accommodation. These are the processes by which the child adapts
to various aspects of his environment. That the development of
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co-operation is tied to the underlying processes of intellectual growth
certifies at least one thing - that co-operation proper is seen as a
consequence of cognition in the sense that the child's egocentric thought
must subside before he can be able to enter into co-operative relations.
But how does egocentrism decline? What motivates or 'causes' the
decline of cognitive egocentrism on which co-operation depends?
Piaget hypothesises a state of cognitive readiness that responds to a
perceived pertubation or conflict in the child's environment. For
example, an infant has a set of cognitive structures characterised by
sucking, grasping, etc. These structures are used to construct his
environment as being suckable, graspable, etc. His world, at this
'stage' of development is therefore limited to objects that can be
assimilated through sucking and grasping - these then make possible
the enlargement and differentiation of his already existing structures
(Schemata). That is, his schemata become accommodated to these new
objects. But, sooner or later, the child runs into the "resistance
of objects to assimilation". A conflict ensues which perturbs his
present schemata arrangements. This stage of disequilibrium engenders
and forces a re-organisation of the child's schema system to deal with
the disturbance. The process of development thus "consists of
reactions of compensations to perturbation (relative to previous
schemas) which make necessary a variation of the initial schemas".
But what is perturbation and what is its source? During the
process of perturbation, what makes one set of solutions more probable
and acceptable than another? What constraints the choice that has to
be made? Piaget has not seriously addressed himself to these
questions, but, fortunately, some of his competent disciplies have.
For example, Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet (197A), took Piaget's notion
of conflict and tested its role in the progress from one stage of
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development to another.
They showed that children who were just about to conserve, i.e.
children in whom a cognitive readiness to compensate could be said to
exist, profited more than children who were not in transit, if they
were given conservation problems in which they were asked to predict
the outcome of some transformations and then shown that their predic¬
tion was wrong. Indeed, the authors stated the problem thus:
"The problem is .... to determine which psychological
mechanism is responsible for the progressive improvements
in the successive forms of equilibrium, improvements and
perfections that Piaget refers to today as equilibration
majorante - 'heightening equilibrium'. The'source of the
progress is to be sought in the disequilibrium which
incites the subject to go beyond his present state of
search of new solutions. But, as this motive cannot, in
itself be sufficient to explain the construction of
novelties, we must try to analyse the actual formation
process, which is revealed in the attempts the child makes
to find a new equilibrium and which progressively lead him
to go beyond the former limits of his knowledge", (p. 264-)
Inhelder and her associates observed and noted the children's
reactions when their predictions were violated:
"The children's amazement is often expressed in their
exclamations: 'Ohl how come? - I don't get it.' They
appear astonished and intrigued. This 'surprise' element
can be introduced into training procedures in more varied
situation, and in a more rapid succession than the child
is likely to encounter in his usual occupations. It
induces the need to take account of al 1 aspects of a
problem, and to question first impressions and outward
appearances. However, .... the 'surprise' element has
no effect if the child does not yet posess the cognitive
equipment which enables him to fit the unforeseen phenomena
into a deductive or inferential framework" (p. 267).
These workers appear to have momentarily grasped what for us is
the fundamental motive-structure for development - the child's quest or
search as revealed in the children's question in the above quote -
'Ohj how come? - I don't get it'. But they seemed to lose their grip
on it when they fell back on the cognitive-equipment explanation to
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account for the zero effect of the conflict environment on some of the
children. We should like to suggest that the child who asks questions
may, in fact, be cognitively ready whether we diagnose him as such or
not. The act of question-asking may be an expression of his intention
to cope with his ever-changing world and indeed be:
1. Either an invitation to solicit the co-operative assistance
of others in finding a solution/answer, etc. to his problem.
and 2. A guide to his own re-thinking about the problem.
Our position on the relation between co-operation and cognitive
development is this. We accept that a situation of conflict, surprise
or incongruity may orient the child toward a search for resolution,
but we cannot define a priori for the child, that which constitutes a
conflict. Nor can we usefully rely on the errors he makes when we
ask him to justify his judgments or reasoning on the tests we set him.
On the contrary, we ought to let him tell us through his spontaneous
questions and seize on such queries as requests for a co-operative
venture. It is within this co-operative framework that we think it is
viable to explore the child's growing understanding and knowledge of
the inter-subjective world.
From this perspective,cognitive development becomes a conse¬
quence rather than an antecedent of co-operative or communal activities.
To rely only on the child's mistakes in his answers to the questions
we pose for him on our tests is perhaps risky methodologically, for we
do not know what his attitudes are, to such questions. Neither do we
know fully how he processes such questions. Studies about children's
comprehension of some relational terms like "All", "More", "Some"
which feature in some of our questions to children indicate that their
understanding of such terms may be very different from the adults'
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(Donaldson and Wales, 1970; Donaldson and Balfour, 1968; Donaldson
and Lloyd, 1974.; Donaldson and McGarrigle, 1974).
For a child, much of his knowledge and understanding is mediated
by the actions of other children and adults in his world. He must
therefore, very early in life, recognise potential sources of knowledge
distinct from the self and develop skills of invitation, address,
request and questioning in order to solicit the help and co-operation
of others in his pursuit of meaning. Adults in naturalistic setting
have been observed to volunteer their co-operation by drawing children's
attention to areas of inconsistency and conflict. We should quote
from Isaacs (1933) to emphasise the contrast and similarity of approach
between her and Inhelder et al.
"Without the enlarged vision which the adult can bring them,
such young children (3 ; 5) rarely achieve (a) reciprocal
imagination; but when she lends them her eyes, they
respond to the new point of view surprisingly often.
"Dan again gives us ready instance of this, when the
children were taking turns at opening and shutting the
skylight window with a rope. When Dan (3 ; 5) had had
his turn, he insisted on holding the end of the rope while
Tommy was using it. Tommy asked him to let go, but at
first Dan would not. Mrs I» asked him 'If you were doing
it, would you want Tommy to hold the rope?' He replied
'No' and let it go ....". (p. 275).
Here, in contrast to the Inhelder study, it is the adult who
remarked on the 'conflict'. It is quite possible that the child did
not perceive the conflict until his attention was drawn to it. It
is also possible that the adult's intervention had a directive function
which guided him to recognise the point of view of Tommy. It is also
noteworthy that the adult chose to intervene by posing a question.
In fact, we examined all of Isaacs' examples of such intervention and
found that they were of an interrogative formi
We hope that we have succeeded in arguing a case for the study of
26
children's questions as an important expression of a fundamental
motive to seek understanding within the framework of co-operation.
Go-operation and language Development
Speech, it has been said, has one objective function that it
performs in human life. It "is the great medium through which human
co-operation is brought about. It is the means by which the diverse
activities of men are co-ordinated and correlated with each other for
the attainment of common and reciprocal ends.
Men do not speak simply to relieve their feelings to air their
views, but to awaken a response in their fellows and to influence
their attitudes and acts". (deLaguna, 1927: p. 19) • If human co¬
operation is served via the medium of speech, might it not itself
develop within this medium? The view of Macnamara (1972) bears on
this question. He suggested that "infants learn their language by-
first determining, independent of language, the meaning which a
speaker intends to convey to them, and then working out the relation¬
ship between the meaning and the language" (p. 1) and continuing, he
claims that "It seems clear that there must be a set of universal signs
of face, physical gesture, and bodily movement which the child interprets
correctly and thus among other things, comes to distinguish among speech
acts" (p. 8). The position taken in this thesis is that "working out
the relationship between the meaning and the language" for the child,
entails an inferential as well as a negotiation process. The child
draws inferences on the basis of what is made available by the environ¬
ment, including the perception of what others are doing. In the case
of utterances (statements about states-of-affairs, requests to do or
not to do something, questions about the child or his actions), the
adult's linguistic structure is frequently accompanied by non-linguistic
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aids such as gaze, smiles, rising intonation, pointing and various
other facial and bodily expressions. This rich and redundant environ¬
ment allows inferences about meanings to be drawn. Of course, the
child's judgements may be in error.
The occurrence of errors may set in motion the process of
exploration whereby the pre-linguistic child may frown, appear
confused, hesitate, or perhaps stop the flow of interaction by doing
something apparently unconnected with the 'topic' at hand. The
linguistic child on the other hand, while he may ask a question, may
also frown or look worried, etc. In both cases, the co-actor (Adult
or Caretaker) is thereby invited to re-examine his own earlier contri¬
bution with a view to effecting clarity or understanding of what was
meant. So far, two important points which have been raised are these:
1. An inferential process that allows the child to get from
the meaning and context to the language, and
2. The existence of a joint and co-operative relationship
between the child and his caretaker that permits a correction of
errors and the negotiation of intended meanings. These two points
need to be discussed in some detail, especially as they seem to be in
accord with the fundamental assumptions of the speech act theory of
Searle (1975).
The Inferential Process
Donaldson (1971) proposed a model of inference in which she
pointed out that, amongst other things "a fundamental requirement for
any system that is capable of inferential activity is that it should
be able to operate in terms of relationships of compatibility and
incompatibility".
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Such a system "... can, given information about situation X (or Z
and I, etc.), survey a further situation Z about which relevant direct
information is not available and can classify values of attributes of
Z as compatible or incompatible with known values for X and Y" (p. 81).
She claimed that the demonstration of this ability in very young
children on formal tasks has in the past met with difficulties.
Several reasons may be responsible for this - these include the
cognitive complexities of the task, the requirement that the child
allows his judgement to be constrained only by the given premises;
and the requirement that he considers his relationship with the Adult
or the Experimenter on a par with respect to knowledge-status.
Donaldson however, noted that observations of children's spontaneous
language behaviour in natural settings have yielded some evidence
favourable to children's inferential capacities.
She suggested, for example, that children's use of interrogative
sentences to ask information amounts on their part to a confession of
ignorance and this implies some awareness of "the existence of a
situation in which more than one possibility is open, so far as this
information goes" (p. 89). This line of reasoning allowed her to
devise a credible situation where children are requested to "help" a
talking doll who is liable to make sentences containing errors. The
performance of the children (the youngest were 3 years 7 months, the
oldest 5 years) revealed that not only did they supply information to
the doll when the doll "did not know", they also recognised and
corrected him when he made statements that were incompatible with the
global "reality" of the task, although they experienced difficulties
with the precise meaning of linguistic qualifiers like "All" and "Each".
(Donaldson and Lloyd, 1971).
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Further support for children's inferential abilities have come
from recent research into children's understanding of Indirect Speech
Acts. Shatz (1978) showed that children as young as two years of age
did not respond literally to directives such as "Is the door shut?".
Instead, they inferred the intended meaning of the speaker and
responded appropriately by carrying out the desired action. Similar
evidence have come from Dore (1977) and Ervin-Tripp (1977). This is
achieved partly through linguistic processing of the utterance itself,
and partly through the supportive non-verbal context as suggested by
Macnamara. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, caretaker
speech to children learning language appears to be supportive,
repetitive, and syntactically simple, thereby making the task of
learning by inference relatively easy for the child. This heuristic
function of caretaker speech has been demonstrated by Ervin-Tripp and
Miller (1977)• They showed that the amount of questions directed to
children increases as the age of the child increases. For example,
at around 2 years of age, the dominant questions from Adults to
children are "what-is", "what-object", "where" and "what-doing". The
frequency of "why" and "who-subject" questions, increased at around
three years of age. Some questions did not occur at all for two year
olds, only to appear when the children turned three years and about five
months. Such questions are "when", "why-not", "which" questions.
It is possible that adults and even other children, select and
vary speech styles relative to the age and the inferred interests in
objects and activities of their listeners (Snow, 1977; Gelman and Shatz,
1977; Shatz and Gelman, 1973; Sachs and Devin, 1976).
It is likewise possible that they deploy question-forms on the
basis of inferred response-capabilities and growing interests of their
child-listeners perhaps because they:
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1. Do not want to antagonise the child and
2. Want to secure the co-operation of the child so as to
accomplish the 'goal' set for the child or the 'goals' presumed to
be established by the child himself through looks, questions,
frettings, etc.
The advantage of the simple model described above is that it
recognises the agency of both the child and adult and allows for each
to act contingently on one another (i.e. co-acting) within a co-operative
(supportive) bond. In other words, the development of language is
conceived as being, initially at least, inter-personal. And it is
this inter-personalisation of relationship that serves as the scaffold
upon which language is built, Bruner (1975) put the point accross
convincingly thus:
"If there is one point that deserves emphasis, whether one
is searching for syntactic, semantic or pragmatic precursors
of early language, it is that language acquisition occurs
in the context of an 'active dialogue' in which joint action
is being undertaken by infant and adult. The joint
enterprise sets the deictic limits that govern joint
reference, determines the need for a referential taxonomy,
establishes the need for signalling intent and provides a
context for the development of explicit prediction" (p. 284-).
Similar views have been expressed by Joanna Ryan (1971) and
Greenfield and Smith (1976) who have urged that the pragmatic or
functional base structure of grammar be considered as determined by
joint action; and also that the child learns the elaborated forms of
the relational categories of Agency, Location, Possession, Vocatives,
etc, initially in situations of praxis and joint action and that these
may even serve as precursors of what will later emerge as their
linguistic case grammar equivalents.
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Co-operation and Communication
Cazden (1970) commended research efforts geared toward the
description of the child's grammatical competence, but warned that it
is not enough.
"We have to describe what Hymes calls 'communicative
competence' - how the child perceives and categorises the
social situations of his world and differentiates his ways
of speaking accordingly ... At any one moment a child
decides to speak or be silent, to adopt communicative
intent A or communicative intent B, to express idea X or
idea Y, in form 1 or form 2. The options the child
selects will be a function of characteristics of the
speech situation as he perceives it on the basis of
his past experience"
(pp. 84.-86).
Becoming an effective communicator as suggested by Cazden, implies
not only the possession of a set of adequate linguistic skills, but
also certain extra-linguistic ones, for example the assessment of
one's communication needs or that of another, the formulation of a
message based on that assessment, and the reformulation of that
message in the face of feedback.
The point to be made is simply that in using language to
communicate, one's main quest is to be most effective in co-operating
with those with whom one is in contact. And the motive force behind
this quest is the need to understand and be understood as a conscious
and intending person. In an ideal two-person communicative set-up,
the need to understand, or show understanding may propel the production
of feedback (e.g. a question, a request ...) contingent on the first
speaker's message. This feedback together with the need to share and
be understood, may in turn force a reformulation by the first speaker
of his earlier message. In learning to use language, children must
not only learn new words to widen their vocabulary, they must learn to
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select from this vocabulary, words which may then be used in construct¬
ing messages that are maximally sensitive to the needs and capacities
of their listener. Brown (1958) in proposing the "Principle of level
of usual utility" and Olson (1972) in his proposal of "Sentences as
descriptions" have both pointed out that a word can have many referents
and a referent can have many words or names. In selecting a name or a
word to describe an object or event for a listener, the speaker's
choice is normally constrained by the requirement for understanding.
Go-operation and Questioning
"... the desire to answer for himself the questions - what
for?, why?, in what way? - is a most important aspect of
/the child's/ psychological development. This search for
causal relationships is the basis of culture; it is the
guarantee of the progress of human thought" (Chukovsky,
1963: p. 24).
Chukovsky is here suggesting that the child is an active agent
tirelessly making observations about events in the world and seeking
answers to questions based on such observations. Implied also is the
notion of construct, that is, organising answers into some form of a
coherent body of knowledge from which the child's cultural group may
benefit; or in terms of which the child can build his world view by
taking advantage of the existing body of knowledge provided by his
culture.
The view that the child is actively searching for meaning appears
currently to enjoy considerable acceptance by the principal theories of
child development. It is apparent in Isaacs' (1933) attempts to unravel
the functions of what he called "epistemic questions" and Piaget's
(1959) thought and language. It underlies Bruner's (1972) brilliant
essay on the "Nature and Uses of Immaturity", and appears to be the
basis of Robinson and Rackstraw's (1975) study of questioning and answering.
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The personal construct theory of Bannister and Fransella (1971) to the
extent that it employs the model of man as an Inquirer and construes
behaviour as an experiment, also shares this view. The source of this
motive to acquire knowledge though, is not open to direct examination
and analysis by an observer, but it is amplified by events in the world
of the child - the world of language, beliefs, objects, etc. It is
translatable into speech and action, e.g. verbal and non-verbal questions.
Such questions deriving from the epistemic motive have a direction
which may be toward the self or toward others.
From this then, it should be possible to examine children's speech
with a view to discovering its purpose and direction. To speak is to
engage in a purposive act. Whether social or egocentric, speech has
the function of constituting a medium whereby diverse activities are
co-ordinated in the pursuit of a goal. Piaget and those who have
followed in his tradition claim a functional distinction between
social and egocentric speech. To social speech they ascribed the
function of the co-ordination of diverse activities, but to egocentric
speech a lack of direction or purpose. Vygotsky contended the issue
of non-directedness and non-purposiveness given to egocentric speech.
He insisted that for the child, egocentric speech serves to guide his
behaviour on a problem, and he supported this claim by observing that:
(a) Its co-efficient increased if the child (while engaged
in a problem) met with some difficulty
(b) The child's action on the problem took a different
direction as a consequence of the egocentric speech
and (c) That if the child was put in the midst of children who
spoke a foreign language (and hence cannot be expected to be influenced
through speech) the co-efficient of egocentric speech decreased.
Hence, even egocentric speech serves a cognitive as well as a social
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function for the child.
We take the position in this thesis, that speech, all speech
(except perhaps that uttered in one's sleep) is purposive in the sense
that it purposefully structures the thoughts and perceptions of the
speaker for the listener. That is, it is aimed so that it may serve
as an aid to direct the listener to those features of objects and events
to which the speaker refers (Olson, 1970)• In disagreement however,
with Olson, we also hold that language structures (co-ordinates) the
thoughts or mental activities of the speaker for the speaker. Evidence
for this has come from Blank and Bridger (1964) who demonstrated that
pre-school children readily perceived and distinguished between stimuli
that are clearly defined in space (e.g. between one and two circles).
This they did regardless of whether they used the relevant verbal labels.
However, they could not perceive or distinguish between vague and
unbounded stimuli such as light of one second duration flashed once and
then flashed twice with "half a second interval between the two success¬
ive flashes". However, when taught to use the relevant verbal labels,
they very soon made the discrimination. Now, this is not to claim that
thought cannot be structured without language. The claim is that, if
thought is to benefit from the contribution of others and to be of
benefit to others, then it is bound to be structured by the medium in
which it is carried. We may also suggest that language as a
communicative medium has evolved to serve this function and has come
to excel at it over other structuring modes. But this is a slight
digression.
The point to be returned to is that as individuals we suffer
daily, new experiences.
Some of these experiences yield understandings which are predictable
while some are so incongruous with our past experience that they yield
no predictable reactions. Nevertheless, they are the building blocks
of our world view.
As beings highly motivated to depend on one another, the world
picture that we build has to be cross-checked and legitimised through
acceptance by those with whom we enter into social relation. This may
entail talking about how we have come to erect such a world view in the
first place. It may also entail a readiness and willingness to be
queried about the observations, reflections and inferences from which
a particular view derives. Reactions to our world view from others may
lead to a validation or a reconstruction of it. And this we would
suggest is the benefit to the individual who submits his picture for
scrutiny by others.
It is now clear we hope, that the young child can be taken to be
an active agent in the pursuance of the meaning of his observations.
In the process of seeking meaning, he draws inferences from his
observations. Some of his inferences will be in accord with the
knowledge of the world he has gathered from past experience. Some
clearly will be at variance with it. As a consequence of the latter,
he may be inclined to ask questions concerning such odd and incongruous
events. He may himself be disposed to being queried. As psychologists,
we capitalise on this disposition when we subject children to interroga¬
tion in our experiments.
We often ask them to explain and justify what they think or say.
In so doing, we are appealing to their knowledge of the basic tool of
achieving understanding - questioning. Occasionally though, we are
surprised by the poverty of their knowledge of this tool. We write
some of them off as "unco-operative during testing". Fortunately, we
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have recently been reminded that using this tool appropriately is a
complex activity which demands paying attention to both the linguistic
content and the communicative intent of the questioner. And as these
two components are not always in perfect agreement with each other, it
may be necessary for the child to make some fine discrimination of
attention in favour of text rather than context (Campbell and Bowe,
1976) or sometimes in favour of context rather than text (Donaldson and
Lloyd, 197A; McGarrigle and Donaldson, 1975).
To recapitulate, a fundamental problem for developmental
psychology concerns the nature of understanding. Now, there is a
sense in which to understand is to know. We have not attempted to
offer a rigorous definition of knowledge. But we have tried to deal
with an aspect of the general problem of knowledge, that is, knowing
what people mean or intend when they communicate. This led to a
discussion of the speech act theory in which we highlighted the concepts
of illocutionary forces and co-operation. We discussed the idea that
the illocutionary force of indirect speech acts can correctly be
inferred only by participants assuming that the respective contributions
of each other are guided by adherence to the co-operative principle.
We suggested that this idea although essentially correct, is inadequate
because it does not explain why participants draw inferences, nor how
they come to validate them within the co-operative framework of conversa¬
tion.
We suggested a basic motive for understanding that manifests itself
in an active search for meanings in the acts of others. We suggested
further that this search may be expressed linguistically or non-
linguistically in question-forms. That such question-forms may
precede the drawing of inferences from observations ("What does I mean?
Perhaps it means such and such"). Or it can be used as a validating
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tool for inferences drawn ("Let's see if such and such was what X
really meant?"). We hypothesized that understanding may be sought
and gained through the use of questioning. And that this is made
possible because questioning invites a co-operative bond between the
questioner and the answerer.
We set out in the chapters which follow to investigate whether
children do, in fact, utilise questioning as a device for negotiating
mutual understanding. And, if so, what constraints operate upon its
use.
In the pilot test in Chapter 2, we arranged the power/authority
relation between the questioner and the answerer in favour of the child.
This, we hoped to achieve by employing a situation in which the child
was to instruct a subordinate being - a doll chimp, wired up to speak.
We were concerned to see if the child would confer agency on the chimp,
that is recognise him as an agent with a motive to seek knowledge.
Would the child 'move' to satisfy the motive of the chimp by attending
to his questions?
Chapter 3 represents an attempt to describe a natural talking
situation full of surprises and uncertainties - a story telling situa¬
tion. Would this context provoke questioning in children? If so,
what would this reveal to us concerning the issue of questioning as a
tool with which understanding can be achieved within a group?
The "Biscuit-in-the-box" game, to be described in Chapter U was
basically an attempt to engage pairs of children on a task that required
joint effort. The game demanded that each child attended to the needs
and purposes of the other, as the realisation of his own purposes was
tied to the co-operative efforts of his partner.
In Chapter 5, we explored the role that questioning oneself plays
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in understanding implicit information. And in Chapter 6, we
summarised our findings and drew some general conclusions which were
then discussed in the light of our theoretical assumptions.
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CHAPTER 2
TEACH THE MONKEY - A PILOT STUDY
INTRODUCTION
Children between the ages of 3 and 5 years engage more in
dialogues with peers than with adults, but their verbal exchanges with
adults are considerably richer in questions. Furthermore, questions
in child-to-adult dialogues are qualitatively superior to those in
child-child dialogues - the former being frequently of the causal type
(Piaget, 1959; McCarthy, 1954.) • Two conclusions may be drawn from
these observations, viz:
1. That young children recognise adults as better sources of
knowledge and information,
2, Young children have some beliefs in the willingness of adults
to entertain and satisfy their questions.
Would children concede in turn the quest to want to know to an
inferior, and co-operate with him in this pursuit? In order to
answer this question, we altered the knowledge/authority relation in
favour of the child. The situation was one in which the child was to
teach a supposedly simple minded "talking" chimpanzee a few things
about some toys and objects to which the child is very familiar. The
idea of a talking doll was created and used by Lloyd (1975) to explore
the communication of pre-school children.
METHOD
Subjects:
10 children (5 boys and 5 girls) from the Departmental Nursery took
40
part in this study. They were divided into two groups of five
children. Group 1 consisted of 3 boys and 2 girls (mean age 59.0 months;
range 6 months)• In Group II were 3 girls and 2 boys (mean age
35.8 months; range 3 months).
The Experimental Room and Materials
In the experimental room was a soundproof cubicle which carried
a one-way mirror. A graduate student who acted as the voice of the
learner was positioned in the cubicle in such a way that he saw into
the experimental room. He had a pair of earphones through which we
monitored sound in the experimental room. He also had a microphone
which permitted him to talk through a loudspeaker embedded in the tummy
of the learner. The microphone and the earphones were hooked into a
tape recorder in the cubicle. The learner was a 1-g-' tall doll
chimpanzee with a big body of fine velvety brown cloth. He sat in a
low chair in the experimental room with his back to the one-way mirror
of the soundproof cubicle. In front of him was a table with a bag of
familiar objects on it. The objects were:
1. A pair of scissors
2. A blue rocking cradle
3. A toy chair
4. A toy table
5. A white toy horse




10. A blue toy house
Opposite this table were two little chairs - one for the child,
the other for the experimenter. Each session was video-taped and
lasted for approximately 1$ minutes.
a
Procedure
A day before the study commenced, the chimp was introduced to the
nursery by the Teacher as an African chimp who wanted to learn a few
things in English. The children were asked to volunteer as his
teacher. They nil expressed willingness and enthusiasm. On the day
of testing, one child at a time was taken to the experimental room
and having sat on the chair directly opposite the learner, was intro¬
duced. He was then asked to take an object out of the bag and tell
the chimp about it. The chimp who has been instructed by the
experimenter on what kinds of knowledge to seek and what mistakes to
make, may ask the question, "What's that (name of the child)?", if the
child did not volunteer information about the identity of the object
extracted. If the question vrtis ignored, it was repeated. If ignored
again, the experimenter then asked the same question. This was to
ensure a flow of exchange.
Instruction to the Chimo;
He was to seek the identification by name of each object and its
function. He was also concerned to get the child to explain the basis
of any object groupings effected spontaneously or provoked by the
chimp. He was to make two types of errors, viz:
1. Identification (e.g. identifying a carrot as an apple).
This may be induced by the experimenter asking the chimp what he has
learned so fax, and
2. Bad reasoning with information provided by the child (e0g. a
child may have said "A cow eats grass", and "A horse eats grass".
The chimp would conclude that "A cow is a horse").
The chimp was to make 10 errors, half of type (l) and the other
A2
half of type (2),
When the child grouped some of the objects spontaneously, or was
provoked so to do, the chimp was to ask 5 "rationale"questions and
5 "compatibility" ones# A rationale question is a "why" question aimed
at getting the child to explain the basis of his grouping. A
compatibility question concerns the possibility of including another
object hitherto outside the group, whilst retaining the identity of the
group, or expanding the identity of the group to accommodate the new
object.




10 Identification Questions, one on each object) These were asked
10 Functional Questions, one on each object } was^ot^freSy"
supplied by the child
Treatment of Data
The data were transcribed and the children's responses to the
question categories of Identification, Function, Rationale and
Compatibility analysed^ so as to reveal the provision of required informa¬
tion. Specifically, we looked for the following:
1. Spontaneous provision of information.
2. Non-spontaneous provision of information, i.e. information
provided only through the chimp's questioning.
3. Refusal to answer questions from the chimp.
4-. Answering the chimp's questions only when mediated by the
experimenter.
5. Refusal to provide information even when asked by both the
chimp and the experimenter.
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We also analysed the children's responses to the identification
and reasoning mistakes made by the chimp. Were the mistakes corrected
and, if so, was correction spontaneous or did it require the
experimenter's intervention? What behaviours accompanied the recogni¬
tion and correction of mistakes?
RESULTS
The 3- and 5-year-old groups of children identified the objects
both nominally and functional 1y. But there striking differences in
the spontaneity of behaviour. With respect to nominal identification,
the younger children supplied A2% (21 in 50) of the required information
spontaneously. The remaining 29 names were given as responses to
questions. The older children on the other hand, spontaneously
provided 94% (4-7 in 50) of the object names. Only 3 objects had to
be identified nominally through questioning. The median of spontaneous
nominal identification in the 5-year-old group is statistically higher
than that of the younger age group at the .005 level (one-tailed).
Functional description presented a similar pattern with the
younger children spontaneously providing only 36% (18 in 50), whilst
the older group spontaneously gave 82% (41 in 50). The median score
is again higher in the older group of children at .005 level of
significance.
There were group differences in the children's attendance to the
chimp's questions about the names and functions of the objects. Out
of the 29 identity questions asked of the 3-year-old group by the
chimp, only 31.0% (9 in 29) were responded to. But the ignored
20 questions, when repeated by the experimenter, elicited naming
responses. The older group of children were asked only 3 identity
questions by the chimp because they had spontaneously named the bulk
of the objects# These 3 questions were answered without the benefit
of the experimenter's intervention# 40.6% (13 in 32) of the chimp's
questions (about functions of the objects) to the younger group of
children were responded to# The same 19 ignored questions, when posed
by the experimenter elicited responses# With the older group all the
9 function questions that needed to be asked by the chimp were answered
without the experimenter's involvement#
There do appear to be two differences so far between the groups
of children - one relating to the spontaneity with which they provided
information, the other having to do with a preference to answer the
same questions from the experimenter that they had refused to answer
from the chimp. Are these differences to be explained by claiming
that the younger children are relatively lacking in autonomy and
initiative? If so, why did they reject the initiative that came with
the chimp's questions? Or could it be that they found the source of
such initiative too incredible? We shall dwell on these questions in
the discussion# For the moment, we will turn to the issue of how the
children explained their actions on the objects (i.e. grouping of the
objects) and their reactions to the erroneous judgements of the chimp.
It would be recalled that the circumstances in which the chimp
asked rationale (i.e. "why") questions, dealt with the object-grouping
behaviour of the children. We observed in general, that the 3-year-old
children spontaneously grouped the objects a lot more than the 5-year-
olds. With the latter group, the chimp had to provoke grouping by
asking "Which ones can you put together?". A grouping having been
obtained, the chimp then sought an explanation of its basis. In our
analysis, we were only concerned to see whether the child would attempt
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an explanation - the correctness or logic of the explanation for the
moment being unimportant. We found that the younger group of children
did not answer 76% (19 in 25) of the chimp's "why" questions whereas
the older group failed to answer only 20% (5 in 25) of similar questions.
We again observed that the younger children were avoiding the chimp's
questions.
Now, it might be argued that the object-groupings on which the
children were being questioned may not have been intended as groups
proper, but as mere aggregates. If this were so, one would expect
the questions implying such aggregates as groups to receive answers
that would negate those implications. It is to such matters that we
now turn.
It would appear from the 3-year-olds' responses to the chimp's
compatibility questions, that they accepted uncritically his sugges¬
tions. Here is an example from a 3-year-old girl, who has just put
the toy house and cot together:
Chimp: "Can I put the cow in the cot to sleep?"
Child: "Yes" (puts cow in cot)
Chimp: "Can I sleep in the cot?"
Child: "Yes"
Chimp: "What about the carrot, can it sleep in the cot too?"
Child: Nodded (puts carrot in the cot).
The older children on the other hand brought to bear on such
questions their critical understanding of what is possible logically,
and what they knew from past experience, although they too fell prey
to the chimp's suggestion. An example from one child would serve to
illustrate this:
Chimp: "Who sleeps in a cot?"
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Child: "A baby."
Chimp: "I am a baby chimp, so I can sleep in it, can I?"
Child: (Turns to Experimenter, smiles). "Thinks he can sleep
in it."
Expter: (Smiles)
Child: (Turns to face chimp) "You can't, you're too big."
Chimp: "OK,but what about the cow, can I put it in the cot
to sleep?"
Child: (Puts cow in cot, removes it ...) "Cow sleeps in shed."
It is also interesting to note that a question carrying a
possibility for action, in the form "Can I put X in Y?", carried for
all the children in the two age groups, a strong invitation to act in
accordance with the proposition "It is possible that X be put into Y",
and thus they put X into Y. The example below is from a 5-year-old:
Child: (Puts the carrot, orange, apple, cow, table and the
chair together)
Chimp: "What else can you put in there?"
Child: "Haven't got any more food"
Chimp: "I see, but what about the horse. Can you put the
horse in there?"
Child: (Puts the horse in.) "The horse eats grass."
Another example came from one of the young ones who, having put
the cradle and the horse together, was asked by the chimp if he could
include the cow. The child simply included the cow, then the car and
so on, until he had all the objects in one heap. Questioned by the
chimp, about the basis of his grouping, the child refused to answer,
but turned to the experimenter who repeated the chimp's question to
which the child replied, "They're on a farm".
The children's responses to the chimp's errors were also illuminat¬
ing. The younger group of children supplied only 11 (44.0%)
4.7
correction-responses to Identity errors, whilst the older group of
children corrected all 25 (100.0%) of such errors. The median of the
correction-responses in the older group was- higher statistically than
in the younger group at the .005 level.
The younger children were also inferior to the older ones in the
number of correction-responses to reasoning errors, although the differ¬
ence in the medians is not significant statistically. Furthermore,
some qualitative differences were observed in the way the young and the
older children reacted to the chimp's reasoning errors. The older
children typically]aughed at the chimp, turned to the experimenter and
joked about the chimp's errors before they corrected his mistakes. The
following is an example from a five year old boy:
Chimp: "What do you do with a car?"
Child: "A car? To drive in."
Chimp: "I see. A car is to drive in0 What about the house?"
Child: "A house is for sleeping in."
Chimp: "So the car can sleep in the house."
Child: (Laughs and turning to the experimenter) "Thinks the car
can sleep."
Expter: (Smiles) "Well ...."
Child: "Ca0o. cars don't sleep."
No doubt, the younger children too recognised such 'errors', but
they acquiesced, appearing not to know what to do. They would turn and
look at the experimenter as if they needed some support or advice. If
the experimenter provided no support or advice, the children were apt
to accept the chimp's ideas. If, however, the experimenter chipped in
with a "Is that right?", or "Do you agree with that?", the child was




The spontaneity of the behaviour of the older children concerning
the identification of the names and functions of the objects, their
justification of the object-groupings they were prompted to construct,
the relatively autonomous (independent of the experimenter) way in
which they handled "Compatibility" questions and "Reasoning" errors
suggests the following:
(a) That they understood the demand-feature relationship between
questions and answers,
(b) That they were willing to accept the chimp as a source of
questions, that is, imbue him with the property of a learner or a
knower. This is an important point psychologically for it indicates
a readiness to accept the bizarre or the extraordinary as a working
basis. It may well be indicative of an ability to deal with phenomena
which are not ratified in the child's past experiences. Clearly the
children were not fooled by the talking doll, Che of them
remarked, "There's someone in there" (pointing to the soundproof cubicle
in which the collaborator was), Five-year-olds know there is a differ¬
ence between fact and fantasy, that certain things are possible, others
are not. The following short exchange between two children listening
to a story about the metamorphic history of the butterfly attests to
this:
The Context: (The hungry caterpillar voraciously eats
into leaves, an event physically depicted
in a page in the story book,)
Elspeth "He (the caterpillar) didn't really, did
(3-11 months): he ... go through that hole?"
Stefan "It's just a story,"
(>4-1 month):
Chukovsky (1963) gives several examples. There is one of a
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four-year-old girl playing with her wooden horse. The little girl said:
"The horse put on a tail and went for a walk."
Her mother interrupted her play, saying:
"Horses' tails are not tied to them - they cannot be put on and
then taken off."
"How silly you are mummy, I am just playing." (p. 26)
He also tells of a mother attempting to get her little girl to
eat. She tried to influence the child via the medium of imaginary
play-acting.
"Don't you hear? - the roll begs you to eat it."
And in answer, she heard the logical reply:
"The roll can't talk. It doesn't have a mouth." (p. 28)
The point about these examples is that not only do children
recognise some truths from half-truths, but they can deliberately exploit
this knowledge to serve certain ends, whether at play or at school.
This exploitation we would suggest, demonstrates in some way the ability
to exercise some autonomy and independence over what is to be assimilated
in the environment of play and communication.
We are not suggesting that this autonomy is total or constraint-free
even in the older children, nor that it is totally absent in 'the three-
year-olds.
It may just be that the younger children, even though recognising
the pretend aspect of the situation, felt unable to accept and exploit
it for what it is0 The confidence with which they entered into the
situation must have been low. If confident, they would have queried
the chimp about its intentions,what it wanted to know, how well he was
coping with the "new" information, etc0 Also, they would have readily
given the chimp the information he wanted, corrected his obvious
50
mistakes, joked about and with the chimp (as the older children did)
and used the pretend component of the situation to turn it into a game.
Instead, they continued to rely on the experimenter for what seemed to
be an interpretation of the situation and suggestions about what they
were meant to do.
In other words, the younger children were more prepared to deal
with the human agency that they knew belonged to the experimenter, but
did not feel confident enough on their own, to relate to the chimp in
the same vein. The discovery of this limitation in children's
willingness to give intelligence and reasonableness to the talking
chimp led us to search for a human environment in which both 3- and
5-year-old children can confidently ask and answer questions about one
another's motives, clarity of expression and intentions, possibility of
actions, etc. The next study is a description of this environment
as well as the manner in which children use questions within it.
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CHAPTER 3
CHILDREN'S QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES AT STORY TIME
INTRODUCTION
Berlyne and Frommer (1966) have experimentally used situations of
incongruity, novelty, surprisingness and uncertainty to provoke questions
in 6 - 8 year-old children. They failed to find consistent differences
in the frequencies of questions of children whose questions were
answered and those whose questions were ignored. We reasoned that a
story-telling context would be ideal for collecting children's
spontaneous questions because some of the content of the stories read
to the children are bound to be novel, incongruous or incompatible with
some of their previously held beliefs and knowledge. We shall be
looking at the dynamics of spontaneous verbal exchanges with a view to
describing how the relationship between speaker and listener is tailored
toward understanding of each other's intentions. More specifically,
we shall focus on the aspects of the relationship aimed at securing,
with the aid of question-devices, some information about the stories.
Of interest also, shall be the interpretation given to the question and
the response attached to it. Knowledge deriving from this study may be
of value from two theoretical positions:
1. Within the Piagetian framework, it may explain how a child,
faced with a break in communication due to conflict in views, negotiates
a resolution of this conflict, and perhaps as a result of this, comes
to avoid similar conflicts by planning utterance that will maximise
understanding of intentions and meanings.
2. Within the speech act theoretical framework, it may lead to
an understanding of how young children use their language resources to
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perform acts and to induce performance in others.
METHOD
The children and the story situation:
The everyday routine of the Nursery includes story-telling, an
event that lasts for about fifteen minutes, starting at around half past
ten in the morning. The children are summoned, usually with a "It's
story time". They are allowed to sit anywhere they choose on the
floor, the general configuration approximating a semi-circle. The
teacher sits on a very low chair facing the group of children and reads
from the selected picture books. An average of two stories are read
per session.
The children's utterances during and after each story, as well as
those of the teacher, were tape-recorded on average of three times
a week for 5 months. There were 12.1 recorded sessions on the average,
a month. Total number of recording was 62. These were transcribed
and a note made on the contextual part of the story that preceded each
utterance. During the course of each session a check list was used
to help identify speakers. This also helped in identifying both the
context and identity of utterance. Despite this, it was not always
possible to identify the producer of every utterance, especially when
more than two children spoke at the same time, but such cases were not
too frequent. Retrospectively, video-taping would have eliminated this
problem.
21 children took part in the study. Some joined the Nursery after
the study had begun, some left before it ended. It became necessary,
therefore, in order to achieve relatively uniform attendance, to select
children whose utterances would be analysed. Two criteria were used
for this purpose. These are:
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(a) At least three months regular attendance in the Nursery before
the study commenced. This was to minimise the effect of unfamiliarity
(with the Nursery and its routine) on the production of, and reaction
to, utterances occurring in the story context.
(b) There was a total of 62 observations. Children whose total
number of attendance was less than 75% of this were excluded from
analysis. The employment of these two criteria disqualified 5 of the
21 children, leaving 16 children who divided into 7 males and 9 females,
with a mean age of 4-6.6 months (range = 25 months). Mean attendance
or observations was 55.3 with a range of 15. The least observed child,
however, averaged over the 75% mark.
Coding of Data
The tapes were transcribed and verbal exchanges initiated through
questioning by the sixteen selected children were extracted. The
questions, together with the answers attendant upon them, were then
scored using a category system adapted from Robinson and Rackstraw
(1972). This system was chosen because of its responsiveness to two
interests with which this thesis is concerned -
1. The intention or motivation to seek some information or
understanding through questioning, and
2. A description of the answerer's attempts to give the required
information or achieve the desired understanding through a series of
negotiations.
The Robinson and Rackstraw's category system recognises that
questions fall into two main types:
Type 1: "Open" or information-seeking. This type of question is
indicative of "a gap in a framework of knowledge or belief" and it serves
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to discover the information required to fill this gap. "One linguistic
expression of such a question is 'What is X?'. An assumption is made
that 'X' is something characterisable by the relative pronoun 'what',
i.e. an object, substance, position, or process which can be referred
to by a substantive. The demand is for a specification of its nature."
Type 2: "Closed" or "Prompt". This type implies that the
questioner is aware of probable alternative answers to his question
and demands that the answer hypothesised and contained in the question
be confirmed or denied.
"The linguistic expression of such a question might take the
forms 'Is X, Y?' Once the existence or meaningfulness of
'X' is presumed, then the predication of it as 'Y' may be
either confirmed or denied' (Robinson and Rackstraw, 1972, p. 17).
It is quite possible to reduce prompt questions to open ones.
"Is X, Y?" is reducible through its underlying assumption that 'X' is
something, to "What is X?" or "Will X go to Y at time Z?" to "When
will X go to Y?". The possibility of this reduction allows the
identification of the referential categories of both open and prompt
questions. An advantage of this process is that different interrogative
markers which function to select the same reference, become known.
It is hence possible to specify and predict the answer required by two
referentially-identical questions. For example, "At what time did he
come?" prescribes an answer the sort of which is required by "When did
he come?". The referential category of these two questions are
considered identical since they both require that an event (i.e. the
coming), be placed in time.
Referential Categories for Questions:
Using the system of categories developed by Robinson and Rackstraw
(1972), 7 referential functions of questions were identified. These
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were questions initiating verbal exchanges. Excluded were queries
which functioned to maintain sequences of exchange.
1. Identification
This comprises questions about the names of people or objects and
labelling of actions which are current or had taken place, or will take
place. They are characterised by the interrogative words 'who' and
•what'. Except where indicated, all questions are taken from the
corpus of children's speech collected in the study.
Examples:
a) "Who is that?"
b) "What is a daddy lion?"
c) "What fell off?", 'What happens if another wolf comes along?"
2. Definition
These axe queries concerning the meaning of a word that has
occurred in a preceding utterance. They are characterised by the
interrogative word 'what' and 'why'.
Example (a):
(Context: talking about a 3-tier wedding cake at a wedding
attended by Willie.)
Child: "There's ... there's a bottom and a top and a big cake down."
Teacher: "That's right ... it's got three tiers."
Child: "Why are they called 'tears'?"
Teacher: "Well - it's just really layers - big one at the bottom, then
the middle one and a little one at the top held up with these
pillars."
It is obvious that the child, having taken 'tiers' for 'tears' and
noticing a different usage of tears from the one she normally knows,
requests for the definition of the new meaning of 'tears'.
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Example (b):
(Context: child handling a real sea urchin shell.)
Teacher: (Issuing a warning) "Be careful with it, because it's very-
brittle. "
Child: "It can break?"
Example (c):
Teacher: "Matilda and Sam were quite worn out." (Passage from a
story book.)
Child: "What's 'worn out' mean?"
3. Placing
These are questions or requests seeking the location of events or
objects or persons in space or time. 'Where' and 'when' are their
characteristic markers.
Examples of a temporal type:
a) (Context: a book was being given to a child for inspection
on request.)
Child: "Can I have a look at that after Debbie?"
b)
Child: "Was I born before Beverley?"
Teacher: "Oh, yes."
Child: "How old is Beverley?"
Teacher: "Beverley is three and you're five."
Child: "She was born two weeks after me?"
Teacher: "Not two weeks - two years."
Example of Spatial type:
a) (Context: the picture of a cavalier bowing to plump little Clara)
Child: "Where's his eyes, Mrs. Strachan?"




These are questions concerning the logical relation of cause and
effect and also that of compatibility. They are typified by the word 'why' -
Example of a Compatibility question:
(Context: the drawing in a story book of a doll with three hands.)
Child: "Why does the doll have 3 hands?"
Examples of Cause and Effect questions:
a) (Context: Shahnaux, who was one of the little ones, was
playing with a story book, to the distraction of the class.)
Child: "Why don't we put it on a high beam?"
b) "Is he sad because he lost his mum?"
5. Process
These are questions about the state or manner or the process by
which a particular state of affairs has, or will come to be. They are
usually characterised by the interrogative word 'how'.
Examples:
a) (Context: a fox has just spotted a hen and wants to catch it
for its meal.)
Child: "He will have to creep up quietly, won't he?" (i.e. if he is
not to alert and warn the hen of his intention, thus
frightening her off).
b)
Child: "How is he?" (asking about a boy who has been knocked down
by a car and is in hospital).
c) "How did the fox get in?"
6. Psychological
This category embraces questions which indicate that the questioner
is aware that -
a) Other persons have thoughts or knowledge or beliefs which may
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be different from his own. Now, two possibilities of action may arise
from this awareness. The child may test the readiness of other
persons in wanting to share their thoughts or knowledge, or he may want
others to share in his thoughts and knowledge about an event or object,
e.g. "Do you know what happened yesterday?" Asking this of a child may
be an attempt to secure his attention and find out about his willingness
to enter into verbal interactions.
The other possibility is that the child may test the validity or
correctness of the other person's knowledge. Or he may simply want
to know whether the other person indeed possesses such a knowledge as
he might have thought. An example: "Do you know, sometimes people
think foxes turn into fishes?".
b) People's understanding of the motives behind actions may
differ. In particular, that an action may be deemed intentional or
accidental.
Example:
(Context: sly fox was tricked by little red hen into carrying home
a bag of stones believing it to contain red hen's chicks. The bag was
thrown into a pot of boiling water and the resulting splash killed the
fox's little ones.)
Child: "Do you think that the wee red hen knowed that the big stones
would kill the red foxes?"
7. Clarification
These are questions seeking the clarification, through repetition,
expansion and specification, of an entire utterance, or segments thereof.
Characteristic interrogative words are 'huh', 'a what', 'which'.
Examples:
a)
Child 1: "And we saw Bobby on it, and he was riding."
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Child 2: "No."
Child 1: "No what?"
Child 2: "No, I didn't see it."
b)
Child: "Buying a hat, did you say?"
Teacher: "Yes."
Coding Responses as Answers
Robinson and Rackstraw (op. cit) offered a detailed scheme for the
description and analysis of answers. They judged as answers, state¬
ments in response to questions. Excluded are queries, exclamations,
commands, refusals to answer and non-verbal behaviours. In other
words, statements were considered to be answers only if they conceptually
filled gaps, that is, supplied the information requested in the
question. They set up linguistic and cognitive criteria which
responses have to meet to quality as answers. Essentially, an answer
must be given by a person who has received a question. "It must be
expressed in language, consist of at least one declarative clause, have
lexical continuity with the question, convey a statement and be able to
function within the same referential category as the question." (p. 24.)
Although Robinson and Rackstraw recognised that the mode, form and
context of an answer may be influenced by the perceived intentions,
present state of knowledge, and the general orientation of the questioner,
they opted for a rather formal and linguistic treatment of the question-
answer relation. Their formal approach to the relation between
questions and answers was necessitated by their conceptualisation of
questions and answers. For them questions function to elicit informa¬
tion lacking in the knowledge framework of the questioner. Logically,
answers become responses which reduce the gap in knowledge indicated by
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the question. "This is quite independent of the motivation or
desires of the participants in the process, viz. questioner and
answerer. Question posing and answering can be considered a formal
exercise which specifies gaps in a conceptual framework and then fill
them in." (p. 29). This emphasis resulted in a study which, though
detailed in analysis, only marginally touched on what, in this thesis,
is an important problem. This relates to how the questioner's
intentions are perceived and realised in conversations and how an
answerer checks and complements the questioner's intentions. In short,
how the questioner and the answerer ensure that they sure both function¬
ing within the same referential locus intended by the initial question.
We shall suggest a few strategies available to people who may want to
use questioning to effect mutual understanding. These are:
a) The complementation or modification of the information
given to a question. This may lead to a concordance of views between
the questioner and the answerer.
b) Successive questioning by participants to ensure the correct
matching of purposes, as the interaction progresses.
c) Even silence may be used as an indication of misapprehension
of what is meant, and hence force a reformulation or restatement of
prior utterance.
c) Non-verbal signs may also be used to indicate disapproval,
disagreement, objectipns, etc., e.g. wearing a worried or puzzled look.
All these may function as guides to keep question/answer pairs
within the larger corpus of verbal exchange tailored down to specific
reference points. This guarantees against wide swings from the desired
path and ensures that contributions can be understood along the same
mutually-agreed-upon axis. For example:
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Teacher: (Context: "The Hungry Caterpillar".)
"There are blue butterflies in Skye."
Child: "Why can you not see them?"
Teacher: "You can see them."
Child: "Can you? I can't."
Teacher: "I said they were on SKYE."
Clearly the child misunderstood the first Skye to mean sky.
However, this was resolved. This example shows how strategy (b) can
be used to restore concordance of reference.
The Robinson and Rackstraw scheme for the description of question/
answer relation does not make provision for how an answer is ensured
to be functioning within the same referential category as the question
it is supposed to be satisfying. This is not a surprising weakness
in a scheme that precludes non-verbal behaviour, exclamations, questions
and commands and 'refusals to answer' as answers to questions. It is
being suggested in this thesis that, if we are to understand how people
come to an understanding of each other's intentions in communication,
the questioner's motive in posing the questions he poses becomes an
important entity for investigation. Such motives may well be to fill
gaps in his knowledge system, or to establish rapport through rhetorical
questions as "How are you today?"; or to secure the attention of a
listener as in "Are you listening?".
Of no less significance is what follows, not only from the standpoint
of the formal grammatical and linguistic concordance of answers to
questions, but also from the standpoint of maintaining the purpose of
the interaction between a questioner and an answerer. That is, how the
two match, test and modify their inferences about each other's intentions
in order to maximise the chances of mutual understanding. Linguistic
and grammatical agreements between questions and answers, though necessary,
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are not sufficient for a complete description of how question/answer
pairs aid the understanding of intentions and referents in communication.
The above objections formed the basis for a treatment of answers
which departs from the one developed by Robinson and Rackstraw (1972).
We, like these authors, relied on the context of utterance, mode and
lexical continuity between a question and an answer to determine the
Appropriateness, Completeness and the Presupposition of answers to
questions. We would here offer a definition of our answer categories.
Context of utterance:
This refers to the aspect of the story that may be taken to be
the target to which the question refers.
Mode:
This refers to the range of possible answers that a particular
question can take. Naturally, the mode selected would depend on
several variables, like the interpretation given to the question-to-be-
answered, what in the answer the answerer can presume to be already
known to the questioner, what the answerer thinks that the questioner
really wants to know, how best the answer is to be framed to permit
understanding by the questioner and so on.
Example: (hypothetical)
Q. "How tall is X?"
Al. "X is very tall."
A2. "X is taller than Y" (where Y is known to both questioner
and answerer).
A3. "X is 6'2" tall."
AA. "Don't tell me you don't know how tall X is", etc.
Al, 2, 3, A are different modes of answers to the question although, of
course, Al is rather incomplete; A2 contains some presuppositions;
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A3 is complete and matter-of-fact and A4 appeals to a belief that the
questioner has reasons or grounds to know the height of X.
Lexical Continuity:
This consists of word-units which co-occur in a question and an
answer. They tie the two together and can make the relation between
them rather obvious.
Example: (hypothetical)
Q. "When is cricket on TV?"
Al. "I don't like cricket."
A2. "It's at seven."
A3. "I have a date tonight."
The occurrence of the word 'cricket' in Al and an interpretation given
to the pronoun 'It' in A2 allows for continuity and, therefore, the
judgement that Al and A2 are answers to the question. In the absence
of a lexical continuity between the question and A3, assessment of A3
as an answer would be relatively more difficult to make. This is not
to say that it may not qualify, but the certainty of its status as an
answer can not be guaranteed on this basis alone.
Appropriateness:
This is defined in terms of an agreement between the 'aim' of a
question and the answer given to it.
Example: (hypothetical)
Q. "Where did the boy hide?"
Al. "He hid in the bushes."
A2. "He ran away into the bush."
Both Al and A2 are appropriate as answers because they supply information
about location. The information need not be factually correct. What
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is important is that the information be related to the locative
component of the question.
Completeness:
An answer can be examined to see whether it completely satisfies
the aim of the question or not. This judgement is being made in our
role as observers and the grounds for making it may be tenuous because
we may not be able to tell what the answerer presumes to be common
knowledge for him and the questioner. Fortunately however, we can
expect a dissatisfied questioner to further pursue his aim. We can
also expect children who are in doubt as to the appropriateness and
completeness of an answer to a question to indicate so, either by
contributing what in their view is the missing part of the answer or
by querying the answer. These expectations lead us into the phase of
our analysis which is about the consequences of types of answers (i.e.
whether appropriate or complete) on talk exchange.
Extension into Further Levels:
The above scheme enabled us to identify and categorise a question
and describe the answer in terms of whether it is appropriate or complete.
But normal talk exchanges do extend beyond that level. An evaluation
of an answer to a question along the lines outlined may lead the
questioner, or a third person, into various activities, including
acknowledgement and agreement of the appropriateness and completeness of
the answer, or it may lead to a disagreement followed perhaps by a
contribution calculated to augment the answer in some way. Or it may,
indeed, lead to a rejection and a restatement of the question; or it
may lead to a query.
This, we think, is one way in which talk is naturally generated
and sustained. We think that talk is in part, an analytic process
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whereby a participant evaluates the contributions of others and uses
the product of this eval.uation to plan his further contributions.
The views of the other person may force an examination of the speaker's
initial views, opinion or knowledge on the issue at hand. This
examination may lead to a rejection, acceptance or a modification of
either his own or his partner's views. It is negotiation of this
sort that causes the development of coherence that is so characteristic
of talk-exchanges or conversations. In order to be able to explore
this feature of question-initiated verbal exchange, we looked at the
children's reactions to answers. Do they follow the hypothesis out¬
lined above? Do they complement answers that they judge incomplete
and in so doing, extend the boundary of the talk-exchange? Do they
query answers given to questions, thereby challenging a point of view
expressed in such an answer or do they ask for a clarification or
modification of the answerer's opinion?
To answer this question, we looked at extensions of the primary
question/answer sequence. We identified 3 levels of extension, hereinafter
called sequential levels 1, 2 and 3.
Sequential level 1 (SLl):
This is the primary minimal unit of our analysis. It comprises
a question (of whatever referential category) and an answer.
Sequential level 2 (SL2):
This category contains sequences of verbal exchanges which start
as in SLl with a question followed by an answer. Then the questioner
or a third child offers a statement that in some way modifies the
answer (through deletion, addition, etc.). The third child's contribu¬
tion or, indeed, the answer may be further commented upon by the
answerer, the questioner or a fourth child, and so on. The significant
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feature of this category is that all the contributions are tied to the
same topic (as introduced by the question) and they constitute different
viewpoints or opinions on that topic. Some sequences finally lead to
publicly acknowledged agreement. Some do not.
Example 1: Key: C = Child
Context: (C has just told of an accident his father had with a
knife.)
C2. "Ohi Did he cut his whole hand off?"
CI. "No - he cut his finger."
C2. "Cut his finger off." (in apparent disbelief)
CI. "Noooo ... it was bleeding. He didn't cut it off ...
it was just bleeding."
C2. "Hmmmm."
Example 2:
CI. "What's that?" (pointing to a cat in the picture book).
C2. Cara "There's a cat."
C3. Stewart "It's like the tiger."
CA. Richard "A mini-tiger, it's like."
C5. Val (Laughs) "Like mini carsI"
Example 3:
CI. "She might get out of it." (About the fox being trapped
in a house.)
Teacher: "Out of what?"
CI. "... get outa it."
C2. "The house, she means."
Sequential level 3 (SL3):
This also is a category containing sequences initiated by a question
The answer however receives a query either from the questioner or from
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a third party. This query may be answered by the first answerer or
a fourth child, and so on. Where the third party, or any of the
contributors, is an adult, we label the exchange SL3 + adult. Where
no adult contribution is involved, the exchange remains SL3. The
essential feature of this category is that it contains at least one
queried answer within each sequence.
Examples of SL3 + Adult:
S-Ann: "Was I bora before Beverley?"
Teacher: "Oh, yes."
E-Ann: "How old is Beverley?"
Teacher: "Beverley is three and you're five."
E-Ann: "She was bora two weeks after me."
Teacher: "Not two weeks - two years."
Example 2:
Context: (The Gingerbread Man)
Elspeth: "Why did he run away?"
Teacher: "Well - why did he run away?"
Gert: "Because he didn't want to stay."
Julie: "He didn't want to be eaten."
Elspeth: "How can he do it? Since he's got ginger legsi"
Example 1 involves two participants while example 2 involves four.
Example SL3 (i.e. without adult participation)
Context: (The mother fox and sly fox throw the bag of stones into
the boiling water, which splashed, killing the little foxes.)
Debbie: "The wee red hen would be pleased now, wouldn't he?"
Cara: "Yeah."
Richard: "But what happens if the wolf comes?"
E-Ann: "She'll have to keep out of the way."
Nial: "But what happens if ... if three foxes come to eat him
all up?"
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In Table 3.1, the speech produced by each child
was partitioned into answers, comments and questions.
Talkativeness measured by the number of utterances
producedJid not increase with age. In fact the younger
children appeared to be more talkative, the correlation
between age and the number of utterances being -0.672,
p ^ .01. It may well be that the older children are
more adept at listening and paying attention to the
stories. Another explanation may be that the older
children being longer in the nursery, have become
more familiar with the stories and consequently have
less to talk about, or that the younger children are
much more given to a display of irrelevant chatter.
But in the absence of an exhaustive analysis of the
children^ behaviour, we had no way of choosing between
these or other possible explanations. An analysis of
the kind we have in mind would include an evaluation
of listening, attending and orienting behaviours;
resistance to distraction and familiarity with the stories.
However, we did consider possible associations between
age of the children and the proportions of questions and
answers in their talk.
For each child, total amount of talk was not
significantly correlated with proportion of questions
although there seemed to be a trend in this direction
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(i*s = 0,417, p <,05)» Talk was also neither correlated
with proportion of comments (r = 0,021) nor with
s
proportion of answers (r = -0,275)• Age did not seems
to be reflected in changes in the proportion of questions
in the children's talk (rg = -0,111) nor did it correlate
with the proportion of comments (r = -0,01),s
As we have observed, younger children tended to do
more talking at story-time. Since age did not correlate
with the proportion of questions it does seem as suggested
above that the older children, being more familiar with
the stories, have less to say and are for the same reason
more attentive and topic-relevant in their utterances.
Although we still have no definite reasons to choose this
out of the two explanations previously offered, i,e, in
terms of expertise in attending or resistance to
irrelevancies and distractions, either of them would lead
us to expect older children to provide more answers than
the younger ones to questions. This expectation was
borne out by the value of the correlation between age and
the proportion of answers given (r = 0,523, p <C ,05)•s
So, although the older children talked less, they answered
more questions than the younger ones.
It is quite conceivable that children who asked
questions might have done so for two reasons. First to
seek information required to fill a void in their knowledge-
system and secondly to seek attention or social approval.
In the case of the former, i,e, epistemic questions, it
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would be expected that the children who used questions to
serve this purpose would be less proficient at commenting
on their very questions or on those of others, for the
simple reason that they would have insufficient knowledge.
Such children would also be less able to comment generally
on the stories simply because they would know less about
them. On the other hand, if questions were being used to
secure social approval or attention, questioners ought to
comment on their questions or on the answers elicited by
such questions and at the same time comment on the general
themes and topics of the stories. The data seem to
favour the epistemic explanation. The proportion of
comments in the talk of questioners was less than in the
talk of non-questioners - the correlation between
proportion of questioners and the proportion of comments
in talk was -0.4-55, p «<. *05. Furthermore, the correlation
between the proportion of questions in talk and providing
responses at sequential level 2 (by definition comments on
answers to questions) was -0.426, p < .05. In other
words, those children who had relatively high proportions
of questions in their talk produced few comments on answers
given to questions. That is, non-questioners more than
questioners extended question/answer sequences by their
comments. This supports the central hypothesis of this
thesis that children ask questions because of a motive to
seek knowledge and understanding of their world.
From Table 3.1, the paucity of answers and questions
TABLE3.1




































































































































































































are obvious# The answers constituted only 234 or 13#3%
of the total talk, whilst questions accounted for 202
or a mere 11#$%# Moreover, the proportion of answers
relative to the talk of every child was extremely low.
The same was true of questions except in the case of
one child, Shabir, whose questions reached an
exceptional 54% of his talk#
Table 3#2 shows clearly that the bulk of the data
on questions came from five of the sixteen children
who between them contributed 83#2% (168 out of 202)
of questions# These same children produced 58,1%
(1,021 out of 1,758) of talk, 52.9% (124. in 234) of
answers and 56#6% (774- in 1,367) of comments as is
shown in Table 3#3# Because of the great contri¬
bution of these five children, detailed analyses of
their questions and answers were done on a case by
case basis#
E-Ann
At 60 months the oldest of the five children
selected on the basis of their questioning activity,
she produced 36 questions# 'Explanation'
questions formed the largest category, amounting to
30#6% (11 out of 36)# 'Identity' and 'Placing'
questions tied at 19*4-% (7 out of 36). 'Definition'
and 'Psychological' questions came next, both giving
11.1% (4 out of 36).
TABLE3.2
























































































































































































1.E-Ann 2.Elspeth 3.Debbie 4.Cara 5.Shabir





11.7(20 ) 16.3(288) 12.1(214) 12.1(214) 5.5(98)
%.N
19.2(45) 13.2( 1) 10.6(25) 7.2(17) 2.5(6)
%.N
12.5( 71) 17.1(235) 11.6( 59) 12.4( 70) 2.8(39)
%.N












The next oldest child at 4-7 months produced
22 questions in all. 'Explanation'questions formed
the largest category, forming 31.8$ (7 in 22).
This was followed by 'Process' questions - amounting
to 22.7% (5 in 22). Next was 'Definition', 'Placing
and 'Clarification', each equalling 13.6%.
Debbie
The third oldest child in age at 4-5 months
produced 30 questions out of which 'Explanation'
formed the largest category, 53.3% (16 out of 30).
'Identity' questions came next with 23.3% (7 in 30).
This was followed by 'Psychological' questions, 10.0%
'Placing' and 'Process' tied at 6.7% (2 questions
each out of the total of 30)•
Cara
The fourth oldest child aged 39 months produced
questions which fell into only four of the seven
question categories. Of these, 'Explanation' was
highest at 51.9% (14- in 27). This was followed by
'Identity' 22.2%, 'Process' at 14-*8% and 'Placing'
at 11.1%.
Shabir
The youngest at 38 months and the only male in
the group, his total number of questions of 53 was
largely made up of 'Explanation' questions, 83.0%
(44- out of 53)• 'Identity' and 'Process' came
second in number, each comprising 5*7% (i.e. 3 in
53)o 'Placing' amounted to 3.8% and 'Clarification'
a mere 1.9%.
These are shown in Table 3.4.
Two interesting features emerged from the
question profile of these five children. First,
'Explanation' questions featured the most in the
questions of each child and secondly, only the two
oldest of the children (E-Ann and Elspeth) appeared
to be interested in the meaning of words as reflected
in the 'Definition' questions they asked. Were the
questions being asked genuinely to seek information
or were they being used merely to establish social
contact? In other words, were the children asking
questions for which they could provide answers or for
which they had no interest in the reply?
Alternatively, were they asking truly epistemic
questions calculated to yield information 'to fill a
gap in their knowledge system?
TABLE3.4





























































































If questions were being used to serve an epistemic
rather than a social function, it would be expected
that:
(a) Some of these questions would be specific
prompt questions reflecting a deliberate and
structured search for specific information with which
to confirm or refute an opinion already held as a
probable answer. Now, whilst a lack of prompts would
not necessarily rule out an epistemic function, its
presence may indicate this function. As shown in
Table 3,5, the proportion of prompts in the questions
of the children are low yet these may represent
deliberate and unequivocal use of questions for
epistemic purposes because prompts are assumed to be
cognitively harder to frame. It would be unreasonable
for a child to employ prompts if his intention was
just to attract attention.
The relative absence of 1Explanation' questions
of the prompt type is to be noted because 'Explanation'
questions formed the largest single category of
questions produced by each child, Gould it be that
the children found it more difficult to formulate
causes, motives and justification of actions and had
to ask such questions in a general and open manner?
Or would this question category be the least
TABLE 3.5
Proportion of prompts in the questions of five children











































No. Prompts A 6 10 1 2
Total Questions 36 22 30 27 53
Proportion of
Prompts
.11 .27 .33 .OA •OA
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differentiated for children in this age bracket?
In order to answer this question it would have been
useful to have had a larger corpus of 'Explanation',
'Identity', etc, questions. This would have




I ) Relating to objects,
effect )
0,.^. "Why is the ball rolling down hill?"
Relating to purpose of human action,
II motivation -
— Psychological action,
"Why are you carrying a bag?"
- compatible with conventions,
III justification
^ ^ is 3tealing bad,„
- compatible with logical reasoning,
e.j. "Why is 2, half of 4?"
Identity Questions
Personal - relating to the identity of
Persons and animals.
Impersonal - relating to the identity of objects
Action - relating to the identification
of agents of actions,
Unfortunately we did not have enough data to do this.
83
(b) If questions were in part being used
epistemically, it would also be expected that the
questioner pay attention to answers elicited by his
questions# Much more acceptable indices of
attentiveness like direction of gaze and head-
orientation towards answerer are not available to
us because the story-telling sessions were audio-
tapedo However, the contributions of questioners
to sequences of interaction elicited by questioning
can be used. If children ask questions and
expect answers, they would probably attend to the
questions of others# This is not to say that
factors other than questioning may not be
associated with attentiveness measured by
responses to questions# In fact, as we have
shown in our analysis of the questions of the group
of sixteen children, age correlated with answering
(r = 0.523, p #05)# Even within the presents
sub-group of five children this is also the case
(r = 0#95, p <. #05)# Unfortunately the
proportion of questioning in the talk of the
children did not correlate with the proportion of
answers in their talk (r = -0#3, p > #05) nor dids
it correlate with the proportion of answers at
sequential level 1 (r = 0.006) or sequentials
level 3 (r = -0.205)* The correlation of
s
questions with answers at sequential level 2
was barely significant (r = -0.426, p < .05).
In other words, children who produced a
lot of questions attended less and contributed
less than non-questioners to Question/Answer
responses at SL2. Because of the small number
of questions in the group of 16 children and
also because of the uneven distribution of
questions within the group, the five children
we had selected because they asked more questions
were examined in terms of the levels at which
they responded to questions* From Table 3.6
it is clear that the proportion of answers
relative to the total number of responses for
each child did not seem to vary according to
age on any of the answering levels. These
proportions did not correlate significantly
with the proportion of questions in the
children's talk.
TABLE 3.6













SL1 21 46.7 10 32.2 9 36.0 4 23.5 3 50.0
SL2 H 31.1 11 35.4 5 20.0 6 35.2 2 33.3
SL3 A 8.9 8 25.8 4 16.0 2 11.7 1 16.6
SL3 + Adult 6 13.3 2 6.4 7 28.0 5 29.4 0 0.0
Total
Responses A5 31 25 1? 6
Did the fire children prefer to answer questions
the likes of which they were apt to ask? In order
to answer this the responses at the three
sequential levels (SL1, SL2, SL3) were pooled
for both responses to children's and adults'
questions. It will be recalled that for all the
five children under study, 'Explanation' questions
formed the largest, i.e. the most frequently asked.
As is shown in Table 3,7, 'Identity' questions
were answered most frequently by E-Ann, Elspeth
and Cara0 For Debbie, answers to such questions
tied with answers given to 'Explanation' questions.
The number of responses produced by Shabir was
too small (n = 6) for further consideration.
It is true that 'Identity' and 'Explanation'
questions were in any case the two largest
categories of questions prevailing within the
story context, and naturally answers to these
two categories of questions were bound also to
be numerous. Nonetheless, the great difference
in favour of 'Identity' questions in the proportion
TABLE3.7








































































































Entriesi parenthe esrepresentool dnumb rfq estionsf ll16childr n anddultte chers.
of answers to these two question categories, at
least for E-Ann, Elspeth and Cara is such that
it is tempting to want to suggest an explanation
of preference for if children were asking one
kind of question and answering essentially
another kind, it is likely that the answers
to the questions they were asking were largely
unknown to them. That is, the most frequently
asked questions are likely to be of some
information value to the children. If this
were so, we may tentatively conclude that those
questions were genuine information-seeking




The main hypothesis in this thesis derives
from the position that children, and perhaps
even infants, are motivated to seek an understanding
of events and relations between events in the
world. The hypothesis states that in children
who have come to possess and use speech, this
motivation may be translated into questions proper
or utterances which function as such. When
questions are employed for seeking information,
the attempt is often successful only because it
benefits from the co-operative nature of human
relationships. Now, using questions in a more
and more controlled manner to seek information
within the co-operative bond must follow a
developmental path which starts out initially as
vague and general (from the observer's perspective)
and leads on to the specific and the explicit.
We have approached the data from the point
of view of the premise expressed above. The
question with which we have analysed the data has
been, "What is it (if anything) about children's
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questions that can lead us into seriously considering
the motive behind such question-asking as a search
for information?n We considered two alternative
possibilities. Were the children's questions
epistemic or social?
It is well documented that adults' speech to
young children contain a high proportion of
interrogatives (Ervin-Tripp, 1977; Ervin-Tripp
and Miller, 1977; McShane, unpublished). It is
also well established that such questions serve
more to initiate and sustain social relationships
than to inform or be informed (Ervin-Tripp, 1977;
Blank and Allen, 1976), For example, an adult's
reaction to a child's undesirable behaviour like
spilling milk is often of the form "What did you
do that for?" or "Why did you do that?". Also, -thc(t
questioning is used by mothers to set up a pattern of
mutual exchange or intersubjectivity around their
infants' interests, emotions and actions is becoming
increasingly clear (Murray, 1980), From this
background the observations often made that the
questions of pre-school children are on some
occasions not information^seeking but attention-
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seeking or relationship-seeking (Lewis, 1951;
Piaget, 1959) is perhaps not surprising. But on
what occasions and at what age do children start
asking genuine epistemic questions as well?
And how can these types of questions be distinguished
from those with social goals?
The problems which arise in classifying
(a) utterances which are non-interrogative in form
but are informatioEKseeking and (b) utterances that
are clearly interrogative in form but are not requests
for information but attention and approval seeking
are complex. Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) have
advanced a reasonably satisfactory model to account
for those cues that are used to decide the status
of questions by participants in a formal situation
such as a classroom. Within this situation, a
teacher's question may be no more than a "starter1'
especially if it is followed by another utterance
from the teacher. In such cases the function of the
adults' question would not be information gathering
but a directive. It might serve to direct the
pupil's attention and introduce the forthcoming
thought to the pupil. On the other hand, the same
question from the teacher can be an "initiator"
instigating information from the pupil if the pupil
is al1 owed to speak immediately after it. The point
is that in these two different "situations" the same
question can have different functions or "tactical"
effects, as the authors call them, on the pupil.
Deciding on the status of questions in a relatively
informal situation such as story telling in a
nursery is bound to be even more difficult. A
knowledge of the direction and duration of the
attention of the questioner may be useful in
deciding whether his question was intended to
elicit information. Because we had no measures
of the non-verbal correlates of attention such as
line of regard, we used verbal ones like contribu¬
tions of the questioner to sequences of verbal
interaction engendered ty his question. This is
of course less reliable as non-contribution may be
due to lack of knowledge about the topic.
Robin Campbell (personal communication) has
suggested a method of dealing with this problem.
He considered this method would be especially
suitable for handling what he called attributive
questions. These are interrogatives about the
defining characteristics and identities of objects.
In our category system these would fall within the
category of "Identity" questions. Campbell proposed
that a distinction be made between questions which ask
about intrinsic and therefore relatively obvious and
static characteristics (e.g. the colour of a car);
the other consisting of questions which ask about the
dynamic and changing properties of objects (e.g.
hotness and coldness). The former subcategory could
be considered to lend themselves to social purposes
since their semantic contents are about obvious and
apparent features. The latter could be regarded as .
more epistemic in intent in that they seek answers
to uncertainties. But this would not totally resolve
the difficulty because, although the semantic content
of a question may be apparently social, its semantic
intent may be epistemic. For example, a child asking
whether a red car he is currently looking at is red,
may by so doing asking for the meaning of the word
'red', or he may be seeking attention. How does one
choose between these two possibilities? We believe
that for two reasons we do not have the ideal kind of
data with which to tackle this problem. First, most
children in our sample gave no substantial and usable
amounts of questions. Secondly, most of the general
9A
ambience of the situation was lost in the audio-
record, thus depriving us of useful non-verbal data
accompanying and/or following each questioning event.
One final point: it is possible that the reason
why questioning occurred very sparsely in eleven of
the sixteen children was the size of the group. Two-
child groups are significantly more effective than 4-,
6-, 12- and 24-child groups for eliciting questions
in 3 to 5-year-old children (Torrance, 1970; Endsley
and Gupta, 1978). Groups bigger than two may be
relatively ineffective because of dominance hierarchy
effects, shyness, etc. Besides, having posed a
question within a large group, the questioner could
relinquish responsibility attaching to the questioning
act to other children in the group.
In the next chapter two-child groups were used
in a context where questioning if it occurs would have




THE GAME OF BISCUITS-IN-THE-BOX
INTRODUCTION
The performance of the child-questioners in the story-telling
situation can be said to be a confident, controlled and, apparently,
non-egocentric use of language to communicate. Our explanation of the
basis of this performance is that, in the story situation, the child
himself defined the interest area within which he chose his topic.
The topics as they appeared in the children's questions were classified
as "to their referential functions. Now, the selection of various questions
formats to encapsulate their inquiries about the topics of interest
arose spontaneously. In other words, children voluntarily selected and
controlled a variety of linguistic and communicative behaviours
appropriate to the particular demands of their interests or to those of
their listeners. But the question arises, in a situation where the
initiative is taken from the child concerning choice of topic, game to
be played or task to be performed, would he still be able to select from
his repertoire of linguistic and communicative skills those which are
appropriate both to the situation and his partner-in-communication? The
answer to this question would depend upon the child's mastery of a
number of potential sources of uncertainty or confusion. Some of these
are:
1, The complexity of the situation in terms of the cognitive demands
placed on the child. Does he possess the cognitive skills required?
2, How easily the child can 'read' the situation as a task and come
to an understanding of its purposes. What is he there to do? and
3, How co-operative his partner-in-communication is, given his age,
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knowledge-status, etc. Does the child being tested have to consider
the contributions of others as sources of information, instruction,
etc., in planning towards achieving the set goal?
These are important issues relating to how children perform under
instructions. Children receive instructions not only at school, but
when they are called upon to 'do' psychological experiments. Under
instructions, they may be required to function within the purposes
defined by others. The problem for the child, therefore, becomes
multiplied. He has to overcome certain natural tendencies to interpret
the situation as he would, if left to his own devices, search for what
the instructor might mean and having done this, subject his actions to
those meanings. This calls for a specific kind of control over his
psychological resources (Donaldson, 1978).
One is reminded of the distinction between spontaneous and non-
spontaneous concepts made by Piaget (1959; 1973) and developed in great
detail by Vygotsky (1962). Piaget labelled those ideas about the world
arrived at by the child's own efforts as spontaneous or psychological
and those ideas secured through the help of adults (instructions for
example) he called non-spontaneous or psychosocial. The former,
whether on the plane of action or language, is unreflective and unconscious,
that is, cannot turn on itself or know itself. The latter on the other
hand, can demonstrate a knowledge or awareness of itself. Olson (1975)
used written speech to exemplify this non-spontaneous use of language.
It can be frozen, broken down and synthesised because the processes and
rules are known at a conscious level. Piaget proposed that the child
moves from spontaneous to non-spontaneous use of concepts by becoming
more aware of his dcills and thoughts. This comes about when he
experiences conflict, that is, when he is exposed to ideas and thoughts
that differ from his own. The need to cope with such differences forces
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the construction of an awareness of his own ideas and thoughts which
hitherto would have been automatic and organized at a lower level of
cognitive functioning.
"If a well-adapted action requires no awareness, it is
directed by sensori motor regulations which can then
automate themselves. When, on the contrary, an active
regulation becomes necessary, which supposes intentional
choices between two or several possibilities, there is
awareness in function of these needs themselves."
(Piaget, 1973, p. 41)
For Piaget, therefore, having a conscious grasp of one's thoughts or
actions is a necessary condition for the attaintment of non-spontaneous
concepts. Although he recognised that the family, education and
schooling can play some role in furthering the course of a child's
development of non-spontaneous thought, Piaget has always stressed the
spontaneous aspect of development - that is, "what the child learns by
himself, what none can teach him and he must discover alone".
Vygotsky accepted Piaget's distinction between spontaneous and
non-spontaneous concepts, but insisted that the role of formal and
informal instruction on the development of non-spontaneous (he called it
"scientific") concepts be acknowledged and studied. Spontaneous use of
actions and language hardly ever require tuition or instruction. He
observed that attention and memory become more voluntary and mature as
the child grows older, and all the mental functions necessary for becoming
aware of his actions and thoughts unfold gradually. As they do, the
child assumes an increasing control oyer his psychological resources.
This, Vygotsky partly credited to the informal instructive role of adults
and, perhaps also, peers in the child's life. However, a great leap
forward is achieved when the child goes to school for formal instruction.
What formal instruction does for the growing child is to force a change
in his attitude toward the world. A change from a rich, action-related
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way of representing to a relatively more schematic and systematic mode
of representation. In yielding to this change, the child's spontaneous
concepts permit a closer, deliberate concentration of effort and control -
a kind of auditing of the contents ofhis spontaneous tool-bag for its
essential generalisable characteristics. The reward to the child of
this change in attitude is the attainment of a relative degree of
freedom from the immediate context of action. It is worth quoting
Vygotsky in some detail.
"The inception of a spontaneous concept can usually be traced
to a face-to-face meeting with a concrete situation, while a
scientific concept involves from the first a 'mediated'
attitude toward its object ......
The influence of scientific concepts on the mental
development of the child is analogous to the effect of
learning a foreign language, a process which is conscious
and deliberate from the start. In one's native language,
the primitive aspects of speech are acquired before the
more complex ones. The latter presuppose some awareness
of phonetic, grammatical, and syntactic forms. With a
foreign language, the higher forms develop before spontaneous,
fluent speech. The intellectualistic theories of language,
such as Stern's, which place a full grasp of the relationship
between sign and meaning at the very beginning of linguistic
development, contain a measure of truth in the case of a
foreign language. The child's strong points in a foreign
language are his weak points in his native language, and
vice versa. In his own language, the child conjugates and
declines correctly, but without realising it. He cannot tell
the gender, the case, or the tense of the word he is using.
In a foreign language, he distinguishes between masculine and
feminine gender and is conscious of grammatical forms from
the beginning." (pp. 108-109)
Whilst the examination of the development of concepts per se is not
the main goal of this thesis, the implications of schooling and instruct¬
ing on attentiveness, deliberate control over the child's resources, and
acceptance of initiative and purposes from other persons are of consider¬
able importance in understanding language use in children, including the
use of questions.
The topics being explored in this chapter are as follows:-
Do Nursery school children possess the volitional control of the
communication resources required for effective performance in conditions
where instruction is to be given by one child to another? If so, how
is it exercised? What role does it play in the process of sharing and
understanding between children?
To try to answer these questions, a situation was devised where one
child was given the benefit of a certain experience, which is to hide
a desired object in one of six boxes, which was then locked with a key.
The hider then had to instruct another child on how to use that
experience in guiding the finder's action to retrieve the hidden object.
We looked for evidence of control in the acts and utterances of both
children. Of interest, also, was how they adapted to each other's
expressed needs and moved along the path of mutual understanding.
If on this joint-task, we can show that a nursery school child does
deliberately vary the use of his language and communication resources
to fulfil the needs of his partner, across varying situations, we would
have shown that:
1. The child is aware of the needs of his partner as they vary
across situations.
2. This awareness must have led to a conscious or intentional
choice in the communicative alternatives (of strategies) open to him.
We can then explore the relationship between the two children with
a view to discovering how the attention, and consequently the awareness
of one is directed to the needs of the other. It is the central hypothesis
of this thesis that this is done through questioning.
THE GENERAL HYPOTHESIS
We had some expectations concerning the performance of the children
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under the four experimental conditions set up. The general hypothesis
was that successful performance demanded a considerable measure of
deliberate control over one's communicative resources. In these
conditions, one just did not say anything that comes into one's head or
strikes one as interesting about the boxes and the keys. The purpose
of the game has to be borne in mind in planning, giving and executing
instructions. Also, certain attributes of one's partner have to be
considered. Ford and Olson (1975), in their work on children's descrip¬
tion of objects, found that A- and 5-year-olds had no difficulty in
describing objects when such objects had to be partitioned from a context
of up to five different alternatives. But the children's descriptions
showed "little sensitivity to the immediate context and to the information
that is actually and minimally required by the listeners ,,,", The
authors did not explain why, but only noted that "even at age 7, children
showed no tendency to elaborate the noun phrase in a way sensitive to the
particular referential context of the object". We would like to suggest
an explanation. In a situation where a child's intentions about an
act are not his own, but given to him, such as happens in Psychological
experiments, the task facing him becomes two-fold, as we have suggested
earlier on. Firstly he must come to know what this 'imposed' purpose
really is, accept it, and agree to its reasonableness and workability.
Secondly the child must use his resources as best he could to act on the
purpose. We found an example to support this in the advice of a 5-year-
old child who failed to describe a picture-card (from a set of four) to
the experimenter (E), who was sitting opposite him without being seen.
When the child realised that his assumption that his own cards and those
of E were "arranged the same" was incorrect, he gathered up his cards and
concluded that "You can't play properly .,, isn't it?".
On being told that it was still possible to play properly by trying
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harder, the child, who had started walking away with his hands in his
pocket, turned round to face E and declared.
Child; "You know what to do?"
E: "No"
Child: "Put same number on these four ... on these four"(the set
from which he was to pick and describe one card, so that
E could pick an identical card from E's set) "and
arrange them the same."
E; "Oh, I see ... you mean ..."
Child; "Say that ... say that" (indicating a card) "was there"
(tapping his right side of the table), "then you put ...
then you put the other one there" (moving over and tapping
E's right half of the table)•
Hence, during a dyadic communication game with children, one of the
primary functions of the initial verbal exchanges may be to establish
the prevailing meaning-intention which they can then use to guide the
formulation of a message to their listener. It is, of course, quite
possible that young children placed in the circumstances we have been
describing, will be unable to control their natural inclinations to act
spontaneously. Consequently, they may fail to ascertain the immediate
purposes of the instruction or they may assume that the purposes and,
therefore, the requirements are as they expect them to be. In any
case, the Ford and Olson paradigm did not make any provisions whereby
the children could ask for specific information concerning such purposes
and requirements.
This study was intended to remedy this situation. One is reminded
of the not so uncommon phenomenon of even 20-year-old undergraduates
faced with an ambiguous question in a term test. Unable to grasp the
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real intentions of the examiner, and unable to ask what ■ those
intentions are, they write all they can and all they know about the items




30 Children attending the departmental nursery took part in the
study. All were between the ages of 2 years 11 months and 5 years and
2 months. They were divided into the following three age groups of
10 children each,as shown below.
No. of Mean age Range
children (months) (months)
5-year-old group 10 58.4- (63 - 56) = 7
4-year-old group 10 4-8.6 (52 - 4-6) » 6
3-year-old group 10 37.5 (40 - 35) = 5
There were 5 boys and 5 girls in each group.
Playroom, Equipment and Materials:
The playroom in which the study was conducted was large, spacious
and well lit. It was frequently used by research students working with
the children and thus could be assumed to be familiar to most of the
children.
The materials consisted of three large (8" x 8" x 8") boxes, one
blue, one red-and the other yellow, with a large blue, red and yellow
key to match.
There were three small (4" x 4" x 4") boxes as well, blue, red and
yellow, each having a key of the same colour and size. A small box
could be put inside a large box. Provided also, was a large tin of
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biscuits from which the children picked two biscuits of their choice to
be hidden in the boxes.
A two-room structure was set up inside the playroom. On one side
was a low table on top of which were the six boxes and the keys. A
video camera was trained onto this table. Two chairs stood by this
table, one for the child, the other for the experimenter. This room
was designated the 'hiding' room. The other side, called the 'telling'
room, also had a low table, a nursery chair and a camera scanning it.
There was in the hiding room an electronic control device which allowed
the experimenter to activate the two cameras alternately. Hence, the
goings-on in both the hiding and the telling rooms could be video-
recorded as the hider/finder interaction moved from one to the other.
Figure A.0»1 represents a diagram of this set-up.
Procedure:
The children were brought into the playroom in pairs and asked to
play a game of 'biscuits-in-the-box'. The introduction went as follows:
"I want you to play a game of biscuits. It's very easy, really. One
of you will hide two biscuits in one of these boxes and then he'll go and
tell the other in the next room. The boy (girl) in the next room will
come and find the biscuits. Then you'll eat the biscuits, OK? Now,
who'll hide the biscuits first?" The experimenter then chose who was
to be the hider. The instruction took place in the hiding room in full
view of the boxes and the keys.
There were four experimental conditions.
Experimental condition Ail:
After introducing the two children to the game, the finder was led
into the telling room and sat on the chair provided. The hider, who
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Fig 4: 0:1: The Experimental room
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the six boxes with a "What colour is this?" from the experimenter who
pointed to each box0 Having ensured that the hider could name the
colours of the boxes, the experimenter took a key and, putting it on top
of the box matching it in colour and size, said, "This key opens this
box, OK?", and "This opens this", matching another key with its box.
The demonstration of two keys with their boxes was enough to provoke the
child into matching all the remaining keys with their boxes. He was
then asked to choose two biscuits from the supply tin which was thereafter
put away. The hider then selected a box in which the biscuits were put.
The box was locked and its key put in a heap with the other keys. The
hider was then asked to go and help the finder retrieve the hidden
biscuits. The instruction was as follows:
"Now, I want you to go and tell (the finder's name) where you've hidden
the biscuits. Tell him properly so he can come and find them. If he
finds them, you'll eat them. Now, tell him properly so he doesn't make
a mistake, OK?". Four features had to be mentioned, the size and colour
of both the key and the box.
Experimental condition 4»2:
The procedure for this condition was identical with that in 4.1
except that the biscuits were hidden in a small box which was put inside
a big box of the hider's choice. Both boxes were locked, thus the task
required the mention of eight features, the size and colour of two keys
and two boxes.
Experimental condition 4»3:
This was similar structurally and procedurally to Condition 4.1
except that, after hiding the biscuits in one box, the hider was asked to
"go and bring (the finder's name) here so you can tell him where you've
hidden the biscuits. If he finds them, then you can eat them. Now,
you must tell him properly so he doesn't make a mistake". This gave the
hider the opportunity to prompt the finder in the course of his seeking.
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Experimental condition 1.1:
This was similar structurally to 1.2 in the sense that the small
box containing the hidden biscuits was put in a big box , and procedurally
similar to 1.3, but, having brought the finder into the hiding room, the
hider was in this condition asked to sit on his hands before telling
the finder. The child-hiders were told the reason they were asked to
sit on their hands was because it was not part of the game to point.
In Conditions 1.1 and 1.2 the finder was discouraged from using a
trial-by-error strategy. If the experimenter had reasons to believe that
the finder was stuck, he saved the game from collapse by sending the
child back into the telling room to ask. The finder's trip was justified
or motivated by the experimenter saying "Heyl You know something?
I have an idea. Why don't you go and ask (the hider's name)?".
The experimenter helped with using keys to open or lock boxes if a
child appeared to be in difficulty. Each child-pair got a warm-up
session. In each true session the game lasted for as long as it took
the children to work out the solution of the problem.
It was decided to restrict the study to the children in the
nursery because of the unique experience offered by the story-telling
routine and the advantages to the children of contact with several adults,
mainly research students and staff. Moreover, it would have been
difficult to set up the experiment with video-cameras and the two-room
partition in a non-university nursery.
The use of a small, population of subjects made it necessary to
distribute the children into the experimental conditions using a
schedule that minimised practice effect. The time schedule adopted
allowed at least a two-week interval between roles. That is, children
who served as hiders in one condition, with a particular age-group of
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children as finders, were used two weeks later as finders with the
former finders now acting as hiders. There was also at least a four
week interval between conditions. Presentation of the four different
conditions was counterbalanced, A summary of the design appears in
Table 1+.0.1.
The category system:
The behaviours of both the hiders and the finders were categorised
on the basis of the two main semantic functions of language, that is
descriptive and interpersonal (Lyons, 1977). Verbal and non-verbal
events were used to put behaviours in the two categories. There was a
third category which embraced the children's reactions to one another's
questions and requests. These reactions were judged to be either
adaptive or non-adaptive to the aims of the questions and behaviours
which have provoked them.
I. The category of Descriptive Behaviour:
This embraced verbal and non-verbal signals relating to the
identification of the box(es) containing the hidden biscuits. This
included a description of the physical attributes like colour and size
of the box(es) and key(s); the action to be performed (e.g. "You open the
box") and the location of the box (e.g. "You go in there, in there
the other room."). Non-verbal behaviours in this category included using
the hands to describe the size of the boxes when hider is in the telling room
with finder, or pointing at the box when both children are in the hiding room.
II. The category of Inter-personal Behaviour:
These are behaviours which serve to establish and maintain social
relationships. We recognised five sub-categories dealing with:
1. Attention - getting behaviours
2. Distance - reduction behaviours
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TABLE 4.0.1
(Summary of the design, showing directions in which the test was
run with different pairs of subjects^ as well as the main
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each Condition






As in 4.1, but hider
and finder together
with the boxes




boxes, but hider not
allowed to point
5-> Adult; 5-^4; 5 -> 3/1 Adult;
4-* 5; 4 3/3 Adult;- 3 —> 5;
3-3>4.
5 ->Adult; 5 -> 4; 5 -£> 3/4 -►Adult;
4—>5; 4-* 3/3Adult; 3->5;
3-£ 4 '





* Base of arrow indicates age of the hider and the head of arrow
the finder.
zrr Represents an interval of at least four weeks.
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3. Identification of motives and states of awareness
A. The regulation and control of behaviour
5. Pointing to indicate direction in which the required
action is to take place.
We shall discuss each sub-category in some detail.
1. Attention-getting:
This included devices for obtaining the attention of the addressee.
Verbal devices used for this purpose are, calling the name of addressee,
saying "hey", "listen", etc. Non-verbal examples included eye-contact,
touching and orienting the body of the addressee toward the speaker.
2. Distance-reduction:
These are behaviours indicating 'closeness' between the hider and
finder. Examples are 'moving and getting close to addressee', 'smiling
to addressee', etc.
3. Psychological identification (dealing with motives,
intentions and states of awareness):
Comprised of behaviours indicative of a recognition that other
persons have psychological attributes like state of readiness ("Are you
ready?"); Intentions ("Do you want to •••?"); Capabilities and Limita¬
tions of ability ("Do you think you can do it?") and limitations of
memory ("I'll tell you twice, so you don't forget."), etc.
1. Regulatory or control of action:
This dealt with the actions of the hider when he is instructing the
finder. Did the finder listen and wait till the hider had finished, and
did he (the finder) acknowledge receipt of information given by the
hider? And if so, is the finder's restraint voluntary or is it forced
by the hider? (e.g. holding the finder to make him wait and listen or
saying to him "Don't go ...").
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5. Pointing:
Those are hand gestures indicating to the finder the direction of
the hiding room. They may be accompanied by verbalizations such as
"In there ...", "Go in the other room ...".
III. The Category of Reactions to Questions and Requests:
This had two sub-categories, adaptive and non-adaptive responses.
Included under Adaptive responses are monitoring behaviours. These
are behaviours showing that the hider was following the finder mentally
into the hiding room. Because the two rooms were separated by a thin
sheet of plywood, the hider could hear (but not see) the goings-on in
the hiding room. Such 'eaves droppings' led some hiders to contribute
and supply needed information from across the floor. Some hiders'
questions to finders also qualified for entry into this sub-category if
they were suggestive of aiding the finder's search. E.g. to a finder
who had come to ask the hider where the biscuits were, "Did you not look
in •••?"• The greatest bulk of adaptive reactions though, were hiders'
responses to questions from the finder. These responses were answers
giving more or new information.
The non-adaptive responses were repetitions, no-responses and those
that were plainly irrelevant or unhelpful to the questions and needs of
the finder.
RESULTS
Three general questions guided our analyses. These are related to:
1. How a hider attempts to get a finder to act in the interest of his
(the hider's) aims. This presupposes that the hider is capable of
diagnosing the capabilities of the finder. It also presupposes that the
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hider can act in ways which are sufficiently suitable to persuade and
encourage the finder to act in accordance with his aims.
2. The ability of the finder to attend to the hider's instruction and
use the information contained therein to guide his action to the goal,
which is the retrieval of the hidden biscuits. If the finder runs into
difficulties either with understanding the instruction or with using it
to effectively guide his search, he must be able to give an indication
to this effect.
3. The problem that arises when a hider misjudges either the
capabilities of a finder, or the suitability of the mode that he (the
hider) has selected in conveying his instruction or request. In order
to overcome this problem, the hider must be able to re-organize his
cognitive and communicative resources to adapt to the new knowledge
concerning the finder's capabilities or the adequacy of his earlier mode
of instruction. To come to this new knowledge, the hider may have to
rely on feedback from the finder.
The hider's initial instructions:
In order to answer question (l) above, we examined the hiders'
initial instructions to the finders and found that the number of critical
features contained in the initial instruction of three-year-old hiders
both on the 4-feature task (i.e. experiment 4«l) and the 8-feature task
(experiment ,4.2) was low, achieving the grand mean proportion of 0.23
and 0.27 respectively. The grand mean proportion of the number of
critical features to the required,was higher in the two experiments
for the 4-year-old hiders, 0.56 and 0.39* This ratio was highest among
the 5-year-olds, amounting to 0.87 and 0.71 in experiments 4.1 and 4<>2
respectively. This is shown in Tables 4«li and 4.2.1.
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TABLE 1.1.1
Mean Proportion of critical features in the initial instruction





Proportion3 yr. old 4 yr. old 5 yr. old Advilt
3 yr. old - 0.3 0.18 0.23 0.23
4 yr. old 0.53 - 0.7 0.45 0.56
5 yr. old 0.68 0.92 - 0.95 0.87
TABLE 1.2.1
Mean Proportion of critical features in the initial instruction





Proportion3 yr. old 4 yr. old 5 yr. old Adult
3 yr. old - 0.25 0.27 0.3 0.27
4 yr. old 0.31 - 0.5 0.35 0.39
5 yr. old 0.3 0.87 0.95 0.71
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But of more interest and relevance to question (l) is how the
hiders gave information to the various finder groups. Is the informa¬
tion given in such a manner as to suggest that the hiders attribute
different handling capacities to the finders on the basis of age?
In an attempt to answer this question, we compared the amount of
information in the hider's instruction to the youngest finders (i.e. the
3-year-olds) with those in the instruction to older finders. We found
that the 4-year-old hiders gave less information to 3-year-old finders
than to 5-year-olds on both the 4-feature as well as the 8-feature tasks.
Using the Wilcoxon T test, these differences were found to be statistically
significant (T = 4*5, p < *025, one-tailed on the 4-feature task;
1 = 5, p <. .025, one-tailed on the 8-feature task). 5-year-old hiders
similarly gave less information to 3-year-old finders than to the
4-year-olds on both tasks. These differences were also confirmed
statistically (T = 7.5, p .025, one-tailed for both conditions).
These results are shown in Figures 4.1*1 and 4*2.1 for the 4- and 8-
feature tasks respectively.
In fact, the information in the 5-year-olds' instructions increased
as a function of the age of the finders in both conditions (see Tables
4*1.1 and 4,2.1). This also held true for the 4-year-olds' instructions
when paired with 3- and 5-year-old finders. It is possible that the
hiders gave little information to the 3-year-old finders in the belief
that they could handle only a little of the required features at a time.
It is also possible that they could have expected the young finders to
act first on the given information and come to ask for the rest. In
order to test the latter suggestion, we looked at the post-initial-
instruction behaviours of the hiders when paired with young finders and
we found among other things, that the hiders monitored the performance


























older" finders in the
4-feature task.
4yrs 5yrs
•age of lifer -
Fig - 4: 2:1;
Fhoporhon of critical
features in instructions








the finders as they went along. We shall come to discuss this more
fully when we consider the hiders' reactions to the finaeid questions
and requests. For the moment we want to leave aside the issue of the
amount of information in the hider's instruction and look at those other
behaviours of the hider that accompanied his instruction. It is to be
recalled that our category of inter-personal behaviour comprises
attention-getting and distance-reduction devices, psychological identi¬
fication of motives and state of awareness, regulation/control of
action, and pointing to indicate direction. Are there differences in
the frequency of use of these behaviours by the hiders, to young and
older finders?
Our results indicate that this is so. Tables 4ol.2 and 4.2.2 show
that where the behaviours occur, the hiders used them significantly more
often with the 3-year-old finders than with older finders0 That is, when
the hiders were working with the younger finders, they used pointing to
indicate the direction of the hiding room, employed attention-getting
devices, reduced both the physical as well as the psychological distance
by moving toward and smiling to the finder, restrained the impatient
ones in an attempt to get them to listen, and asked about their ability
and readiness to play the game. These findings, together with the
paucity of descriptive features in the hider's instruction to the young
finders, suggest that the hiders were co-operating in special ways that
are likely to ensure successful performance by the younger finders.
The Responses of finders to the hiders' initial instructions:
The hiders in their initial instructions were solicitously controlling
the younger finders by restraining and directing their communicative
resources to the requisite demands of the game. Examples of these
demands include attentiveness, directionality and a readiness to act on
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TABLE 1.1.2
Frequency of Inter-personal Behaviour Categories Accompanying










































































6 P < .05
Read the table thus: (Q = Cochran ^test)
1 out of 10, 1-year-old hiders pointed to indicate direction to
3-year-01d finders. None pointed when paired with 5-year-old and
adult finders.
5 out of 10, 5-year-01d hiders pointed to 3-year-old finders. None
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the basis of the information contained in the instruction. Now, how
many of these demands can the young finder meet without the benefit of a
helping hand from the hider? Specifically, how much control does the
3-year-old finder have over his attentional resource compared with the
A- and 5-year-old finders?
In order to answer this question, we created from our data an
identical instruction-situation for both the young and older finders.
This we did by dividing all of the hiders' instructions into two types,
one comprising those with half or more of the required number of critical
features, the other made up of instructions containing less than half.
We shall refer to the former type of instruction as "complete" because they
contain all the information necessary to find the biscuits, or at least
enough to lead to an intelligent search. For example, mentioning the
colour and size of the critical box may lead a finder to select a key on
the assumption of a correspondence between the colour and the size of key
and box. The other type of instruction shall be referred to as
"incomplete". On receiving an incomplete type of instruction, we
expected a finder to hesitate and wait in anticipation of further develop¬
ment of the instruction. It was also expected that the finder might ask
for information that was withheld by the hider.
To use our earlier example, a finder might want to be told which key
opened the mentioned box. To summarize, our strategy was to assess the
finder's control of his attentional resource by counting the number of
finders who:
(l) voluntarily delayed attending to incomplete instructions
and (2) asked questions about what he (the finder) thought the hider might
hare omitted.
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hiders receiving incomplete instruction increased with age - there
being three voluntary delays among the 3-year-old finders to 17,
incomplete instructions; ten, among the 4—year-olds to 18 inadequate
instructions and also ten among the oldest group of finders to 16
incomplete instructions in the 1-feature task. The number of questions
asked by the finders also increased as a function of age.
A similar result was found on the 8-feature task in which two delays
were effected by the 3-year-olds to 20 incomplete instructions, 10 from
1-year-old finders to 16 incomplete instructions and 17 delays from
5-year-olds to 20 incomplete instructions. Again, the number of
questions asked by the finders increased with age. This is shown in
Figure 1.2.2. These results indicate a greater control over attentional
behaviours with age.
The Finder's Questions:
We turn now to the analysis of the finder's behaviour subsequent to
his acting on the information first given by the hider. It should be
emphasised that finders were discouraged by the experimenter from opening
more than one box at a turn. This was to ensure that the finder acted
mainly on the hider's instruction. We expected that those finders who
had not been adequately instructed or those who had forgotten some of
the relevant information given, or those who had not received the aider's
instruction because of impatience or distraction, etc., would have three
options to them, viz:
(a) Return to ask the hider
(b) Ask the experimenter
or (c) Remain stuck.
In the case of (a), the finder's questions were regarded as
spontaneous. In (b), the experimenter said it was not his part of the
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game to tell. The finder could, thereafter, use option (a) or (c).
If (a), his questions were considered spontaneous. If (c), the
experimenter 'saved' the situation from collapse by suddenly presenting
the idea that the finder could go and ask the hider. Questions ensuing
under (c) were regarded as provoked. Hence, questions were generated
either spontaneously or under provocation. Apart from the issue of
spontaneity of feedback, our analysis also included the type of question
used. We were concerned to see how specific or 'prompt' such feedback
would be. This is to be contrasted with 'open' or general types of
question-feedback. As discussed in chapter 3, an open question is a
device aimed at discovering the information required to fill a gap in
the questioner's knowledge system. For example, "Where's the biscuits?"
assumes the biscuits are somewhere, but the questioner does not know
where. A prompt question on the other hand,implies that the questioner
is aware of possible whereabouts of the biscuits and demands a denial or
confirmation of the hypothesized location. For example, "Are the
biscuits in the little red box?". Our interest in the specificity of
question-feedback arose from our suggestion in chapter 3 that by the
nature of the answers appropriate to prompt questions, they are relatively
easier to handle by young answerers. If this were so, one would expect
helpful and co-operative finders to direct more prompt than open questions
to very young hiders.
As expected, the three-year-old finders appeared not to know what
they could do after failing to find the box containing the biscuits.
Most of them appeared to lose interest in the game, or had their attention
distracted and switched onto something irrelevant to the purpose of the
game (e.g. building towers with the boxes). Consequently, all of the
70-odd questions from them were provoked. This was not the case with
the older finders. 93.9% (77 out of 82) of questions from the
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4-year-old finders were spontaneous, and only 6.1$ (5 in 82) provoked.
88.7% (63 out of 71) of questions from 5-year-old finders were spontaneous,
whilst only 11.3% (8 in 71) were provoked. Naturally, all adult finders'
questions were spontaneous. It is interesting to note that all of the
4- and 5-year-old finders' questions to 3-year-old hiders were spontaneous.
The few provoked questions from these finders were directed to older
hiders. In other words, 4- and 5-year-old finders did not hesitate in
asking questions from 3-year-olds, but to older children, they were not
always so willing. It is also of some interest that the greatest number
of questions from 4-> 5-year-olds and adult finders occurred when each
was paired with three-year-old hiders as shown in Figure 4»1.3. This
relates to the relative poverty of the initial information (the descriptive
features of the critical box and keys) contained in the instruction of
three-year-old hiders (see Table 4»1.1). Spontaneity of finders'
questions in experiment 4.2 (i.e. the 8-feature task) is roughly identical
to the profile above except that, as shown in Figure 4*2.3, the 3-year-old
finders' questions included 20 spontaneous ones, i.e. about 15% of the
number of questions produced by them. A small proportion of the 4~ and
5-year-olds' questions were provoked, 6.9 and 5*2 percent respectively.
With respect to the type of questions used by the finders, we found
that in experiment 4»1» all of the 3-year-olds' questions were of the
open type. The 4- and 5-year-olds produced roughly equal proportions of
open and prompt question types - 51*2% and 48.8% respectively in the case
of 4-year-olds; and 53.5% and 46.5% respectively for the 5-year-olds.
Eut all of the prompts of the 4-year-olds as well as those of the 5-year-
olds were produced when they had 3-year-old children as hiders. Further¬
more, the older finders each directed more prompt than open type questions
to the young hiders. This is shown in Figure 4.1.4.
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The above results compare in some respects with those found in
experiment 4-*2. Here too, all of the 3-year-olds' questions were open.
But, unlike the results of experiment 4-.1, there were more open type
questions than prompts to the 3-year-old hiders from both 4-- and 5-year-
old finders. However, it is still noteworthy that all of the older
children's prompts were produced when they were paired with 3-year-old
hiders. (See Figure 4-«2.4-«) From the evidence, it appears that the
older children as finders, understood more than the younger ones, some
of the purposes to which different types of questions could be put.
This they did voluntarily and efficiently, especially when they had
younger children as their partners.
We come now to the question of how the hider responded to feedback
from the finder. We dealt with two broad categories of responses.
The first comprised those hiders' responses which satisfied or attempted
to satisfy the aims of a finder who posed a question or made a request.
Such responses will basically provide information about the colour, size,
location, etc. of the boxes and keys as they were required by the finder's
questions. Included also in this category were unsolicited but relevant
information from hiders, based on the monitoring of the finder's
performance in the hiding room. In other words, two types of responses
were covered in this class, one based on actual, the other on inferred
finder-needs. This category will be referred to as adaptive.
The second category, which will be called non-adaptive, comprised
of irrelevant and repetitive responses, or plain refusal to respond.
Our analysis revealed that prompt questions were highly successful
at eliciting adaptive responses from all the children. In both experi¬
ments 4-.1 and 4-«2, only 2.7% (7 out of 260) of such questions failed to
draw adaptive responses from the 3-year-old hiders. All 31 of similar
questions to the U- and 5-year-old hiders elicited adaptive responses.
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Non-adaptive responses to open questions were, in both experiments,
highest amongst the 3-year-old hiders, amounting to 68.0 and 54*4 percent
in experiments 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. This was followed by the
4-year-olds, with 10.2 and 27.3 percent. The 5-year-old hiders
produced only 12.8% (19 out of 149) non-adaptive responses in experiment
4*2, none to 54 open questions in experiment 4*1» These findings are
given in Tables 4«1»3 and 4*2.3« They show that with very young
children, the more specific the form of an enquiry, the greater the
chance of it eliciting information which is direct, relevant and satis¬
factory to the aims of the questioner. General and less specific
queries tended to elicit non-adaptive responses from the younger children
perhaps because such queries did not indicate probable domains of
adaptive responses.
In the two experiments, repetition accounted for most of the non-
adaptive responses, it being responsible for 54*5, 71.2 and 84»2 percent
among the 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds respectively. Refusal-to-answer
contributed 29.8, 20.3 and 15.8% to the non-adaptive responses in the
respective age-groups.
We observed that the older children gave some unsolicited aids only
to 3-year-old finders and not to one another. There were 26 and 29 of
such proffered helps in experiments 4»1 and 4«2 respectively. It will
be recalled that our category system of the hider's responses to the
finder's questions and requests, allowed us to score unsolicited aids as
adaptive.
It would appear from the results in experiments 4.1 and 4.2 that
in a situation of joint enterprise, older children seem to show their
communicative skills best when they are working with younger children
than with children their own age. Their treatment of 3-year-old children
TABLE 4.1.3
Hider's Responses to Open and Prompt Questions in Experiment 4.1
Hider Age
Groups
Hider Response Open Prompt





























Hider's Responses to Open and Prompt Questions in Experiment 4.2
Hider Age
Groups
Hider Response Open Prompt
































demonstrates a knowledge of the young one's capabilities, needs, as
well as how best to tap those capacities and satisfy their needs. This
came out clearly in how they approached the young children prior to and
during the initial instruction; and how they used particular forms of
questions to elicit information from them. We would like to suggest
that the older children's performance, in so far as it is based on the
awareness of the demands of the game and how to help the young children
cope with these demands, implies some degree of self-control on their
part. By self-control is meant the ability to proceed from means to
ends in a manner that is relatively free from distractions. Within the
context of experiments 4.1 and 4.2, self-control would be relatively
difficult to exercise because two ends or purposes would have to be
considered and planned for, in what the child says and does. One
such purpose would be that of his partner, the other, his own.
As we have shown, the older children helped the younger ones
restrain their natural impulse to act and furthermore, by asking prompt
questions, directed their attention to the specific need-areas of the
game.
But to talk about control is to imply a decision, or a choice.
Experiment 4*3 was carried out to determine which system of communication
would be chosen by a hider to describe the boxes containing the biscuits,
when the boxes are visible to both of them. It was assumed that the
gestural as well as the verbal systems of communication are already
available to children at the age of three years. Experiment 4«4
investigated how much control the child had over his gestural system.
It will be recalled that only 3- and 5-year-old children were used on
both experiments and that in experiment 4*4» the hiders were asked to sit
on their hands so that they could not point.
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The instructions of all hiders to 3- and 5-year-old finders in
experiment 1.3 were pooled and examined for incidence of pointing and
the specification of the physical attributes of the boxes and keys. It
was found that only 10% (2 out of 20 cases) of the 3-year-old hiders1
instructions specified either the colour or the size of the target box.
The remaining 90% were pointings augmented occasionally with verbal
directives such as "there", "In there" or "that one". 30% (6 cases in 20)
of the 5-year-old hiders1 verbal instructions specified at least one of
the physical features of the box. The rest of their instructions was
either pointing or touching. The two groups of hiders did not differ
significantly in their choice of instruction mode - both employing
pointing more frequently than giving verbal descriptions. The number
of cases giving at least one verbal attribute (colour or size) in their
description was 2 among the younger hiders and 6 among the older children.
The difference was non-significant (a2 = 2.50, p ^ .05). It was also
observed that all cases specifying the physical features occurred in
response to hesitations by the finder. That is, they were reformulations
of previous gestural descriptions. It does appear that the children
relied more on pointing and touching than giving colour or size in
identifying the critical boXj when it was present for both the hider and
finder to see.
In experiment I.4., the biscuits were hidden in a small box which was
then put in a bigger box. The 3-year-old hiders had difficulty in
complying with the instruction which was that they sat on their hands and
not point. In telling the finder, they either pointed at, or touched
the target box. The older children, on the other hand, complied with the
instruction. In 16 cases out of 20, they leaned forward in their seat
and, moving their heads in the direction of the target box, verbalized
the colour ana size of the box. The difference in the frequency of pointing
132
in the two groups of children was significant (X2 = 26.6, p .001).
However, the superiority of the older children over the young
ones in terms of the degree of control they exercised on pointing,
vanished with the opening of the big box. No sooner did the finders
identify the big box and open it, than the hiders got up from sitting on
their hands to point at, touch, or select the appropriate key to the
small box. Hence, although the older hiders complied with the experi¬
mental instruction by inhibiting their natural urge to point, it was
difficult for them to sustain this control when the goal was nearly
achieved.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
In experiments A.l and A»2, the older children as hiders were
listener-oriented in their instruction to younger finders. They moved
toward them, sought and sustained their attention, in some cases
restrained the impatient ones, pointed in the direction of the hiding
room, generally reduced the psychological distance through smiles and
close physical proximity. Even with the departure of the young finder
into the hiding room, the older hiders maintained a 'mental' contact with
him, inferring and attempting to satisfy his needs. As finders, they
were patient and controlled when receiving instruction from the hiders
and they spontaneously asked the hiders for more information as the need
arose. Furthermore, the questions that were asked of the younger
hiders were specific, thus effectively anticipatory of adaptive response.
The performance of the 3-year-old children contrasted sharply with
our report of their communicative behaviour in the story-telling context
(see chapter 3). In the story-telling, spontaneous questions freely came
from the 3-year-olds. In fact, all 96 of their questions were spontaneous
and there were even a few specific (i.e. prompt) questions from them.
133
But on the 'Biscuit game', very few of their questions were spontaneous.
Indeed, of all their questions in both experiments 4-.1 and 4-.2, only
9.9% were not provoked, and none were prompts. This difference in
performance can be explained on the basis of the degree of control
required to function in the two contexts. The naturalness of the story
situation permitted the freedom to choose which aspect of the story to
explore. This may have accounted for the high frequency of spontaneous
questioning. Besides, having posed a question, the questioner may
relinquish responsibility to older and more able children if the substance
of his question was challenged and queried. The confidence with which
to initiate a course of action and contribute to the process that may
see that course of action through, is conferred on the child by the
co-operative support he feels he can get from those around him. By
contributing voluntarily to the activities of persons in his world, the
child's confidence level increases. He then comes to feel like a little
master who can exercise some control over his world. He can then start
to ask not just the names of objects and the causes of their existence,
but also query the beliefs and ideas of others. The degree of control
needed to co-ordinate his actions with those of his partner in the
'Biscuit-game' may have been too great for the 3-year-old to exercise.
When, however, his partner was an older child who co-operated by providing
an environment of discourse most suitable to his capacities and needs,
then his performance improved.
We defined "control" in terms of an awareness of a deliberate choice
between various means with which to gain an end. This approach to the
issue of "control" has been suggested as a springboard for intellectual
growth by Donaldson (1978):
"If the intellectual powers are to develop, the child must
gain a measure of control over his own thinking and he cannot
control it while he remains unaware of it. The attainment of
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"this control means prising thought out of its primitive
unconscious embeddedness in the immediacies of living in
the world and interacting with other human beings." (p. 123)
The control hypothesis was put to the test in experiment 4.4 and
the results indicate a superlative possession of this quality by the
5-year-old children. Is this the age then, that children start to
grasp the communicative functions of their messages, questions, requests,
etc.? An incident suggestive of the existence of this ability in
4-year-olds occurred during one of the sessions in experiment 4«2.
The child involved had just finished instructing a 3-year-old on
how to find the biscuits and, whilst the young finder was on his way to
the hiding room, the hider shouted across to the experimenter:
"Kayode, have I told him right?"
This, we think, is an example of a four-year-old thinking about the
efficiency and completeness of his instruction and its likely effect on
the performance of the finder. Clearly, he must be aware that his
instruction can be evaluated in terms of adequacy or 'Tightness'.
Prompted by this event, we decided to collect self-reports on why children
ask questions. We got typically "don't know" responses from 5, randomly
selected, three-year-olds. From the 5 selected four-year-olds, however,
came some startling reports, some of which are given below. In
parenthesis by each report is a label of the class to which we felt the
particular report belongs.
Why Children Ask Questions (self-report by 4-year-olds)
1. "Because they want to know things." (Search for knowledge^
2. "'Cause nobody is talking to us." (Initiation of social intercourse^
3. "'Cause people don't know what you're meaning." (Clarification of
intentions.)
4« "'Cause people don't know, don't know what you don't know."
(Drawing attention to one's area of ignorance - with a view to
seeking help.)
135
5. "'Cause you want, want to know, what he want to know." (Asking
aboutintentions of other persons.)
6. "Because people do want to know what they are doing." (About
actions of others.)
7. "Because they want to ask." (Rhetorical.)
These examples lend some support to our suggestion that nursery
school children below the age of five years may already have begun to
develop an awareness of some of the reasons underlying their questioning-
behaviour. This awareness brings along with it a degree of control
over their behaviour. The control, it has been suggested, is a
necessary condition for inter-individual interactions in which the child
has to accept responsibility for his contributions.
Control is considered a necessity if the child is to mentally hold or
freeze an utterance and evaluate it in the context binding the utterer, and
the addressee, and determine its meaning and implicature (Grice, 1967).
Only after this can he plan and formulate an appropriate reply. It is
our claim that control of this aspect of the processes of communication
is only minimally present in the 3-year-old, but is manifestly present
at around the age of A years. It is an important concept which reveals
itself in A- and 5-year-olds as a blanket, which can be pulled over
spontaneous behaviours to restrain them. There is an advantage
conferred on the child by the possession of this blanket, especially as
he moves from situations with differential demands. Since some of his
natural impulses can be held in check, a new situation is perceived as
new. He then stands ready to re-organize his psychological 'tools'
and apply them in accordance to the special demands of the new situation.
In the next chapter a study will be reported in which the child's
ability to question the efficiency of his own instruction to a listener,
in the face of implicit feedback, is explored. In this situation,
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successful communication is predicated on:
1. The child-instructor inferring that the listener feedback must
mean a fault in his instruction.
2. The child-instructor analysing his former instruction so as to
locate the fault, and
3. The child-instructor sending another message to repair or





Human skilled activities have generally Deen interpreted in terms
of a model that specifies three levels of functioning. First, there
is an intentional level constituted by a desire to bring about some
change in the subject's relation to the environment. At the second
level, devices are effected which translate intended acts into perform¬
ance and thirdly there is a regulatory level that allows for the use of
knowledge of results. At this level, there is perception of success
or failure in the attempt to achieve the intended act through actual
performance (Bernstein, 1967; Welford, 1968). Bruner summarises
Bernstein's control theory model of voluntary activity thus:-
"... the carrying out of an activity requires a system
containing an effector which is to be regulated, a control
source which conveys to the system the specifications of
the act intended, a receptor that registers the course of
the act, a comparator that estimates the discrepancy between
intended act and act thus far accomplished, and a feedback
device that converts the discrepancy computed by the
comparator into regulatory signals to the effector. In
short, there is a feed-forward signal from the control source
specifying intention, a discrimination of present state, a
comparison of present achievement with intention, and feed¬
back based on that comparison. This is the essence of
regulated activity." (Bruner, 1969: p. 3)
It has been assumed in this thesis that questioning can constitute
an attempt by a questioner to effect a change in the situation in which
he finds himself. This change may be directed inward, that is to the
self, as when a questioner seeks to obtain for himself information with
which to close a gap in his knowledge system. On the other hand,
questioning may be directed outward at other persons, as it is when a
questioner intends to get others to do something for him they would
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otherwise not have done.
The assumption has allowed us to posit the existence of a co-operative
bond between a questioner and an answerer. The justification for
hypothesizing the existence of this bond has been found by examining the
role played by questioning in establishing and sustaining communication
when children of different ages were engaged in a situation of story¬
telling ( Chapter 3), or undertaking to solve a joint-problem (Chapter U)•
Our analysis of questions in Chapter U dealt with how they were
used to regulate the behaviours of others. This analysis revealed that
whereas both 'open' and 'prompt' questions were successful in eliciting
adaptive responses from older children, only prompts were so successful
with the very young ones. It was argued that prompt questions drew a
proportionately greater number of adaptive responses from younger
children than open questions, because they specified explicitly the
questioner's domains of interest and also suggested possible answers.
All that the answerer had to do was to confirm or deny the proposed answer.
On the contrary, 'open' questions marked or segmented the questioner's
domain of interest only in general terms. Prompt questions then may be
taken as being relatively more explicit about the form of information
they require than open questions.
It is not questions alone however, that can be treated along the
dimension of implicitness -explicitness. Other kinds of information
can be analysed in a similar manner. For example, requesting that a
child hand over a toy car he's currently holding, may be made in one of
the following ways:
1. An outstretched hand in the direction of the toy.
2. Saying the word "Car" ^ outstretched hand.
3. "May I have the car" i outstretched hand.
4-. "Would you mind giving me the car" - outstretched hand.
5. "I want you to give me the car you're holding."
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1-5 are different modes of requesting which vary along the continuum
of implicitness-explicitness. Note that mode 1 is essentially non¬
verbal, modes 2, 3 and 4 are either verbal or both verbal and non-verbal,
depending on whether they are accompanied by the outstretched hand.
Mode 5 is verbal. Without intending to suggest that the non-verbal mode 1
is necessarily less explicit than the verbal mode 5, it is nonetheless
reasonable to suppose that mode 5 is the least equivocal for someone who
understands the language. Similarly, rebukes, warnings, worries,
puzzlements, etc. can each be signalled in ways which are more or less
explicit. The point is that to become a competent communicator in an
adult sense involves being able to make use of implied as well as
explicitly stated information about the wishes or intentions of others.
There are both theoretical and practical reasons for wanting to
study children's understanding of implicit information. The theoretical
interest is compelled by the hypothesis that gestures, facial expressions,
and other kinds of tacit information accompanying linguistic utterances
constitute powerful clues for the child learning language. These clues
help him in understanding meaning-intentions which are then mapped on
to utterances (MacNamara, 1972). Other theorists of child language
development have proposed that, in learning about language, children
must be able to recognise and utilize implicitly given information
within the linguistic context in which they occur (Greenfield and. Smith,
1976; Rommetveit, 1974).
Various approaches have been used to test this hypothesis. One is
to require children to select a pictorially represented facial expression
from a set, and match it with a story describing an appropriate emotional
state, e.g. joy, sadness, fear and anger (Borke, 1971; Chandler and
Greenspan, 1972). Another is to elicit from children verbal descrip¬
tions of line drawings depicting in a cartoon fashion, a person thinking
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about another person, or thinking about another person's actions, etc.
(Miller et al, 1970). Finally, children are requested to judge whether
the actions of an actor in a story are intentional or accidental. Would
the implications or the consequences of the actor's actions be used in
judging? (Imamoglu, 1975). Borke claimed that children as young as
3 years were able to infer correctly the meaning of emotions from the
picture cards. Imamoglu found that 5-year-olds did infer intentional
and accidental acts from their consequences. Chandler and Greenspan
also found that 3-year-old children abstracted information from cartoon
drawings and used it to anticipate the emotional reactions of characters
in a story. These authors disagreed with Borke's interpretation that
the young children, in anticipating the consequences of affect-situations
on story characters, were taking the 'point of view' of another. They
argued that the young children's success could be based on processes of
identification, projection and empathy - relatively automatic processes
which do not negate the existence in the children, of egocentrism defined
as "the inability to accurately assume perspectives different from one's
own". Differences in interpretation notwithstanding, the pant relevant
to our interest is that very young children appear able to recognise and
indeed utilise implicitly given information in drawings and cartoons
concerning the motives of others. Miller and his associates employed
this basic recognition in testing children's understanding of the recursive
property of thought.
A different kind of approach is characterised by the collection of
naturalistic data suggesting that implied linguistic information is
processed by children. Shatz (1978), Dore (1977), Errin-Tripp (1977)
have shown that very young children comprehend and react appropriately
to indirect (and therefore implicit) information in speech acts. But in
the environments in which these studies were carried out, the children
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will have had access to non-linguistic situational clues as well as
some explicit linguistic information accompanying the indirect speech
acts. This possibility makes the findings equivocal.
The practical reason for wanting to investigate children's under¬
standing of implicit information arose from the findings of experiments
4.1 and 4.2 (in Chapter 4) that the 3-year-old child-hiders did not
respond in an adaptive way to 'open' questions from the finders. 'Open'
questions are those which specify a gap in the knowledge system of the
questioner and request that the gap be filled by the answerer. They
take the general form "What is X?" and are thus different from 'prompt'
questions which not only specify a gap in the questioner's knowledge, but
also involve the awareness of possible answers to the question. E.g.
"Is it X?" We suggested that the young children might have found 'open'
questions difficult to answer because they did not contain explicit
statements of what answers might be satisfactory to the questioner's
aims. Could it be that the young hiders did not perceive the relation¬
ship between 'open' questions and the adequacy of their earlier
instruction? Or could they have perceived the relationship but be
unable to locate the inadequacy of their instruction? Or did they
locate the inadequate segment of their instruction, but lack the capacity
to rectify it?
In this chapter, we will be concerned to determine whether a child-
instructor can recognise implicit feedback from his listener and interpret
it as an invitation to examine his earlier instruction. The general
hypothesis is that, given implicit feedback from a listener, a skilled
instructor will utilise it as knowledge of result, for he would assume
that the feedback is related to his instruction. Having made this
assumption the instructor would want to know something about the
listener's understanding (or lack of it) of his instruction. Now, how
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much the child-instructor would in fact know from the implicit knowledge
of result would depend, in part, on how well he can use self-directed
questions to abstract features from the feedback that are relevant to
his original instruction. It is expected that the instructor's subse¬
quent message would reveal the extent to which his self-directed questions
have succeeded in helping to identify the faulty, difficult or incomplete
segment of his initial instruction.
METHOD
Subjects:
The participants were 10, three-year-olds with a mean age of 3 years
2 months (range 2;10 — 3;04) and 7, five-year-olds with a mean age of
4 years 11 months (range 4;10 - 5;02). Sex distribution was about equal
in each group, but this was not a significant factor.
Playroom, Equipment and Materials:
The Playroom was large, sparse and well lit. In the middle was a
table with a very low divide across it. This allowed the child and the
experimenter who sat opposite to see one another, but it effectively
precluded the sighting of the top of each other's half of the table.
A video-camera was situated to the side of the table.
The play material consisted of two sets of picture cards. Each
set comprised 4 cards, 7x5 inches and depicting a large cup. Each
set had a cup with its handle on the left, one with a handle on the right,
another had it in the middle and there was a handle-less one. The right
handled cups had 'oC' written in the top left corners of the card depicting
them. The left handled ones were marked with '^ * in the same place.
The handle-less had ' <5 ' inscribed on them. While those with handles in
the middle were adorned with 'J '. The lettering was done so as to
identify each card quickly on video.
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Procedure:
Each child was tested individually. He was brought into the play¬
room and after a brief chat, asked if he would like to play a game of
cups. Willingness expressed, he was sat in a chair and given a set of
picture-cards. Having ensured that he knew what the drawings were^
by asking him to identify them, the experimenter brought out his own
pack of cards. The two sets were compared and agreement concerning
the similarities of the cards led to the start of the game. The
experimenter sat opposite the child and spreading his cards, advised
the child to do the same. The game started with the experimenter
giving the following instruction:
"Now, I want you to take one of your cards. OK, tell
me about it so I can take the same card from my
side. I don't want you to show me. Just tell me
properly so I don't make a mistake. OK?"
There were two conditions. One in which a low screen stood between
the child and the experimenter. In this conditio:^ the E responded
to the child's initial and if necessary, subsequent messages by giving
facial expressions intended to portray worry and puzzlement. The
experimenter did this by first catching the eye of the child, looking
down and across his cards and pretending to be in difficulty by frowning,
biting his lower lip and scratching the nape of his neck. He also
muttered, grunted and occasionally repeated the child's message whilst
going through the facial expression signalling non-comprehension.
This condition was called the visible facial condition (FC)• The
other condition, called the implicit verbal condition (IVC), had a high
screen between the child and the experimenter, who responded to the
child's initial and if necessary^subsequent messages by giving an implicit
verbal feedback of the sort:
"I don't understand", or
"I can't find it".
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In this condition, the high screen totally prevented the child and the
experimenter from seeing one another. Half the number of children in
each age group did the facial condition first, the other half, the verbal
condition first.
If a child picked the handle-less cup, the game was allowed to run,
but was asked to choose a different one the next time. Descriptions
of the handle-less cup were regarded as warm-ups and therefore not
scored nor reported. Each of the three messages subsequent to and
including the child's initial message, received a feedback appropriate
to its experimental condition. Beyond this, the session was terminated
whether the child was successful or not. Termination was effected by
showing the child the cards one at a time until the target was hit.
Tasks requiring the co-ordination of two or more different perspectives
are difficult for young children to solve (Hughes, 1975). It was for
this reason that this problem was chosen. The advantage of this choice
is that the experimenter could 'genuinely' pretend that the child's
descriptions were inadequate.
Coding of Data
From the children's protocols collected in the two experimental
conditions, four kinds of strategies emerged:
Strategy 1
This was a 'Trial by Error' response involving calling on the
listener (that is, the experimenter) to make a choice which, if wrong on
comparison, would be eliminated, e.g. "Take one and I'll tell you if
you're right".
Strategy 2
This was a 'Placement' response based on the assumption that there
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was a serial order correspondence between the two sets of picture-cards,
e.g.:
"It's in the middle (tapping the middle top of his
table). Yeah, two in the middle, one of those".
Strategy 3
This was a 'Featural' response involving the use of the handle and
its position on the cup. For example, in describing the right-handled
cup in the Facial Condition:
"It has a handle pointing to that door"
(indicating by pointing, the door which is to his
right).
Example from the implicit verbal condition: The child came to the
middle of the table, thereby avoiding the large screen ana said:
"When it's this way (tapping his right of the table),
it's this way" (pointing to the experimenter's left
of the table).
Strategy L,
This was a 'Number' response based on the assumption that the Greek
letters on top of the cards were numbers, e.g.:
"It's number eight, eight at the top".
The first strategy employed by each child was identified. Changes
within the chosen strategy or changes from one strategy to another^
subsequent to each feedback from the listener were noted. The within-
strategy changes fell primarily into the category of addition. This
category comprised of post-feedback messages which elaborated (by provid¬
ing more information) upon earlier messages. Such added information
could be verbal, non-verbal or both. Changes from strategy to strategy
were merely recorded as inter-strategy changes.
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"I have picked a cup"
(Facial Expression)
"There's more cup than there's the mug"
(looks at listener)
"And there's only one mug and two cups"
(Facial Expression) "Hmmm....hmm...."
"... Well, you pick any one ...."
(Hesitates then facial expression)
"Pick any one you want ... and then I'll
tell you"
(Looks from card to card, hesitates, then
facial expression)
(Looks across own cards) "Try the one with a
handle pointing towards you (pointing to
listener) and me (pointing at, and touching his
chest)"
(Nods, smiles)
"The handle is pointing towards me (pointing to
himself) and from there (touching the screen,
then pointing to the listener) you, toward you."
An Example of Intra-strategy changes:
Strategy Message
(3) Child: "Cup with handle this side" (tapping table top
to indicate right handled cup)
Listener: (Facial Expression)
Child: "That side, that side (tapping table top)
Listener: (Facial Expression)
Child: (Looks intently at own cards)
"I don't know my left from right"
Listener: (Looks surprised)
Child: "Not really (shaking head from side to side and
smiling), only when some, only when someone is
putting their hand up"
U7
Strategy Message
Listener: "Hmmm ... hmm ... (Facial Expression, then
raised right hand)
Child: "Right. You got the right hand up (puts a
finger on the right-handled cup, looks up at
listener's raised hand and used his left hand
to project a point diagonally from listener's
right hand to his own, which all along was
kept on the right-handled cup).
"The right hand up. The other side of the
right hand. Like that."
20 protocols were randomly selected from the two experimental
conditions and coded by two naive judges into strategies. Any changes
within, or between strategies were also identified. The inter-judge
reliability was high (f*s = 0.85).
Other relevant behaviours of the child were also noted. By
'relevance' is meant behaviours pertaining to the task of formulating
messages for the listener to decode. These were classified into three
categories:-
(1) Declaration of Intention:
This embraced expressions of intentions concerning actions to
be taken, e.g.: "I'll give you a clue".
(2) Admission of Difficulty:
Included in this category were expressions concerning the
comparison of task-demands and personal competence required, e.g.:
"This will be very hard to do".
"I don't know my right from left".
(3) Questioning:
Events admitted into this category were interrogatives. Their
loci of reference were used to sub-categorise them into 'Psychological',
'Locative' and 'Others'.
"Psychological' questions pertain to the child's awareness of what
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the listener can or cannot do in playing the game, e.g. "You can guess,
can't you?", "You don't know?"
'Locative questions are about the spatial orientation of the
listener's cards - "Do you have a cup with a handle here?" indicating
right or left by pointing), or such attempts as to spatially orient the
listener through questioning, e.g. "Where is your right hand?".
Questions which did not fit into any of the above sub-categories
were placed in the 'Other' sub-category, e.g. "You don't have any mug?".
RESULTS
Facial Condition (FC)
Three post-initial messages were scored per child. The maximum
number of sequences (where a sequence represents feedback from the
listener and the child's subsequent message) for the 7, 5-year-old
children is 21, and for the 10, 3-year-old group, 30.
Whereas the 3-year-old group exhausted all 30 of the available
sequences without a single success, the older children utilised 16
(76.2%) of the available 21 ana achieved 4 successes. The initial
messages of all the children in the two groups were inadequate, that is,
incapable of leading the listener to the target. However, the
listener's facial expressions meant to indicate non-comprehension^were
followed by reformulations of original message among the older children.
To some, this meant changing from one strategy to another and to others
it meant effecting intra-strategy changes. All reformulations involved
pointing. The younger group of children mainly repeated their earlier
messages, especially when forced to abandon what appeared to be a great
tendency to show the listener the target-card. When such visual displays
were ignored or countered with:
"You are not allowed to show me"
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8 out of 10 of the children merely repeated earlier messages which were
typically:
"It's a cup", or "It's a yellow cup"
Otherwise, they were silent, appearing dismayed and confused.
The impression gained was that the three-year-olds were only
minimally aware of the message-structure of the listener's facial
expressions. They suspected perhaps that the listener was in some sort
of difficulty, but the specific nature of it, its relation to their own
messages about the target-card, and more importantly the kind of reform¬
ulations necessary to help the listener, eluded them. Visually display¬
ing the critical card for the listener to see^was an attempt to overcome
the difficulty of the task, but, unfortunately, it was unacceptable.
Its rejection did not yield an attempt to employ a new strategy.
The older children on the other hand, effected 16 changes in their
messages. There were three between-strategy changes from 2 of the
children - one of them started with strategy 3, declared an intention
'to give a clue' in his first post-feedback message, adopted strategy 4
and changed to 2 in his third message, although this led to failure.
The other child started with strategy 1 and changed to 3« The remaining
five children changed within the initially chosen strategy. Within this
strategy^ they changed some of the aspects of their messages - pointing
to themselves, to the listener or to physical referents (like doors) in
the room. The non-descriptive behaviours of some of the older children
gives further support to the impression that they could use implicit
facial information. One of the children asked a psychological question
and 2 of them expressed their intentions before acting on them^in the
reformulation of their messages.
The number of children giving at least one reformulated message
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to the listener's facial expressions is presented in Table 5.1. This
shows that only 2, three-year-olds and 7, five-year-olds produced
reformulated messages. The difference in the number of children who
recasted their messages and those that did not is significant (Fisher
exact probability = 0.0018).
TABLE 5.1
Number of children giving at least one reformulation












n = No-, of children in each age group.
Implicit Verbal Condition (IVC)
The 5-year-olds' initial messages were inadequate, but there were
changes in them following the 'I don't understand' feedback from the
listener. Such changes however relied heavily on pointing which, in
order to be effective, that is, to be seen by the listener, led to the
children either getting up from their chair or leaning to one side of the
big screen to point in the direction of the cup handles. One child
admitted the difficulty of the task, saying:
"This will be very hard to do"
whilst stretching up a hand and asking the listener if the up-stretched
hand could be seen.
It is instructive to note that only 1 out of the 7, 5-year-old's
initial messages utilised pointing to accompany the verbal descriptions.
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Clearlyj pointing could be of no communicative value in this condition
because it could not be seen by the listener. However, when verbal
messages proved insufficient, pointing became irresistible. To the
first implicit verbal feedback from the listener, the children's pointings
to augment their verbal descriptions were scored as re-formulations of
messages. Repeated pointing-responses to second and third feedback
from the listener were coded as non-reformulations. There were 12 of
such repetitions out of 19 responses generated from a possible set of
21 listener-speaker sequences.
In contrast to their performance in the facial condition, there
were only 3 successes. Furthermore, there were no between-strategy
switches, all seven children effecting post-feedback changes within the
initially chosen strategy. Two children started with strategy 2 whilst
the remaining five chose strategy 3, which is, using the handle to
differentiate the target from the non-targets for the listener. The
small number of successes notwithstanding, the fact of the children's
reformulation at least to the first feedback from the listener, is some
evidence that they realised the inadequacy of their original messages.
The three-year-old children experienced great difficulty with this
experimental condition. Like their performances in the facial condition,
their initial messages were colour bound, inadequate and devoid of any
discernible strategies. Their typical initial messages were of the kind:
"A cup ... yellow cup".
Post-feedback messages were mainly repetitions (21 responses out of
30 possible messages)• The remaining 9 responses were attempts to
bring the card over to the listener to show him, these being coded as
non-reformulations. The number of children giving at least one
reformulated message in response to the implicit verbal feedback from the
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listener is presented in Table 5.2. This shows that all 7 of the five-
year-olds did reformulate, whereas none of the three-year-olds did.
The difference is significant (Fisher exact probability is 0.00005).
TABLE 5.2
Number of children giving at least one reformulation












n = No. of children in each group
The proportions of reformulated messages in the two conditions are
presented in Table 5.3.
TABLE 5.3
Proportion of reformulated messages in two age groups of
children under two different conditions of implicit
feedback from listener
Age
















Number of responses are in parentheses.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The pattern of results in this study indicates that the 5-year-old
children's messages were constrained by implicit feedback provided by the
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experimenter in the facial condition as well as in the Implicit verbal
condition. The greater proportion of reformulation of messages in the
facial condition^ compared with the verbal condition, may be due to the
availability of visual cues in the former condition. Because the child
could see the listener scanning his cards and looking worried, he could
not escape the impression that his listener was in some sort of difficulty.
The context of interaction, that is, the task mutually engaged in by both
participants^ may have encouraged the child in his attempt to draw a link
between his inference of listener-difficulty and the pre-feedback
message that he gave. What is to be done to help the listener overcome
his difficulty? Two options appear open to the child - (a) he may
repeat his message on the assumption of a memory failure or hearing
difficulty on the part of the listener, (b) he may examine his message
on the assumption of a possible deficiency,, The second option may lead
to a reformulation. Whatever the choice of the child, it can only be
made as a result of his asking himself the following questions:
(1) What does the listener's facial expressions or utterances
mean, and do they relate to his message to the
listener? If so, how?
(2) Having inferred the meanings and the intended requests
from the feedback from the listener, how can he use
them to help the listener?
Now, these very questions must underlie the child's performance in
the Implicit Verbal Condition, but here the child had only the utterances
of the listener to rely on as cues. With vision cut off,due to the
large screen separating the child and the listener, the child may have
been forced into trying to establish visual contact necessary to render
his post-feedback gestural reformulations effective. The only other
alternative was to use a purely verbal description of the target - a
difficult feat requiring a heightened level of control necessary to resist
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the constraint imposed by some perceptually salient but functionally
unhelpful aspects of the task. This is so, because the target, i.e.
the critical card, was in front of the child and its presence is likely
to have directed his attention only to some perceptually salient features
of the card which may in turn constrain its full description (Brent and
Katz, 1967; Blank, 1974)o Nevertheless, it emerged that the 5-year-olds
demonstrated some sensitivity to the communication needs of their
listener, even when such needs had to be inferred from Implicit verbal
and non-verbal cues.
This contrasts with the findings of Peterson, Danner and Flavell
(1972) who engaged 4- and 7-year-old children on a "guessing game" in
which they instructed each child to describe nonsense figures drawn on
cards to an experimenter sitting opposite him. The experimenter then
gave three kinds of information to the child. In one condition, he gave
explicit indication of what the child was to do to help e.g. "Look at it
again. What else does it look like?" In another, called the Implicit
Condition, the experimenter's request for help were implicit and took the
form "I don't understand" and "I don't think I can guess that". In the
third condition, the experimenter "gave stereotyped facial expressions
that indicated puzzlement and bewilderment". This condition was called
the Facial Condition. The authors summarised their findings thus:-
"Both 4- and 7-year-old children readily reformulated their
initial messages when explicitly requested to do so by the
listener, and both failed to reformulate when confronted only
with nonverbal, facial expressions of listener non-
comprehension. In contrast, only the 7-year-olds tended to
reformulate their messages in response to an implicit rather
than explicit verbal request for additional help ..." (p. 1463)
Peterson et al's 7-year-olds did not reformulate in the facial
condition whereas our own 5-year-clds did reformulate in our own facial
condition. This prompted a closer examination of the three conditions
of Peterson et al. We found that their Implicit Condition approximates
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our own facial condition in two important senses, viz:-
(1) Although the experimenter in Peterson et al's study did not
consciously provide facial expressions of non-comprehension in the
Implicit Condition, they could not have been totally excluded because
visual contact was maintained between the experimenter and the child,
(2) In our own Facial Condition, the experimenter unwittingly
provided vocal accompaniments (like grunts, mutterings and occasional
repetition of the child's description) to his facial expressions.
Comparing the performance of the children in these two conditions
we found that U- and 7-year-olds in the study of Peterson et al
produced 30% and 83% message reformulations respectively. This
compares with the 17% and 100% message reformulations scored by our
3- and 5-year-old children respectively.
We may on the basis of our findings and those of Peterson et al,
conclude that 1-, 5- and 7-year-old children recognised and met the
listener's requests contained in implicit verbal feedback especially
when augmented with facial cues, A recent study by Bacharach and
Luszcz (1979) has provided additional evidence in support of our
conclusion. Bacharach and Luszcz invited 3- and 5-year-old children
to describe a series of picture cards,one of which depicted a horse
pulling a wagon, another, a bee sitting on a flower, etc. Before
exposing a card to the child, the experimenter made a remark such as "Did
you know that horses can do a lot of different things? Horses can run.
Horses can jump fences. Horses can eat hay. Here's a picture
(exposing picture of horse pulling a wadjon), tell me about it."
This type of remark was intended to focus the child's attention on
the action portrayed in the picture. Another type of remark made by
the experimenter was designed to focus the child's attention on an object
156
depicted in the picture. An example prefacing the exposure of the
picture of a horse pulling a wagon is "Did you know that there are a lot
of different kinds of animals? A cow is an animal. A rabbit is an
animal. A cat is an animal. Here's a picture, tell me about it."
The authors found that the children's productions indicated that the
5-year-olds identified and used the implicit suggestion given by the
experimenter to constrain their descriptions of the picture cards. The
3-year-olds on the contrary did not utilise the implicit information to
structure their comments.
Where do three-year-olds stand on this issue? When listeners are
minimally co-operative by giving only implicit feedback, very young
children experience great difficulties. This conclusion may be drawn
from their performance on both the facial and the Implicit Verbal
Conditions. Their failure to modify their messages in response to
implicit verbal or non-verbal requests can be explained in several ways.
One explanation may be that the children have not yet developed the
necessary communication skills required to identify and translate the
listener's requests from the tacit cues. Another explanation may be
that the children can identify that a request has been made and are
capable even of examining their own pre-feedback messages with a view to
modifying them, but would not do so until specifically and explicitly
requested so to do. Yet another explanation may be that the children
possess the pre-requisite communication skills necessary to decode the
listener's request, but are unable to specify the particular flaws or
inadequacies in their pre-feedback messages. In other words, they may
have inferred from the listener's cues that some requests for help have
been made, but were unable to identify what sort of help. Now, there
seems to be an obvious relationship between the latter two explanations.
Ey explicitly asking a child to examine his messages for inadequacies,
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a listener would be forcing the child's attention to the listener's
specific need-areas, and thereby helping him identify the sort of help
required. What we are suggesting is that very young children may not,
of their own accord^ question the communicative efficiency of their
messages to an older person nor even do so when the listener's request
is vague and implicit, even though they can from such cues infer that
something is wrong with those messages. But when led to do so by the
listener asking for specific information as in the adults' and older




SUMMARY. CONCLUSION AND GENERAL DISCUSSION
GENERAL SUMMARY
In the introduction we found that the interrogative is one of
several ways of expressing an objective, and perhaps achieving it through
the agency of another person. The interrogative we found, has a
social-demand characteristic which requires at least an acknowledgment
from the addressee. Questioning is, therefore, an act based on co¬
operation and this suggests that questions may be regulated by the
Co-operative Principle broadly outlined by Grice (1967) for language.
The characteristic features of Grice's co-operative principle include
informativeness, relevance, clarity, orderliness and the avoidance of
falsity and ambiguity. But the degree of co-operativeness between a
questioner and an answerer, when judged in terms of adherence to
specific features of the Co-operative Principle, varies from culture to
culture (Keenan, 1976). It also varies from one social class to
another within the same culture (Robinson and Rackstraw, 1972), or it
may depend upon the relative status of the questioner and the answerer
(Soskin and John, 1963).
Furthermore, when a child asks a question of an adult, the child has
a particular aim or motive - to gain needed information, to attract
attention, etc. The act of question-asking as an expression intended
to satisfy that motive may be just one of many means believed by the
child to be appropriate to that end. Combining these two perspectives,
that is, conceiving questioning as (l) an expression of an inner psycho¬
logical state or desire and (2) as an expression of an intention to
secure the co-operation of another in the satisfaction of its desire,
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the implication is made that the child as a questioner must recognise
appropriate powers, knowledge, etc. of the person to whom the question is
directed. The child must also believe in the willingness of the person
to co-operate with him in the attainment of his motive. Do young
children recognise and attempt to co-operate in the fulfillment of
similar question-asking motives in others? Our pilot test constitutes
an attempt to decide whether this problem is well posed.
Basically, the test situation was one in which the child was cast
in a superior knowledge-status relative to a toy chimpanzee who wanted
to learn about some objects visually present to them both. As might
be expected of a young learner, the chimp asked a lot of questions and
made two types of errors - misidentification of some of the objects and
errors of reasoning. It was found that the 5-year-old children were
more spontaneous than the 3-year-olds in identifying the names and
functions of the objects to help the chimp. Furthermore, the older
children responded more to the chimp's questions, correcting him and
even joking with the experimenter over some of his errors. This was
interpreted to mean that the older children were relatively free of the
artificiality of the situation - an attribute likely to encourage the
acceptance of the status and responsibility attaching to their role as
instructor and at the same time, to provide the basis for dealing with
the 'learning' role played by the chimp. This was in contrast to the
performance of the younger children who were heavily dependent on the
experimenter's intervention as a condition for answering the chimp's
questions. In other words, the younger children were unable, in the
experimental circumstances, to pretend that the chimp was a purposeful
person from whom one could expect and entertain questions.
The problem concerning children's recognition of a willingness to
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co-operate in the satisfaction of quests from others may have been well
posed, but the situation clearly was inappropriate. The limitation of
the younger children in giving purpose to acts of the chimp in this
situation led to a search for a less artificial environment in which both
3- and 5-year-old children would be relatively free to ask and answer
questions.
We chose to observe children's questions and answers during story¬
telling because of the theoretical expectation that situations of
novelty, surprise or uncertainty built into a story are likely to provoke
the use of questions in children's attempts to resolve such uncertainties
and understand such novelties. We hoped that an analysis of children's
questions and answers would shed some light on their ability to perform
two acts. First, to ask about aspects of the world that they consider
interesting, and second, to challenge or query the opinions and views of
others that run counter to theirs0 Consequently, we distinguished
questions which were interaction-initiating from those that functioned
as interaction-sustainers. The former were classified into seven
categories on the basis of their referential functions. These are
Identification, Definition, Placing, Explanation, Process, Psychological
and Clarification, and each category was dichotomised into open and prompt
types.
Identification questions are those asking about the names of people
or objects or the labelling of actions. They are characterised by 'who'
and 'what'. For example, "What is a daddy lion?".
Definition questions are concerned with the meaning of words. For
example, "What's 'worn out' mean?".
Placing questions request the location of events, objects or
persons in space or time. 'Where' and 'when' characterise spatial and
temporal questions respectively. An example of a spatial question is
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"Where's his eyes, Mrs. Strachan?". An example of a temporal question
is, "Was I born before Beverley?".
Explanation questions are those concerned with the logical relation
of cause and effect or the incompatibility of observed and expected
events. An example of the former is, "Is he sad because he lost his
mum?". An example of the latter is "Why does the doll have 3 hands?".
Process questions relate to the state, manner or process by which
a particular state of affiars has, or will come to be. They are
usually characterised by the interrogative word 'How'. An example is,
"How did the fox get in?".
Psychological questions are those which indicate that the questioner
is aware that other persons have desires, intentions, knowledge, beliefs
and thoughts which may differ from his own. Examples are:
"Do you know what happened yesterday?" (asking about the
addressee's desire).
"Do you know sometimes people think foxes turn into fishes?"
(knowledge or belief of another person).
"Do you think that the wee red hen knowed that the big
stones would kill the red foxes?" (is the hen's action
intentional or accidental.)
Clarification questions are those seeking repetition, expansion and
specification of segments or an entire previous utterance. Character¬
istic interrogative words are, 'Huh', 'a what' and 'which'. An example
is, "Buying a hat, did you say?"
Open questions are those that mark the questioner's domains of
interest in general terms. For example, a child who wants to know the
name of an object may express this by posing the question, "What is that?"
The assumption is made that the object has a name. Prompt questions on
the other hand specify more explicitly, the questioner's domain of
interest and in so doing, present the child's knowledge about a possible
answer to his question in the form of a hypothesis. For example, "Is
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that an X?"
Interaction-sustaining questions were treated along with other
responses of the non-query type within a sequence, as answers. These
answers were categorised into three levels on the basis of how they
responded to questions.
The primary answer level is called the sequential level 1 (SLl).
This comprises of a question (of whatever referential category) and an
answer that 'terminated' the sequence of interaction.
Example of SLl
Question: Is he going to be sick?
Answer : I don't think so.
The second sequential level (SL2) starts as in SLl with a question
followed by an answer. Then the questioner or a third child offers a
statement that adds to, deletes, negates or in some other way modifies
the answer. The third child's contribution, or the first answer may
be further commented upon and so on. An important characteristic of
this sequence is that all the contributions are tied to the same topic.
Example of SL2
Question: What's that? (pointing to a cat in a story book)
Answer: There's a cat.
Comment^: It's like the tiger
Comment2: A mini-tiger it's like
Comment^: (Laughs) Like mini carsI
The third sequential level (SL3) is also initiated by a question
which successfully attracts an answer. This answer however, or a
comment on it, receives a query either from the questioner, the answerer
or a third party. Where an adult is involved in a sequence of this
type, it is called SL3 + adult. But where no adult participation is
involved, it remains SL3. The essential feature of this sequential level
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is that it contains at least one queried answer within each sequence -
the assumption being that an answer is called into question because it
is doubted in its completeness or appropriateness in satisfying the
motive of the original questioner.
Example of SL3
Questions The wee red hen would be pleased now, wouldn't she?
Answer: Yeah.
Questions But what happens if the wolf comes?
Answer: She'll have to keep out of the way.
Questions But what happens if ... if three foxes come to
eat him all up?
The talk of the group of 16 children was partitioned into answers,
comments and questions in order to establish the extent to which the
children had prone tuss for questioning. Total amount of talk was not
correlated with the proportion of questions although there seemed to be a
trend towards more questions with more talk. Amount of talk did not
correlate with the proportion of answers. Age did not seem to bear any
strong influence on the amount of questioning or comments. However,
younger children did produce more talk than the older children. It was
thought possible that the older children talked less because they were more
attentive to the stories. Furthermore, it was reasoned that their
attentiveness and knowledge might lead them to provide more answers to
questions. This expectation was tested by correlating age with the pro¬
portion of answers in the talk of the children, and was confirmed,
(r = 0.523, p .05).
Children could engage in question asking for two reasons. First
to seek information and secondly to attract the attention of others and
regulate relationships with them. Which of these purposes was the under¬
lying one in the story context? It is possible that both factors could
be at play, but, acting on the assumption that one was likely to be
dominant, we correlated the proportions of questions with (a) the propor-
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tions of comments on the stories and (b) the proportion of answers to
questions on sequential level 2 (SL2). Answers functioning at this level
were by definition comments on the basic Question/Answer sequences of
interaction,. They would indicate the contributions of a questioner to
the answer(s) given to his question# As such they might be regarded as
evidence of interest or attentiveness, this being taken to mean that a help¬
ful answer was expected to be given to his question# The correlations
between the proportions of questions and their associated comments and
sequential level 2 responses were -0.4-55 and -0.426 respectively# Both
were significant at the 5% level# In other words, those children who
asked many questions tended to produce few comments to the stories and
contributed only a few answers to question/answer sequences. Two views
might be taken of this result, either the children who were proficient
questioners were using questions epistemically and so could not really be
expected to comment on the answers given to their questions because they
were deficient in the relevant knowledge; or they were not really expect¬
ing or interested in answers to their questions because those questions
were not true information-seeking but rhetorical attention-giving devices#
The difficulty of choosing between these two options was increased by the
small sample of questions for the group as a whole, and also by the uneven
distribution amongst the children of the few questions that were asked#
In an effort to overcome the sampling difficulty five children who
produced the bulk of the questions were selected for further analysis#
Unfortunately, this analysis did not throw light on the above issue as
neither age nor proportion of questions related in any consistent way to
ability to respond at any of the three answer levels (i.e. sequential
levels 1, 2 and 3)#
These five children, thoughr«n.g Uvj in age from 38 months to 60 months,
with a mean of 4-5 #8 months, all produced more 'explanation' questions
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than any other. Moreover, in all but one case, 'identity1 questions
ranked second. Only the two oldest children asked any questions about
the meaning of words. Another interesting feature of the children's
questions is the presence of prompts which despite their small number,
indicated some deliberately structured search for information with which
to ratify or reject a piece of information already held. It was thought
unlikely that a child would go into the cognitive trouble of framing a
prompt type question if his intention was merely to seek attention - it
being assumed that 'open' questions are cognitively easier to formulate
for this purpose.
It was also found that although the children asked 'explanation'
questions much more frequently than any other kind of question, they
gave answers most frequently to 'identity' questions despite the fact
that there were many more 'explanation1 questions for them to answer.
This dispariiy was used to argue that questions were being used mainly
for epistemic purposes, the main thread of the argument being that if
the children did not answer the kind of questions they most frequently
asked, it is plausible that they were asking that kind of question
because they wnated to find out something they did not know and could
not discuss.
The evidence we have procured for the epistemic use of questions
by nursery school children in story telling is thin and the grounds
on which our arguments rest are tenuous. This is principally because
the sample of talk available was too small. The meagre production of
questions was probably due to the size of the group of the children.
It was therefore decided to contrive situations where pairs of children
would work on tasks designed to elicit a good sample of convincing
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epistemic questions#
The game of "Biscuits-in-the-box" was an attempt to
displace the source of the intentional, structure to one in
which a reward desirable by two children was obtainable
only through a joint effort# This was to ensure that
neither child could act outside the purposes and
requirements of his partner if he was to secure the
biscuits which where used as the desirable reward# One
of the children hid the biscuits in one of six boxes#
He then told the other (the finder) where to look for the
biscuits# The 'telling' room was separate from the
'hiding' room#
In the experimental conditions 4*1 and 4#2, the hider
instructed the finder outside the room containing the
boxes, one of which contained the biscuits# In these
two conditions, 5-year-old hiders were paired with adult,
4— and 3-year-old finders# 4-year-old hiders were paired
with adult, 5- and 3-year-old finders# And 3-year-old
hiders worked with adult, 5- and 4-year-old finders0 We
found the following:-
1# As hiders, the older children (4- and 5-year-
olds) gave less information in their initial instruc¬
tions to finders younger than them-
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selves^ thus indicating a sensitivity to the (presumed as opposed to the
actual) information handling capacities of the young finders.
2. With respect to interpersonal behaviour, the older children,
when serving as hiders, also behaved differently to young and old finders.
They smiled more to young finders, secured their attention, restrained
the impatient ones, asked about their capabilities to do the required
task and monitored their progress in the hiding room. In this, they
were vastly superior to the 3-year-old hiders.
3. The older child-hider's responses to both prompt and open
questions from finders^were highly adaptive, whilst the young child-
hiders produced adaptive responses to prompt questions only. Repetitions
and refusals accounted for most of the non-adaptive responses in both
groups of hiderso
A. As finders, the older children were less impulsive than the
young ones in acting on the information received from the hiders. They
asked questions from hiders, especially when the role of hiding was
played by younger partners.
5. When post initial instructions were discovered to be inadequate,
this led in the main, to spontaneous questions from older finders.
Young finders on receiving similar instructions, had to be manoeuvred by
the experimenter into asking the hider for more information.
It was as if they did not match the given information with the task-
requirements and so could not tell whether the given information was
adequate or not.
6. Questions from older finders to young hiders were more specific
than to older hiders. That is, they were more frequently of the prompt
type. Young finders were not discriminatory, asking mainly open type
questions.
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It would appear from these findings that in a situation of joint
undertaking, older children were more capable than the young ones in
teasing out the relevant aspects of the task demands, directing the atten¬
tion of co-participants to them, and making their own actions as well as
those of their partners rest on those abstracted features. We argued
from this, that an awareness of possible alternative solutions to problems
may be better developed in the older children than in the young ones.
Now, to act on the basis of this awareness^implies a degree of self-control,
defined as involving at least the ability to resist spontaneous and
impulsive first choices. The fact that the older children showed their
skills best when paired with younger ones indicates on their part, not
only an awareness of some of the limitations of the younger children, but
the ability also, to act on the basis of it. This seems to be one of the
essential differences between 3- and 5-year-old children.
In experimental Condition 3 we demonstrated that 3- as well as
5-year-olds spontaneously chose to point rather than offer verbal
descriptions^when the object to be described was in full view of both the
hider and the finder. In Condition however, where the hider was
instructed to sit on his hands in order that he might not point, it was
found that the older child-hiders, verbally identified and described the
visually present object to a nearby finder without pointing.
The three-year-old hiders could not resist the urge to point. We
interpreted this as a demonstration of the relative lack of control over
pointing behaviour by the young children.
We concluded that although young and older children can give and
follow instructions on simple joint tasks when such tasks are born not
out of their own initiative alone, the inter-personal requirements
necessary for this achievement, and the extent of the children's reliance
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on it, varies according to the age of the child. The very young child
seems to require a maximally co-operative environment in which:
(a) His spontaneous and impulsive actions can be restrained
by others. Or they can be used to assist in the compre¬
hension of his purposes.
(b) His attention can be directed to, and focused on the
relevant and saihent aspects of the task.
and (c) When information is required from him, the type of
information will be specified explicitly to him.
In other words, young children have more to be carried along on
the initiative and directive of another person,if they are to participate
in the attainment of a joint venture. Older children on the other hand,
are less dependent on the initiative of their partner. This we claimed,
on the evidence of the superior control they demonstrated over their
actions and in particular, over their questioning skills.
One of the variables which seemed to benefit young children's
performance when, as hiders, they were requested to give information,
was the nature of the request, in particular its specificity. Prompt
question-types which, by definition, are very explicit requests, elicited
adaptive responses from 3-, as well as 5-year-olds. But open question-
types whilst generating adaptive responses in the older children, created
extreme difficulties for the younger ones. We suggested that this was
probably because open question-types did not specify explicitly for the
childj the relevant segment within the domain of inquiry.
This suggestion was put to the test in the "Gup" experiment
(Chapter 5) in which 3- and 5-year-old children were used as subjects.
The child sat opposite the experimenter and each had a set of U picture
cards identical one to another. On one card was depicted a cup with
its handle on the left, on another, a cup with its handle on the right.
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The third had its handle in the middle and the fourth was handle-less.
The child was to select one picture-card from his set and describe it
so that his listener (the experimenter) could pick an identical one
from his own set.
There were two conditions. In one, the experimenter responded to
the child's description by giving facial expressions intended to portray
non-comprehension. A divider, low enough to permit visual contact but
high enough to preclude both of them seeing the top of each other's half
of the desk, was installed. In the other condition the experimenter
responded to the child's description of the cup by saying that he did
not understand. A high divider totally cut off visual contact between
the child and the experimenter. The two kinds of responses or feedback
from the listener (one verbal, the other non-verbal) were deliberately
structured to be non-specific, i.e. implicit about the needs and
difficulties of the listener. Our concern was to see if the children
would recognise this implicit information and act accordingly on it.
To act accordingly in this task,requires that the child reformulate his
earlier description of the picture card. We found that in both
conditions, the 3-year-old children did not reformulate their descriptions
of the chosen picture card, whereas the 5-year-olds did to a significant
level. The success of the older children was thought to be due to their
recognition of the implicit feedback as an indication of the inadequacy
of their pre-feedback descriptions. This recognition, it was further
argued, might have led to the children asking themselves what was wrong
or insufficient in their preceding descriptions. An examination of
those pre-feedback descriptions might then have been set into motion,
culminating in the identification of the source of error or inadequacy,
and in some cases, leading to successful reformulations. In other words,
the implicit information from the listener might be construed as an
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invitation or request to analyse the consequences on the experimenter's
task, (picking an identical card) of the child's descriptions. But it is
important for the process of analysis that the child be able to ask
himself the right questions, such as:-
1. Why is he (the experimenter) confused? Why can he not pick
the card as I told him to?
and 2. Could his inability be due to a shortcoming in the description
I gave? If so, how can the description be improved?
The inability of the young children to offer reformulated descrip¬
tions in the two conditions of verbal and non-verbal feedback cannot be
due to a failure of the recognition of the implicit information as an
indication of the difficulties experienced by the listenei^ because they
did make attempts, albeit inappropriate, to show the target cards. It
was suggested that their failure at reformulation may be due either to
an inability to spontaneously raise question (2) above, or an inability
to locate the possible source of error in their pre-feedback message,
without the guidance of an explicit prompt-type question. In other
words, they had insufficient autonomous self-examination to permit them
to give the aid implicitly requested.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AMD DISCUSSION
In the pilot study reported in Chapter 2 we found that very young
children felt the distinction between the human agency and that of
artificial animation of a doll, to be important. They found it natural
to confer on humans the "right" to ask them questions and advance
suggestions, but denied the same to the artificial agent. Older children
too recognised the two types of agencies, but co-operated with both with¬
out much discrimination, answering the questions asked by the "pretend"
agent.
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A paper by Brown and Levinson (1978) borrowed the concept of "the
face" from Goffman (1967) and developed it into a formal characteristic
possessed by "all competent adult members of a society", and acknowledged
in one another. Brown and Levinson (1978) defined a face as:
"... the public self-image that every member wants to claim
for himself, consisting in two related aspects:
(a) negative face: the basic claim to territories,
personal preserves, rights to non-distraction -
i.e., to freedom of action and freedom from
imposition.
(b) positive face: the positive consistent self-
image or 'personality1 (crucially including the
desire that this self-image be appreciated and
approved of) claimed by interactants" (p. 66).
Thus, a face is something that everyone recognises, respects and
wants to maintain in one another during interaction. We would like to
suggest that there is something recognisably faceless about a contrived
doll,wired up to talk. The facelessness may have been threatening for
the very young, but not for the older children who appeared willing to
•save' the artificial face presented by the doll.
Why the older cMLdren may not have felt threatened is a matter of
speculation, but of this we are reasonably certain. It is likely to
have an important implication for the reception by young children to toys
or puppets endowed with a voice, especially one that instructs on how to
spell, add, etc. (As in Sesame Street).
Our observations of children's questions in naturalistic contexts
laden with surprises and novel events in Chapter indicated that they
used interrogatives to initiate interactions which formed the basis for
the exchange and negotiation of views, knowledge and opinions. In
Chapter A, the children had to contend and grapple with one another's
needs in order to achieve the reward attending the joint project,in which
they were engaged as pairs. ' Here, the children's performances,
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especially those of the older ones, evinced rationality and considerable
sensitivity. By rationality is meant the capacity to work from means
to ends, that is, to have a goal which in the case being presently con¬
sidered, is mutually shared, keep it in "sight" whilst making plans
(again in this case, plans that must include the co-participant) for
attaining the goal. Sensitivity refers to the responsiveness to the
overt as well as covert needs and intentions of one another. It
involves, in both cases, interpretation and inference. The young children
did not appear very capable, their successful performance resting on the
older children's support. We specified the nature of the support
required. In Chapter 5, the sensitivity of the older children and their
ability to use covert or implicit information during interaction was
confirmed, indicating an ability to interpret and infer meanings from
reduced listener-collaboration.
The young children were not so capable, at least in this situation.
From the above, we think that it may be safely concluded that some
support has been gathered for the set of assumptions with which this
thesis began. These assumptions are:
1. That it is sensible and necessary to conceive man as an
active and rational agent in search of the meaning and understanding of
those events he observes in his world.
2. That this search takes place, and is satisfied, within an
intersubjective structure, characterised by co-operativeness.
Now, the management of this intersubjective structure is subject to
certain constraints, like being able to share the aims and purposes of
other persons; being able to direct and focus the cognitive resources
of attention, inference and interpretation on those behaviours of others
that are relevant to the realisation of their aims; and being able to
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deploy those resources in ways which are respectful of the strengths
and limitations of other persons. We suggested that one of the necessary
conditions for operating within this set of constraints is describable in
terms of the concept of control. We also used this concept to explain
the differences we observed in the communication behaviour of very young
children in naturalistic settings (such as story telling) and contrived
experimental contexts (such as the game of biscuits-in-the-box). A
brief but integrated account of the role of this concept in the realisa¬
tion of purposive behaviour, may at this point be useful.
To be able to exercise control over a variety of linguistic and
communicative skills, and deploy them appropriately to serve different
usesj is one of the major achievements for the child who has learned to
use language successfully. (Doughty, Pearce and Thornton, 1972;
Donaldson, 1978). One of the uses to which linguistic and communication
skills can be put must be the expression of motives. The expression of
the motive to know or understand the aims of another person,has been one
of the concerns of our inquiry. We have also been concerned with the
consequences of the use of a particular epistemic device (questions), for
both the person who wants to know and the perscn who collaborates with
him in this venture. Our argument is that children who have a fair
degree of control over the linguistic and communicative resources by
means of which motives can be expressed and satisfied^must also have an
awareness or an insight into the purposes of communication. This is
because intentional control and the awareness it entails, permits a
shift away from the immediate, spontaneous and unreflective disposition
to actions. This in turn, allows:
(a) A consideration of alternative modes and means of
expressing their motives and intentions. Each alter¬
native can be singled out for consideration, since
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voluntary control brings with it, the ability to
inhibit one or more possible modes, in order to
release others for use.
and (b) A readiness to be guided in their actions and
thoughts by the motives of other persons, and so to
regulate their dependency in joint activity.
Our findings indicate that 3-year-old children are limited in doing
two things. They have difficulty in restraining their natural disposi¬
tion to act spontaneously with a wide variety of paralinguistic
expression of intent. They also fail to voluntarily ask themselves
what the demands of the situation they are in, are. The second limita¬
tion is heightened in contexts where the intentions of the child are in
competition with those of another person, that is, in situations where
the realisation of his interest,depends at least in part,on the realisa¬
tion of the intentions of the other person. These two limitations are
related in the sense that asking a question of another, requires that the
child pauses and attends to the situation which he shares with the other.
This fundamental difference we observed between the 3- and the 5-
year old child affects the expression in language and action,of the
child's motive-structure. With respect to the younger child, the
successful realisation of his motive-to-understand,relies rather heavily
on a maximum facilitatory co-operation from those with whom he engages
in communication. As we have shown in this thesis, older children and
adults endeavour to provide this requirement for younger children. Some
of the strategies employed to do this, include, holding the child to
restrain him, turning him to face the speaker, arresting his attention
before giving him information, smiling, moving close to and touching
him. Some other strategies include, linguistic variations in the
questions posed to the children - e.g. simple, easy to answer prompt
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questions are used# The literature reports a variety of speech adjust¬
ments of older children and adults to very young children. In the main,
simple, repetitive, well-formed directives, questions and statements are
directed to young children (Sachs and Devin, 1976; Shatz and Gelman,
1973; Gelman and Shatz, 1977; Snow, 1977)#
What does this adaptation of other's behaviour do for the growing
child of three years? We think it provides an intersubjective framework
wherein mutual confidence and co-operation already active in the child,
develop. Through these, the child begins to consolidate, on the
linguistic plane, the communication skills engendered during infancy.
He can now start to use language to regulate his attention and intentions.
Put differently, the child's language as well as his actions, begin to
reflect greater ejqpressive control (or regulatory powers) over his
motivational system.
Although a three-year-old^ typically cannot of his own volition^,
control his desires for a prized toy by waiting for his turn to play
with it, appropriate and well-structured adult intervention can succeed
in getting him to appreciate the value of waiting his turn to play a
game or get the toy0 This is important because it indicates a readiness
to be guided into recognising the existence of another mind vying with
him for the same objective (the toy)0 The child may find this lesson
useful in similar situations in the future.
In general, our findings confirm the views expressed in Halliday's
(1975) functional approach to language development. He firmly puts
language within an inter-personal context, one that allows for the
exchange of meanings. As meanings are never devoid of social values,
his emphasis on language lies not as an object of study on its own, but
as a means for understanding pre-existing and developing social
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structures and processes. His basic question then,is concerned with
what a person of status A, in context B, with Person C, can choose to
do or mean. In a sense therefore, it is a theory of how motives are
expressed in language. This approach is useful in three important
ways. Firstly, it does away with the practical limitations for
research inherent in the Chomskian notion of language as a formal system
in which idealised speakers, structure the linguistic relations between
classes of linguistic events in logical terms. This makes possible the
study of real and actual language-use, in the context in which it
normally occurs.
Secondly, because it does not start from linguistic structure, but
from linguistic function, it makes it possible to ask what functions
language serves,even for infants, who as yet may not speak, but perfectly
express certain communicative motives. Thirdly, it allows for a
pragmatic definition of 'language' that may illumine the very nature of
language as an adaptive mental power. If we know what functions
language serves for adults, we may then ask,by what means infants express
some or all of such adult-like purposes and motives.
Halliday posits that language essentially handles two aspects of
"social reality" for the user. These are, the inter-personal and the
Ideational. He argues that baby language can be observed to codify the
inter-personal relations existing between the child and other persons.
This aspect of social reality (the inter-personal) is developmentally
prior to, and therefore first handled in language before the Ideational.
Halliday (1975) identified 7 kinds of inter-personal functions served
by language for the child. These are, the:
1. Instrumental ('I want'): satisfying material needs.
2. Regulatory ('Do as I tell you'): controlling the behaviour
of others.
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3. Interactional ('Me and you'): getting along with other
people.
1. Personal ('Here I come'): identifying and expressing the self.
5. Heuristic ('Tell me why'): exploring the world around and
and inside one.
6. Imaginative (let's pretend'): creating a world of one's own.
7. Informative ('I've got something to tell you'): communicating
new information.
Before the child makes the transition from child language to adult
language, he abstracts two important semantic features from the above
seven interpersonal functions. These are the pragmatic mode (language
as action) and the mathetic mode (language as reflection). It is an
interesting part of Halliday's thesis^that he regards the mathetic mode
as growing out of the HEURISTIC context in which the child uses the baby
language medium^to learn about his world. The mathetic mode later comes
n
to create the conditions for the development of ideational meanings,
those expressing the speaker's experience of the phenomena around and
inside him (processes, quality and quantity, time, etc.); and the
pragmatic function, that of language as doing, that creates the conditions
for the development of interpersonal meanings, those expressing the
speaker's role in and angle on the communication process (mood, modality,
intensity, etc." (Halliday, 1975, p. 88).
Halliday considers that the rules of grammar, though essential for
the ideational function, are not necessary for the expression of the
interpersonal function. This is in agreement with the views of
Trevarthen (l979)j that even before the onset of language, the child
directs the attention and action of others and also responds to the
linguistic communication of others. Hence we have a situation in which
the child,who as yet does not possess speech,communicates his motives and
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responds to simple instructions from others. How does he move from the
non-verbal, system of representation to acquiring the linguistic system?
Why does he make this transition and what advantages accrue from it?
We would suggest that the impetus to move from the non-verbal to
the verbal system may arise partly because of some of the limitations
of the former to express certain needs of the child in co-operation with
others. An important cognitive need of the child that cannot effectively
be expressed non-verbally is, asking others about specific causal relations.
It is quite conceivable that the child can 'represent' to himself his
observations about the world directly (Olson, 1970). It is also
possible for him to determine, independently of language, the meanings
of such observations, for or with others. Indeed it is quite likely that
in learning his language, the child first determines the 'sense' or the
meaning of what is said to him, and then matches this 'sense' with the
language used to convey it,by an older person who is an accomplished
speaker (MacNamara, 1972; Bloom, 1975). But the non-verbal system
does fail in conveying to another person, 'things' which have no
correlates which are portray-able in action, and orientation (McNeill,
1970), or which cannot be perceived in the so-called sensorimotor way,
that is,with direct relation to immediately perceivable objects (Blank,
1974).
Brown and Bellugi (1964) have observed that children from the age
of a year and a half, actively construct and invent novel two-word
sentences. They claimed from their observations that the children may
have abstracted some general principles of language use. For example,
plurals end in '-s', past tenses end in '-ed', etc. In applying these
principles, the children sometimes made errors like saying "I digged".
Since it is highly unlikely that the children would have been exposed
to such ungrammatical usage, an explanation based on simple imitation
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is ruled out. If the children are imitating, they are also innovating.
Blank and Allen (1976) also observed that although adults hardly ever
direct "Why" questions to children under 2 years, the children produce
"why" questions before they comprehend them. This observation is
significant for two reasons. First, it represents a reversal of the
comprehension-production sequence^, typical of the development of most
linguistic terms in general (Bloom, 1973; Lewis, 1951) and other question
words like, "What", "Where" and "Who" in particular (Ervin-Tripp and
Miller, 1977). Secondly, unlike "What", "Who" and "Where" questions,
"Why" does not have an immediately perceivable context and cannot readily
be answered^using a non-verbal mode like pointing. Could it be that the
need to know and master his enviroment or the need to wonder about it,
is mirrored by the early appearance of "why" questions? And could it
also be this need that underlies the child's abstraction of general
principles of grammar that he so often misapplies?
The advantage of such behaviour to the child is that the errors that
he makes, for example errors of overinclusion of reference, which is,to
use the same word in situations that do not carry similar perceptually-
salient elements (Bloom, 1973) strongly attract corrections from adults.
The child may from such corrections gain access to a more adult-like
usage, or at least come to realise that there is another usage beyond
his own. It may even be possible that such corrections may induce in
the child a revision of the perceptual organisation that formed the basis
of his earlier usage. This revision may lead to his discovering that,
what for him was most perceptually salient in the phenomenon that he
wanted to code, is at variance with normal conventions governing the
linguistic coding of such phenomena (Clark, 1973). The child's initial
hypothesis concerning the relationship between linguistic and phenomenal
events thus becomes a vantage point,from which he is helped by others in
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his attempt to master his environment.
The act of questioning or forming a testable hypothesis is then
a means of inviting responsive agents (one-self or others) to join in
the search for meaning. This point is made more pertinent by the
observation that blind or partially-sighted children ask more questions
than sighted ones (McCarthy, 1954.) • This is likely to augment the
perception of events they obtain through touch, hearing, taste and smell.
It is also likely to compensate for their loss of vision.
Once a child can formulate in linguistic terms his search for
meaning and understanding, it becomes a means not only for regulating and
controlling his own actions, but those of others as well. Furthermore,
he can use his language to invite others to help in his quest to find out
about the meaning of language itselfl We found and described some
instances of questions about the meaning of words in Chapter 3.
Nathan Isaacs (1930) demonstrated that children's questions are a
means of bringing memory and imagination to bear on a problem and so
coming to deal with temporal and causal relations that lie outside the
grasp of immediate perception. But the child may not always search
properly for meanings, demands, expectations or consequences. There
are effective and ineffective ways of conducting a search. Ervin-Tripp
and Miller (1977) have shown that adults use the strategy of questioning
to initiate and sustain conversation with children. And as pointed out
by Isaacs (1933) and Lewis (1963), adults' questions to children may
serve two main functions:
1. They may be designed to elicit genuine information from the
child, e.g. "Where is your red ball?".
2. They may have a regulatory and directive function. That is,
they may direct the child's attention to his surroundings and the events
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therein. They may stimulate and induce his curiosity to want to find out
for himself. Some of these adults' questions may suggest alternative
solutions to problems - alternatives that the child may not have thought
of before. Or they may lead him to search his memory for answers which
may already be somewhere in there. In short, through the adults' questions,
the child's awareness and imagination may be awakened. He may, as a
consequence of this,become more efficient and effective in his search for
the meaning of both linguistic and non-linguistic events.
The asking of a question is inextricably linked to the perception by
another, of the intention underlying it. We have shown that when the
A- and 5-year-old child's intention is not realised or only partly so,by
the answer given to his question, he may repeat himself, or modify the
answer or even query it. The adults' questions may be subject to
similar scrutiny by the child. For example, if the child should have
grounds for supposing that the adult is asking an obvious question, a
'trick', or a difficult question, he may just provide a perfunctory answer
or a "No/l don't know" answer.
Inhelder, Sinclair and Bovet (1974-) have observed,when testing
children on class-inclusion tasks, that those subjects whose "attitude
toward the questions" led them to "repeat the questions correctly" and
think for a while before giving their answers, did perform slightly better
than those who "had a marked tendency to modify the questions and make
them more 'natural'". As the authors pointed out, those children who
had a questioning attitude to the questions of the experimenters, benefited.
That is, those children performed better, who strove to understand what the
experimenters actually meant,than the children who assumed an obvious and
transparent meaning to the experimenters' questions. Although we are
not told that any of the children did ask overt questions of the
experimenters' intentions, it may be taken that the successful children
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asked themselves^such questions. This may be deduced from the children's
hesitations and the period during which they "thought for a while before
giving their answers".
What is the relation between asking questions of oneself and asking
others? We have suggested that it must be in the recognition of the
existence of other minds who can function as conscious agents of purposes
and motives, distinct from oneself. That is, the relation between self-
addressed and other-addressed question-acts, must be rooted in the
perception of a dependent or mutually sustaining relationship between the
questioner and the answerer.
One of the causes of children's failure to communicate effectively
on tasks based on the Glucksberg, Krauss and Ueisberg (1966) paradigm^is
their limited perception of the dependent relationship required between
the speaker and the listener. We think this limitation is,in part,
inherent in the task because as we have shown in the story-telling context
(Chapter 3)j those children who took an active interest in the stories,
that is, those children who asked questions, also attended to the
questions of other children. They contributed to discussions generated
by other children, thereby demonstrating their knowledge of the dependent
acts of questions and answers. This is in agreement with the findings
of Garvey (1977).
We tried to stimulate the active participation of children in a
structured two-person game (Chapter by:
(a) building the inter-dependence of the speaker-listener dyad
into the task. This is why the task was such that neither the hider
nor the finder could independently of one another arrive at the mutually
desired goal which was the retrieval of two hidden biscuits, that they
could eat.
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and (b) Leaving the communication channel open such that the children
could ask questions of each othei^ about their respective roles and
responsibilities in the game.
We hoped that these measures would make obvious to the children,
the dependent relationship of the speaker-listener dyad. We also hoped
that they would exploit this relationship for purposes of achieving mutual
understanding of the intentions and actions of each other.
As our results have shown, this approach paid good dividends,
at least,for the older children who spontaneously exploited the in-built
co-operative measures between the speakers and the listeners. This was
not so for the younger ones, who had to be directed by the experimenter
to the advantages of soliciting their listener's participation.
Do children normally ask overt verbal questions of adult
experimenters' intentions when they are doing psychological tests, or
engaged on a quasi-school-room situation? We do not know of any
systematic study done to answer this question. We suspect however, that
it must be a rare phenomenon, for in a formal situation as opposed to a
play situation, young children may not be able to explore the actual
meaning of our requests and questions, when they are in doubt. They may
lack the confidence to ask for clarification of our intentions, when those
intentions elude them. They may consequently act perfunctorily and with
little regard for the advantages of utilising the interdependence between
the tester and the testee. It would be illuminating to explore this
issue further in future research,because it seems to be at the heart of
a common problem in testing the communication abilities of young
children. It is about the problem of effecting an understanding of what
we require them to do. We cannot always expect them to rely on verbal
instructions alone (McGarrigle and Donaldson, 1975)o But can we
persuade them to ask, if they are in doubt about our intentions ?
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Only in one case did we find a child asking the experimenter about
how close his actions were, to what he was supposed to do. This case
was reported in Chapter U* It concerns a four-year-old hider who,
having instructed his partner on how to find the hidden biscuits, asked
the experimenter:
"Kayode, have I told him right?"
Why is it so rare for a child of U to ask the experimenter about the
test itself? What stands in his way? Our research leaves this question
unanswered - a lead for further studies.
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